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FAIR TRADE DEVELOPMENTS: 1951 - 1961
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Fair Trade, the persistent child of protective 
legislation and the subject of only faint judi­
cial remonstrances for two decades, has, in a 
few short years, discovered itself in troubled 
adulthood. Its once tranquil existence has 
been transformed into one of stormy attack.^
Fair trade is a system of price control by which 
the owner of an article identified by brand name or trade­
mark sets a minimum price below which the article may not
2subsequently be resold. As it is normally the manufacturer 
who owns the brand name or trademark, this form of price 
control is mostly exercised by him. It is a device to con­
trol the price behavior of the wholesalers and retailers. 
Occasionally it is the wholesaler who owns the brand name
^Richard K. Bates, "Constitutionality of State Fair 
Trade Acts," Indiana Law Journal. 32 (1957), p. 127.
2U. S_. Congress, House, Select Committee on Small 
Business, Fair Trade; The Problems and Issues. Report No. 
1292, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952, p. 3.
and who employs fair trade provisions to control the prices 
of its customers - retailers.
Fair trade is one form of resale price fixing or 
resale price maintenance. It is the general reference given 
to the form of resale price maintenance which is effectuated 
through contracts. The extent and applicability of such con­
tracts is delineated and sanctioned by state and federal 
legislation.^ This legislation is permissive in character 
and provides for a voluntary price maintenance program.
In practice, fair trade is a method of price con­
trol between the different levels of the production column.
It does not result supposedly from any agreement among per­
sons who are in competition with one another, but originates 
in the manufacturer or wholesaler. This price maintenance 
system is often characterized as a "vertical" as distinct
4from a "horizontal" restriction of price competition. Under
5the fair trade laws of forty-five states the manufacturers 
or wholesalers are permitted to enter into contracts to pre-
^C. C. H. Trade Regulation Reporter, Commerce 
Clearing House, inc.. Vol. I, Tenth Ed., 1959, p. 4101.
^S^ren Gammelgaard, Resale Price Maintenance 
(Paris: The European Productivity Agency of the Organisa­
tion for European Economic Co-operation, 1958), p. 11.
^Approximately half of those laws are ineffective, 
while one has been repealed.
scribe a minimum price or fix a stipulated price at which
the buyer must sell the commodity to another person at a
different level of the distribution system.
Vertical price fixing contracts are agreements 
between producers and wholesalers, between 
producers cind retailers, or between wholesalers 
and retailers. Horizontal price fixing agree­
ments are contracts between producers them­
selves, between retailers themselves, or be­
tween wholesalers themselves
This distinction forms the tenuous basis on which the fair 
trade structure rests as an exemption of the federal and 
state antitrust statutes. The vertical price fixing charac­
teristics of fair trade legislation supposedly prevent 
rather than cause monopolization of trade by eliminating 
certain predatory trade practices at the retail level. All 
federal and state fair trade statutes contain explicitly 
prohibitions against horizontal price agreements between 
manufacturers, wholesalers or retailers.
In addition to the provisions to establish resale 
prices by contract, the manufacturer may establish prices by 
notification and announcement. This is accomplished in an 
indirect fashion. All state laws provide that if a manufac­
turer negotiates a contract with one retailer in the state
^Seaqram-Distillers Corp. v. Old Dearborn Distri­
buting CO., 363 111. 6 1 0 , 2 N. E. 2d 9 4 0 , 942  ( 1 9 3 6 ) .
and announces the terms of this contract including the stip­
ulated or minimum prices to other retailers, he may enforce 
these prices on them regardless whether they have refused 
to agree to his contract. This so-called nonsigner pro­
vision is the heart of the whole statutory fair trade scheme. 
Without it fair trade contracts would be practically worth­
less, since distributors and retailers who want to cut prices 
would never sign a price maintenance contract,^ and resale 
price maintenance would not be possible.
It is the coercive character of the nonsigner pro­
vision which gives fair trade its measure of practicability. 
At the same time, however, this characteristic is the most 
difficult aspect of fair trade to justify in the existing 
body of legal authority and in the economic philosophy of 
the capitalistic competitive free enterprise system.
State fair trade laws apply directly only to intra­
state trade. The U. S, Congress, however, has specially 
lifted the bar of the interstate commerce provision of the 
federal constitution with respect to state fair trade regu­
lations. The Miller-Tydings Act, which was enacted in 1937,
^Carl H. Fulda, "Resale Price Maintenance in the 
United States," The Business Lav Journal. 3 (1956), p. 66.
exempts from the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Federal Trade 
Commission Act contracts to maintain prices in interstate 
trade in states vrtiich have laws authorizing such contracts. 
The McGuire Act, which was enacted in 1952, exempted from 
those two federal statutes the nonsigner provision of state 
fair trade laws, and enabled enforcement of established 
prices by contract on nonsigners in interstate commerce in 
those states which have nonsigner provisions.
Character of the Fair Trade Issue 
Few subjects of direct concern to the different 
sectors of the business community and the general public have 
shown such a high and unchangeable degree of persistent con­
troversy as the principle of fair trade pricing. The objec­
tive of the fair trade provisions cannot be stated unequivo­
cally. "Many hold the principle of resale price maintenance 
to be un-American, a denial of due process, and a price fix­
ing device to guarantee retailers a profit by the elimination 
of price competition. Conversely, a large body of opinion 
holds that fair trade confers on certain manufacturers a 
basic form of property protection and in so doing shields 
thousands ujpon thousands of small retailers and wholesalers 
from predatory price cutting, thus contributing significantly
6
to the preservation of our free enterprise economy.
The usually avowed purpose of state fair trade 
acts is to provide a means whereby the manufacturer may pro­
tect his property right in the good will of his trademark 
or brand name from the damaging effects of loss leader sell­
ing. There is, however, ample evidence (and many courts and 
commentators have expressed themselves accordingly) that the 
raison d'etre of the fair trade acts is really the protec­
tion of small independent retailers from price competition.^ 
Economic conflicts are intermingled with legal ar­
gumentations for and a g a i n s t , w h i l e  the economic effects
®U. S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Small 
Business, Fair Trade, Report on a Study on Fair Trade. Based 
on a Survey of Manufacturers and Retailers, Report No. 2819, 
84th Cong., 2d Sess., 1956, p. 1.
QSee e. g. General Electric Co. v. Whale. 207 Ore. 
302, 296 P. 2d 635, 645 (1956), as one of the many examples.
■^he Practising Law Institute sponsored a special 
"Fair Trade" Lawyers' Field Day in New York in 1954. The 
different statements made there are illustrative of the per­
plexity of the issue. Winston Picket, the legal representa­
tive of General Electric Company, called fair trade "a 
philosophy - to be entered into as serious as a marriage 
vow." Saul Stone, the attorney for the nationally known 
opponent of fair trade - Mr. Schwegmann -, asserted less 
lyrically that "fair trade protects the inefficient retail­
er" and will therefore "die under its own weight." Lewis 
Bernstein, the legal advisor for the fair trade minded re­
tail jewelers believed that "every manufacturer has the right 
to set its own prices at the level he chooses," but Abraham 
Lowenthal, legal representative for the discounter Sam Goody,
and consequences of fair trade are far from being determined 
definitely. A comprehensive tabulation of the alleged merits 
and disadvantages of fair trade amplifies the controversial 
character of the issue.
The proponents of fair trade argue that (1) fair 
trade protects the public from the evils of unrestrained 
price cutting, (2) fair trade protects the producer of bran­
ded merchandise, (3) price cutting threatens the existence 
of the independent wholesaler and retailer, (4) fair trade 
protects the consumer from the deception of unrestrained 
price cutting, (5) fair trade is consistent with competitive 
principles, (6) fair trade imposes a strong curb on monopoly, 
(7) fair trade prices are fair prices, (8) fair trade does 
not lead to excessive mark-ups, (9) fair trade promotes effi­
cient retailing operations and reduces -the cost of distribu­
tion, and (10) the nonsigner provisions are necessary to make 
fair trade effective and applicable to all retailers. Those
did not agree with the contention that fair trade is an issue 
of legal determination of rights. "Legal devices won't de­
cide the issue. It must be settled on basic facts." Chris­
tianity and atheism clashed on the fair trade issue when 
George Chapman of the Sunbeam Corporation confessed that 
"fair trade embodies the Ten Commandments and the Sermon on 
the Mount," while William Simon of the American Bar Associ­
ation claimed that "there's nothing fair about fair trade - 
it's like a Russian peace proposal." (Quotations cited in_ 
"Fair or Unfair Trade: It all Depends Where You Sit," Busi­
ness Week. May 15, 1954, pp. 122-4.)
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provisions are fair and democratic.
The opponents of fair trade have their arguments. 
In many respects they are more directly related to facts and 
"sound" economic reasoning. The critics of fair trade con­
tend that (1) the suppression of predatory price cutting is 
not the real objective of fair trade, but the elimination of 
price competition on the retail level, (2) few manufacturers 
or retailers are seriously injured by predatory price cut­
ting; the use as leader rather helps the good will of trade- 
marked products, (3) fair trade is essentially monopolistic 
in character, (4) fair trade laws are not a remedy for dis­
criminatory pricing, (5) fair trade means higher prices for 
the consumers, (5) fair trade leads to an undesirable price 
uniformity and rigidity, (7) the real purpose of fair trade 
is to obtain higher retail margins, (8) fair trade tends to 
discourage efficiency in retailing and to increase cost of 
distribution, and (9) the nonsigner provisions are coercive.
^^House Report No. 1292, o£. cit., pp. 7-11.
^^Mr. Maurice Mermey, Director of the Bureau on 
Education on Fair Trade, stated in 1956 that he knew of 
very few professional economists in the United States who 
have emerged as champions of fair trade. (Proceedings of 
the Silver Jubilee Conference on Fair Trade. New York,
1956 , sponsored by the Bureau of Education on Fair Trade, 
p. 21.)
oppressive, unfair and undemocratic.^^
This manifold and intricate network of arguments 
for and against fair trade has caused a voluminous amount of 
theorizing, argumentation and statistical surveys to prove 
or to disprove any of the defenses or adverse allegations.
The opposing forces thus far never came to a decisive battle 
deciding the issue definitely in favor of any one group. The 
fair trade issue seems to follow a cyclical movement. The 
depression of the 1930's saw the birth of the present day 
fair trade structure. The depression, followed on the heels 
by a period of wartime scarcities and shortages, kept the 
picture of fair trade out of focus. "The retailers' organ­
ized pressure combined with the depression and war was enough 
to keep the balance among the relevant group interests far 
in favor of fair trade. The balance between the pros and
cons of fair trade began to develop in favor of the fair 
trade opponents shortly before the beginning of the 1950's, 
when the market for consumer goods had more or less shifted 
from a "sellers" to a "buyers" market situation in a pros­
perous and high employment economic atmosphere. The result­
ant of the opposing forces in the fair trade issue moved
^^House Report No. 1292, 0£. cit., pp. 11-15.
^^Bates, 0£. cit., 129.
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rapidly in favor of the fair trade adversaries.
Statement of Obj ectlves and Limitations
The major purpose of this study is to trace the 
legal fair trade developments and their economic causes and 
effects during the last decade. The developments in other 
forms and devices of resale price maintenance are beyond 
the scope of this study although they are occasionally men­
tioned .
For practical purposes it is impossible to dis­
tinguish legal developments from changes in economic factors 
affecting the fair trade structure. They are mutually de­
pendent. The approach of this study was strongly influenced 
by this situation. The study follows in chronological order 
the legal developments of the main aspects of fair trade.
The interdependency of economic pressures for and against 
and the legal developments find expression in almost every 
part of this treatise.
This study does not include sales-below-costs or 
unfair trade legislation. These laws are often confused with 
fair trade or resale price maintenance. The purposes and 
results of unfair trade practices acts, the field in which 
they are normally applied, and the problems inherent in their
11
enforcement are quite different from those intrinsic to 
fair trade practices.
This study is not intended to be a legal treatise 
even though there are many references to judicial interpre­
tation of legal provisions. The writer is not tutored in 
legal theory and speculations concerning the law in its 
technical aspects would have been far beyond his means.
Only the economic consequences of developments in legal fair 
trade interpretations pertain to the subject of this study.
Sources
The primary legal sources for this study were the 
individual court cases as reported in the National Reporter 
System of the West Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minnesota.
A selective choice was made from a complete list of fair 
trade articles which appeared during the last ten years in 
legal periodicals published in the united States. Other 
sources were obtained through the bibliographical sections 
in the American Economic Review and the Journal of Marketing. 
References to governmental publications were obtained through 
the Bulletin of the Public Affairs Information Service. Gen­
eral information pertaining to the fair trade developments 
was selected from a bibliography compiled through the Busi­
12
ness Periodicals Index and the Reader's Guide to Periodical 
Literature. A copy of select references, 1957 - 1961 on re­
sale price maintenance from the Library of Congress Legis­
lative Reference Service constituted another source through 
which several references were obtained.
Order of Chapters 
To put the fair trade issue in the right perspec­
tive the extent of fair trade pricing and the composition of 
the practitioners of fair trade expressed in statistical data 
has been attempted in Chapter II. This chapter also contains 
a statistical approach to describe the extent of the effects 
of legal fair trade developments during the last decade. In 
Chapter III a very concise historical review of the origin 
and development of resale price maintenance is presented.
The legal and economic history and the legal justification 
of the present fair trade structure form the final part of 
this chapter. The significant adverse fair trade develop­
ments were initiated by two U. S. Supreme Court decisions.
The Schwegmann and Wentling decisions and the resulting fed­
eral McGuire Amendment constitute the subject material in 
Chapter IV. The trend of state courts invalidating their 
fair trade statutes was started in 1949 by the Florida Su-
13
preme court. Chapter V traces chronologically the subse­
quent influence of this action on the reasoning of the courts 
in other states in respect to fair trade legislation. Chap­
ter VI covers the legal decisions and their economic effects 
pertaining to fair trade enforcement procedures including 
the problems (and consequent decisions) created ^ / the mail 
order vendors selling from non-fair trade jurisdictions.
The methods of fair trade proponents to counteract the weak­
ening of the fair trade structure are surveyed in Chapter VII. 
Chapter VIII analyses the major economic factors that contri­
buted to the decline of fair trade pricing and traces the 
effects of legal developments on the extent of this practice. 
The final chapter summarizes the study and attempts to make 
an evaluation of fair trade in the light of the present eco­
nomic conditions in relation to the different economic inter­
est groups involved.
CHAPTER II
EXTENT AND COMPOSITION OF FAIR TRADE
Characteristically, discussions of fair trade give 
off more heat than light, because the subject of 
resale price maintenance inherently is not amen­
able to conclusive theoretical discussions 
While opinions are plentiful, of facts there is 
paucity.^
The extent of fair trade pricing should be des­
cribed in order to evaluate the significance of the issue 
in the context of the whole economic framework. No satis­
factory comprehensive statistics for any one period, however, 
do exist or are being compiled concerning the extent of fair 
trade pricing.
Although extensive factual information with regard 
to the extent and consequences of fair trade pricing would 
mean a substantial elimination of the controversial charac­
ter of the issues and interests involved, the goal of this
^U. S. Congress, Senate, Select committee on Small 
Business, Fair Trade. Report on a. Study on Fair Trade. Based 
on a Survey of Manufacturers and Retailers, Report No. 2819, 
84th Cong., 2d Sess., 1956, p. 3.
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treatise is much less ambitious. The statistics on fair 
trade pricing as presented below must be considered as intel­
lectual guesses afflicted by a substantial margin of error. 
The required data to measure reliably the extent of fair 
trade pricing do not exist. The presented statistics are 
only employed to designate roughly the magnitude of the fair 
trade pricing phenomenon in order to qualify and possibly to 
quantify the significance of developments in fair trade pric­
ing during the last ten years.
It can be generally stated that the practice of 
resale price maintenance varies considerably in the different 
trades and industries, while "... its adoption has increased 
with the growth of industrialization and, particularly, of 
branding of goods. The practice seems to have spread gradu­
ally up to the outbreak of the second world war, its growth 
being perhaps most rapid between the wars, when the method 
of branding goods in several trades came into more general 
use."^
The fact that nearly the entire U. S. A. was 
covered by effective fair trade laws during the first few
^S^ren Gammelgaard, Resale Price Maintenance 
(Paris: The European Productivity Agency of the Organisa­
tion for European Economic Co-operation, 1958), p. 18.
16
years of the 1 9 5 0 does not mean that the major part of 
all trade laws themselves contain important limitations on
4the practical application of fair trade pricing provisions. 
First, the fair trade legislation is of a permissive charac­
ter in the sense that it does not forcedly require a manu­
facturer or wholesaler to establish minimum resale prices 
and to enforce them. Furthermore, the privilege of employ­
ing the fair trade provisions to engage in resale price 
maintenance is limited for the most part to goods identified 
by trade-marks or brand names.^ A third restriction, how­
ever of minor practical importance, is the legal requirement 
that commodities subject to resale price maintenance must be 
in free and open competition with similar goods.^ In most
^Infra, Chart 1, p, 169.
^McGuire Amendment, 66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15. U.S.C. 
45(a) (1958).
^A minor exception to this rule is to be found in 
the court's rejection of the contention that the sale of 
prescription drugs after removal of the trade name is exempt 
for the fair trade statute. [ Hoffman-La Roche. Inc. v. 
Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets. 122 F. Supp. 781.
(La. 1954)3.
^The legislative history of the Miller-Tydings 
amendment and the McGuire amendment shows clearly that the 
purpose was to validate only resale price agreements with 
respect to branded commodities which are in effective com­
petition with similar commodities produced by others so that 
if the resale price of the branded article was set too high
17
trades and industries the economic circumstances create the 
most powerful factors that limit the implementation of effec­
tive and/or profitable resale price maintenance programs.^ 
"Those limitations in both law and economics mean that only 
a small fraction of all goods produced for sale is or ever 
will be subject to maintained prices."®
Fair-traded Volume of Retail Sales 
The most meaningful measure of the extent of fair 
trade pricing is the volume of goods sold under effective 
fair trade contracts as a percentage of total retail sales. 
Only very widely diverse estimates are available. In a re­
port to the Temporary National Economic Committee in 1941 
it was estimated that not more than 15 per cent of retail
the manufacturer would lose his trade by competition of the 
other articles. This restriction caused only in one case an 
invalidation of a fair trade program. The decisive case here 
is Eastman Kodak Co. v. Federal Trade Commission. [ 158 F.2d 
592 (2 C. A. 1946)]. In this case it was contended that 
color film is in free and open competition with black and
white film, both competing for the "consumer dollar". The
court disagreed and considered those products not in the 
same general class. That the consumer "... can buy a black 
and white film will not serve to destroy the monopoly of the 
sole producer of color film...." (Ibid.)
^Infra. Chapter VII, pp. 212-3.
®U. S., Congress, House, Select Committee on Small 
Business, Fair Trade: The Problems and Issues. Report No.
1292, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952, p. 20.
18
9sales came within the scope of the various fair trade laws. 
Grether supplies a more specific estimate for the pre-second 
world war period. He estimates the fair trade fraction of 
the total volume of retail sales to be probably no more than 
5 per cent and certainly less than 10 per cent.^^ Other es­
timates place the percentage all the way from 4 to 20 per 
cent.^^ The estimate is that in 1952 less than 10 per cent
of the total turnover of consumer goods was subject to re-
12sale price maintenance under fair trade programs.
Herman provides the most sophisticated and more 
recent e s t i m a t e s . I n  his article he employs unused mater­
ial of a survey of manufacturers and retailers conducted by
14the Senate's Select Committee on a Study of Fair Trade.
^Temporary National Economic Committee, Problems 
of Small Business. Monograph No. 17 (Washington; U. S. 
Government Printing Office, 1941), p. 199.
T. Grether, Price control under Fair Trade 
Legislation (New York : Oxford University Press, 1939),
p. 322.
^^House Report No. 1292, loc. cit.
12U. S. Congress, House, Antitrust Subcommittee of 
the Committee on the Judiciary, Hearings on H. R. 4365, etc.; 
Resale Price Maintenance. 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952, p. 746.
^^Edward S. Herman, "A Statistical Note on Fair 
Trade," Antitrust Bulletin. 4 (1959), 583-92.
l^senate Report No. 2819, 0£. cit.
19
The total retail value of fair traded goods in 1954 is esti­
mated at $11.7 billion, or 5.9 per cent of the total 1954 
retail s a l e s . " T h i s  suggests that the volume of goods 
sold under fair trade contracts may have reached 10 per cent 
of retail sales in the pre-Schwegmann decision era. There 
is little doubt that the value of the fair traded goods sold 
today [1959] is substantially below 1954."^^
Although those estimates function as an illustra­
tion of the quantitative significance of resale price main­
tenance through the provisions of fair trade legislation.
^^Herman assumed the population of fair trading 
firms in 1954 to be equal to the rough estimate for 1956 
(Infra. Chapter II, p. 23, note 22.) in order to apply this 
estimate to the 1954 Census data. His justification is two­
fold. First, the 1954-1956 period did not contain any major 
developments in fair trade and secondly the available popu­
lation estimate for 1956 was the most reliable in order to 
come to a volume estimate in which an accurate ratio of large 
firms was represented. Next he adjusted the 1954 fair-traded 
sales volume sold by 175 manufacturers included in a sample 
(Infra. Chapter II, p. 23 ; also Table 2, p. 29.) for whole­
sale and retail markups based on information to be found in 
H. Barger, Distribution's Place in the American Economy Since 
1869 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), pp. 81-
83. The resulting retail value of the 1954 fair traded goods 
sold by the 175 manufacturers in the sample amounted to 
$2,300 million. As the 1956 population estimate of 893 firms 
was assumed also to apply to 1954 ^ d  the sample of 175 manu­
facturers was assumed to be representative of the population, 
the total estimated 1954 retail value of fair traded goods of 
$11.7 billion was obtained by multiplying the sample retail 
value of $2,300 million with the ratio of manufacturers 
893/175. (Herman, op. cit., p. 587).
^^Ibid.
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one should be warned not to conclude from those estimates 
that the total volume of retailed goods and services minus 
the fair traded fraction constitute the volume of retail 
sales of which the prices are determined solely by competi­
tive forces at the retail level. Several substitute methods 
of resale price maintenance do exist with different degrees 
of success to the practitioners and with different effects 
on the various levels of the production column and the con­
sumer. Supporters of fair trade use as an argument the 
statement that the volume of goods subject to fair trade 
legislation is relatively small, but that the volume sold 
under all forms of price maintenance is large. In a House
Report in 1952 reference is made to an estimate of the Bureau
1 7Of Education on Fair Trade. It was stated that the fair 
trade laws account for approximately $5.2 billion of annual 
retail sales or about 4 per cent of the total. Over $30 bil­
lion was estimated as the amount of retail sales that takes
L8place annually under other forms of "standard" pricing. In
^^House Report No. 1292, loc. cit.
^®This $30 billion would represent approximately 
23 per cent of annual retail sales. It is interesting to 
compare this percentage for the United States with some es­
timates of a few other industrialized countries. Two reasons 
justify this note on an international comparison of the ex­
tent of resale price maintenance. First, it gives a rough
21
the latter category are included such products which are 
distributed through agencies, goods sold directly, products 
which are distributed through licensing arrangements, e.g., 
newspapers and magazines, and many miscellaneous products 
in respect to which informal price maintenance has long been 
practiced.
indication of the degree of competitive pricing on the re­
tail level in the United States in comparison with other 
capitalistic free enterprise countries. Secondly, this com­
parison can function as a verification of the estimates for 
the United States.
In Sweden, where resale price maintenance is now 
banned, it was found in an extensive study in 1948 that an 
average of 25 to 28 per cent of the public's expenditures on 
consumer goods was subject to resale pricing by private firms. 
If tobacco and spirits, which in Sweden are produced by pub­
licly owned companies and sold under maintained resale pri­
ces are included, the percentages were 31to 34. in the Uni­
ted Kingdom, where since November 1956 collective resale 
price maintenance is unconditionally prohibited, it was es­
timated that in 1938 about 30 per cent of the sales volume of 
consumer goods was price-maintained, and in 1951 the Board of 
Trade thought it likely that this percentage had gone up 
rather than down. In Germany, where the American and British 
Occupation Forces in 1947 legally allowed only certain types 
of resale maintenance, similar to the legal provisions in 
the United States, information from trade associations in 
industry and trade indicated that 12 per cent of the total 
retail turnover in 1954 was made up of articles with main­
tained retail prices, in France, it was estimated in 1952 
that about 10 per cent of the total turnover of consumer 
goods was covered by resale price maintenance. The practice, 
however, has been banned since 1953. In Canada, resale price 
maintenance has been illegal since 1951. Before this the 
practice was reported to be of significant and growing pro­
portions, but no figures indicating the share of price- 
maintained goods in terms of total turnover are available. 
(Gammelgaard, op. cit., pp. 19-21.)
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On this bases, the above estimates should only be 
considered as rough indicators of the role fair trade legis­
lation plays among the several forms of resale price main­
tenance. Even then a further qualification is necessary.
It is doubtful to assume that the volume of retail sales 
priced under fair trade programs would not be affected by 
some other form of resale price maintenance in the absence 
of enabling fair trade legislation, it should be noted, 
therefore, that the extent of fair trade pricing as expressed 
by the percentage of the total volume of retail sales af­
fected, is highly unconclusive in the attempt to quantify 
the significance of the effects of fair trade legislation.
Industrial Composition of Fair Trade Population
Another approach to the problem of statistical 
quantification of the extent of the fair trade practice is 
the enumeration of the population of fair-trading manufac­
turers and the determination of its composition as to the 
industries sind the volume of fair traded products and the 
effectiveness of the different fair trade programs.
On the basis of lists supplied by the American 
Fair Trade Council, the Bureau of Education on Fair Trade, 
and other organizations, the Senate's Subcommittee on Retail­
ing, Distribution, and Fair Trade Practices attempted to
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survey the entire population of fair-trading manufacturers 
19in 1956. Questionnaires were originally sent to approxi­
mately 1,700 manufacturers, which number was reduced due to 
duplications to no more than 1,453 individual manufacturing
firms. From this number 836 manufacturers replied, or
20slightly less than 58 per cent. The received returns
indicated that at least 514 manufacturers or approximately
2161.5 per cent were fair trading during 1956. In order to
arrive at a population value for manufacturers engaged in
fair trade in 1956, Herman applied a crude but plausible
adjustment for non-returns and estimated the population
value for the manufacturers engaged in fair trade in 1956
2 ?to have been approximately 893.
In 1952, Mr. John W. Anderson, President of the 
American Fair Trade Council, informed the Celler Committee
19Senate Report No. 2319, o£. cit.
^^Ibid. , p. 3.
•^^Tbid.. p. 4.
22The same percentage of fair-traders among the 
total of 836 respondents was assumed also to be among the 
617 non-responding manufacturers. The upward bias toward 
the number of fair-trading manufacturers which was encoun­
tered by this assumption, due to the very logical fact that 
non-fair-traders would much easier not respond, was supposed 
to be compensated for by the incompleteness of the employed 
lists of fair trading manufacturers. (Herman, op. cit.. 
p. 584.)
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that 1,595 manufacturers were known by the Council to be
23fair-trading at that time. The 1947 Census of the Manu­
facturers reports a total of 240,881 manufacturers in the 
United States, it is, therefore, not likely that in 1952 
the percentage of fair-trading manufacturers in the United 
States did exceed sixty-six one hundredths of one per cent 
of the total numi^er of manufacturers as reported in the 1947 
Census of Manufacturers.^^
According to those estimates the number of fair- 
trading manufacturers showed a decline during the period from 
1952 to 1956 of approximately 44 per cent. As will be dealt 
with in subsequent chapters, this decline took place before 
the major legal and economic attacks on fair trade booked 
their most significant successes. Especially since mid-1956 
fair trade suffered a "... sharp decline under the dual im­
pact of a major series of adverse court decisions and the
growth of excess capacity and sharpened competition in many
2 ^consumer goods industries." “ Fair trade programs were aban­
doned in a number of significant consumer goods industries
^^House, Hearings on H. R. 4365, etc., op. cit.,
P. 731.
24Ibid.
^^Herman, op. cit.. p. 585.
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while they suffered important attenuation in many other for-
26mer strongholds.
Table 1 gives the percentage of the total number 
of manufacturers of nationally advertised products as listed 
in the 1951 Standard Advertising Register which fair traded 
one or more products in 1951, as well as this percentage for 
each industrial classification. The sequence of the indus­
trial classification was rearranged according to the per­
centage fair trading manufacturers constitute of the total 
number of manufacturers in each classification. Only 1,031 
or S.7 per cent of the 11,842 manufacturers of nationally 
advertised products, listed in the 1951 Standard Advertising 
Register, fair-traded one or more products. Only very in­
accurate conclusions can be drawn from those percentages 
concerning the quantitative significance of fair trade pric­
ing of nationally advertised products. Information on the 
fair-traded sales volume of the individual firms in the dif­
ferent classifications should be available to function as 
weights in order to calculate more conclusive percentages. 
However, Table 1 indicated that important differences do 
exist in the utilization of fair trade programs between in­
dustrial classifications.
2Ginfra. Chapter, VIII, pp. J229-38.
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TABLE 1
NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF THE FAIR TRADING MANUFACTURERS OP 





















Smokers' requisites 110 46 41.82
Proprietary medicines, drugs.
chemicals, etc. 620 174 28.06
Cleansers 213 53 24.88
Office equipment 225 51 22.67
Automobile accessories 354 78 22.03
Tires and tubes 25 5 20.00
Sporting goods 345 65 18.84
Toilet requisites 402 61 15.17
Jewelry, silverware, etc. 248 37 14.92
House furnishings 553 82 14.83
Household appliances 142 18 12.68
Gasoline and lubricants 109 13 11.93
Hardware 337 33 9.79
Publishers, engravers, etc. 493 48 9.72
Paints, varnishes and enamels 175 17 9.71
Flour and cereal 76 6 7.89
Wines and liquors 165 13 7.88
coffee and tea 59 4 6.78
Musical Instruments,
amusement, etc. 104 6 5.77
Games, toys, etc. 88 5 5.68
Knit goods and underwear 230 13 5.65
Airplanes and accessories 72 4 5.56
Food products 861 44 5.11
Radio and television 158 8 5.06























decorations and upholstering 3 30 16 4.85
Fancy goods, notions, etc. 335 16 4.78
Lighting 150 7 4.67
Heating 244 11 4. 51
Automobiles and trucks 59 2 3.39
Seeds, plants and fertilizers 287 9 3.14
Men's clothing and furnishings 295 q 3.05
Beer, ale and soft drinks 251 7 2.79
Machinery and supplies 684 19 2.78
Watercraft, bicycles and
motorcycles 86 2 2.33
Sweets 137 3 2.19
Shoes 250 5 2.00
Building construction and
material 601 12 2.00
Miscellaneous 621 11 1.77
Farm equipment 338 3 0.89
Women's clothing and
furnishings 741 5 0.67
Trailers, pleasure 29 0 0.00
Mail-order houses 36 0 0.00
Total 11,842 1,031 8.71
Source: Compiled from data contained in testimony 
of John W. Anderson, President of the American Fair Trade 
Council, before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Com­
mittee on the Judiciary, Congress of the United states, 82d 
Cong., 2d Sess., Resale Price Maintenance. Hearings on H- R. 
4365, etc., 1952, p. 731, Reference I
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Weighted Industrial Composition 
of Fair Trade Population
Herman took a sample of 175 fair trading manufac­
turers chosen at random from more than 400 full returns re­
ceived by the Subcommittee of the Select Committee on Small
27Business in 19 56. With this sample he attempted to deter­
mine the volume of fair-traded merchandise in total and by 
industrial classification. He checked the value of sales of 
the fair-traded goods for the sample categories against the 
figures of the I9o4 Census. He furthermore classified large 
firms in the sample by industry and compared them with lists 
of sizable fair traders which were compiled from industry 
sources. He states that neither check indicated any obvious 
bias in the returns employed in the sample as regards indus­
trial distribution."®
Table 2 summarizes the results of the sample. It 
confirms the striking numerical importance of the “Proprie­
tary medicines, drugs, chemicals, etc." manufacturers as 
sho'wn in Table 1. Table 2 additionally shows that this in­
dustrial category also looms largest among the practitioners 
of fair trade if measured by more significant figures, i.e..
27
28
Senate Report No. 2819, op. cit. 
'Herman, op. cit. . p. 585.
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TABLE 2
INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE FAIR TRADED MERCHANDISE OF
175 FIRMS, FOR 1954*
Industrial classification Number Per cent Volume Per
of firms of firms® of cent
sales of
(mil. ) sales^
Drugs and medicines 26 14. 9 $ 271.2 20.0
Druggists' sundries 23 13.4 200.1 14.6
Electric appliances and
housewares 6 3.4 186.0 13.6
Alcoholic beverages 7 4.0 131.4 9.5
Cosmetics and perfumes 31 17.7 100.8 7.4
Tobacco products and
accessories 8 4.6 90.0 6.6
Cameras and photo supplies 4 2.3 65.5 4.8
Boats and outboard motors 2 1.1 49.8 3.6
Firearms and eummunitIon 2 1.1 48.9 3.6
Automotive supplies 7 4.0 38.0 2.8
Clocks and watches 4 2.3 36.2 2.6
Clothing 5 2.9 35.2 2.6
Shoes and other footwear 2 1.1 29.9 2.2
Hardware 11 6.3 19.5 1.4
Books 7 4 . 0 16.2 1.2
Hosiery 3 1.7 16.0 1.2
Food products 2 1.1 5.2 0.4
Sporting goods 4 2.3 2.7 0.2
Other 21 12.0 25.9 1.9
Totals 175 100.0 $1368.5 100.0
aSource; Edward S. Herman, "A Statistical Note on
Fair Trade," Antitrust Bulletin, 4 (July-August , 1959), 586.
Percentages may not add to 100.0 because of rounding.
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the fair-traded volume of sales. While the "Drugs and medi­
cines" category represents only 14.9 per cent of the total 
number of manufacturers in the sample, it accounts for 20 
per cent of the total fair-traded volume of sales.
The results become more conspicuous if the volume 
of goods of the different industrial categories are related 
to the type of retail outlets through which they most common­
ly reach the consumer. The industrial categories which are 
most closely related with drugstores, i.e., "Drugs and medi­
cines", "Druggists' sundries", and "Cosmetics and perfumes", 
constitute together 45.7 per cent of the total number of 
manufacturers in the sample. More than four-tenths of the 
fair-traded volume of sales originate in those three cate­
gories. If the category "Tobacco products and accessories", 
which is also closely related to the typical drugstore retail 
outlets, is included in the previously mentioned three cate­
gories, the numerical significance of manufacturers whose 
products are mostly distributed through drugstores is indi­
cated by 50.3 per cent of the total number of manufacturers 
included in the sample. The sales volume of those four drug­
store-related categories represents slightly less than half 
of the total.
The category "Electric appliances and housewares"
31
finds its prominent position among the fair-trading indus­
trial categories as a reflection of the wide-spread dissi­
pation of independent hardware stores. The salient position 
of large manufacturers in this category is expressed by the 
fact that only 3.4 per cent of the manufacturers in the 
sample fall into this category, but this category's share 
of the total fair-traded volume of sales is exactly four 
times as large. It may be noted at this instant that this 
category and the other notable category of "Cameras and photo 
supplies" have been least successful in withstanding the in-r
fluences of adverse legal and economic fair trade develop-
29ments since 19oô.
More light is put upon the composition of the fair- 
trading population by the size distribution of the 175 manu­
facturers, included in Herman's sample, according to the 
value of goods sold in 1954 under fair trade contracts.
Table 3 shows that the smaller manufacturers are 
numerically in the majority. Exactly 36 per cent of the manu­
facturers had a 1954 fair-traded sales volume of less than 
$1 million. This category represents, ho\fever, only 1.4 per 
cent of the total fair-traded volume of sales. Seven-tenths
29infra, Chapter VIII, pp— 229-38.
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TABLE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF 175 FAIR TRADING MANUFACTURERS BY VALUE OF 














0 - less 
than $ 1 million 63 36.0 $ 18.7 1.4
$ 1 million - less 
than $ 5 million 62 35.4 135.9 9.9
S 5 million - less 
than $10 million 14 8.0 96.9 7.1
$10 million - less 
than $25 million 17 9.7 258.2 18.9
$25 million and up 19 10.9 858.7 62.8
Totals 175 100.0 $1,368.4 100.0
Source: Edward S. Herman, "A Statistical Note on 
Fair Trade," Antitrust Bulletin, 4 (July-August, 1959), 588.
Percentages may not add to 100.0 because of rounding.
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of all manufacturers sold slightly more than 11 per cent of 
the fair-traded products. The manufacturers with sales volume 
of $10 million and up amounted to only 20.6 per cent of the 
total population, but they handled 81.7 per cent of the total 
fair-traded sales. The comparison of those percentages is 
even more striking for the category with sales over $25 mil­
lion. Percentage-wise their significance expressed in the 
volume of sales was slightly less than six times their nu­
merical position among the total number of manufacturers.
"Many small manufacturers undoubtedly have a stake in fair 
trade legislation, but in terms of volume of sales of goods 
under fair trade would appear to be of primary benefit to 
large firms.
Extent of Fair Trade Programs 
Table 4 constitutes an indication of the extent of 
individual fair trade programs by classifying them according 
to the number of states covered in 1956. Only 383 manufac­
turers out of the 514 fair-trading manufacturers from whom 
the Senate's Subcommittee^^ received the survey returns gave 
specific information on the state-coverage of their fair
^^Herman, op. cit.. p. 589. 
^^Senate Report No. 2819, op. cit.
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TABLE 4
DISTRIBUTION OF 383 MANUFACTURERS BY THE NUMBER OF STATES IN 
WHICH THEY HAVE FAIR TRADE AGREEMENTS, 1956^
Number of states Number of 
manufacturers
Per cent of 
manufacturers^
Fair trade agreements in :
41 or more states 251 65. 5
31 but less than 41 states 7 1.8
21 but less than 31 states 70 18.3
11 but less than 21 states 18 4 . 9
6 but less than 11 states 8 2.1
1 but less than 5 states 29 7 . 6
Totals 383 100.0
^Source: Compiled from data contained in U. S., Con­
gress, Senate, Select Committee on Small Business, Fair Trade, 
Report on a Study on Fair Trade, Based on a Survey of Manufac­
turers and Retailers, Report No. 2819, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 
1956, p. 6.
^Percentages may not add to 100.0 because of rounding.
35
trade programs. It must be assumed that the data contained 
in Table 4 are biased potentially toward the manufacturers 
with extensive operations. These are the larger firms that 
attach much value to fair-trading and are less likely to be 
inaccurate or negligent in their reporting.
In correspondence with Table 3, it also appears 
from Table 4 that fair trade seems to be predominantly sig­
nificant for the larger manufacturer who has a national mar­
ket for his“pfoducts. Almost two-thirds of all reporting 
manufacturers had a fair trade program that can be character­
ized as a national program. The fair trade programs of only 
7.6 per cent of the reporting manufacturers was effective in 
1 to 5 states.
State Fair Trade Laws and Retail Market Area
An attempt is made in Table 5 to find a quantita­
tive expression for the legal developments of fair trade 
during the last decade. This table combines the legal status 
of fair trade legislation in the various states on January 1, 
1951, and on August 1, 1961, with the total retail sales 
volume by states for 1958. The purpose of Table 5 is to 
indicate the portion of retail sales that took place in ju­
risdictions with effective fair trade acts at the beginning
TABLE 5
LEGAL STATUS OP PAIR TRADE LAWS: JANUARY 1, 1951 AND AUGUST 1, 1961 
ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE SHARE OF 1958 TOTAL RETAIL SALES BY STATES*
Legal status of fair trade laws^









United States $ 200,370,378 100.00
Alabama 2,111,783 1.28 effective no decision no decision
Alaska 174,514 0.10 no law - -
Arizona 1,001,004 0.70 effective const. const.
Arkansas 1,333,632 0.77 effective no decision unconst.
California 15,643,974 9.96 effective const. const.
Colorado 1,726,759 1.05 effective const. "3 unconst.
Connecticut 2,617,526 1.55 effective const. const.
Delaware 492,899 0.29 effective const. const.
D. of Columbia 1,212,450 0.65 no law - -
Florida 4.014,417 2.91 unconst.^ const.^ unconst.
Georgia 2, 963,217 1.76 effective no decision unconst.
Hawai1 426,115 0.26 effective const. const.
Idaho 670,0 57 0.41 effective no decision no decision
Illinois 11,018,913 6.38 effective const. const.
Indiana 4,512,673 2.58 effective const. unconst.
Iowa 3,077,580 1.68 effective no decision unconst.Kansas 2,200,585 1.22 effective no decision unconst.
Kentucky 2, 201,101 1.29 effective const. unconst.
Louisiana 2,339, 289 1.47 effective const. unconst.
W
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and the end of the period. It furthermore provides a stan­
dard to measure the significant difference in importance of 
the individual fair trade acts.
The underlying assumptions of Table 5 are twofold. 
First, it can be assumed that the relative share of total re­
tail sales of the various states is rather constant; i.e., 
the occurring shifts between the relative position as to re­
tail sales volume of the individual states during a decade, 
due to migration and different rajbes of positive or negative 
rates of economic growth, are most likely not significant 
enough to defeat the purpose of Table 5 in which the 1958
retail sales statistics have been employed as weights for the
whole period under consideration. Secondly, it seems to be 
a reasonable assumption that the composition of the retail 
sales in the various states is to a high degree similar, so 
that, knowing that fair trade is only practical for a very 
limited group of retailed goods and within this group with 
various degrees of practicability, it may be assumed that the 
application of the fair trade provisions is more or less the 
same in the different states.
Table 6 is compiled from Table 5. While 88.2 per 
cent of the states had effective fair trade laws on January 1, 
1951, this percentage was reduced considerably during the
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TABLE 6
PERCENTAGE OF STATES WITH EFFECTIVE FAIR TRADE LAWS 
GROUPED BY 1958 RETAIL SALES VOLUME











, August 1, 
1961
All states^ 100.00 88.2 49.0
Largest 10 states 57.78 80 .0 60.0
Second 10 states 19.93 90.0 40.0
Third 10 states 12.60 1 0.0 30.0
Fourth 10 states^ 6.44 90.0 40.0
Smallest 11 states 3.24 81.8 72.7
^Source: Compiled from Table 5.
^Percentages may not add to 100.00 because of rounding.
^Laws on which no court has passed judgment as yet 
are assumed to be effective. The states in which the fair trade 
act in general and/or the nonsigner clause has been held un­
constitutional, either by the highest court or by a lower 
court, are assumed to have ineffective fair trade laws.
^District of Columbia included.
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TABLE 7
PERCENTAGE OF 1958 RETAIL SALES TRADED UNDER EFFECTIVE PAIR 





Per cent of retail sales 






All states^ 100.00 88.15 56.60
Largest 10 States 57.78 85.64 68.51
Second 10 States 19.93 87.10 38.38
Third 10 States 12.60 100.00 35.16
Fourth 10 States^ 6.44 89.90 - 37.42
Smallest 11 States 3.23 90.12 76.85
^Source: Compiled from Table 5.
^Percentages may not add to 100.00 because of rounding
Laws on which no court has passed judgment as yet 
are assumed to be effective. The states in which the fair 
trade act in general and/or the nonsigner clause has been 
held unconstitutional, either by the highest court or by a 
lower court, are assumed to have ineffective fair trade acts,
District of Columbia included.
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next 10 years to 49.0 per cent on August 1, 1961. The per­
centage decline was least for the smallest 11 states, while 
the largest 10 states are second in this respect. The lat­
ter group has legally well entrenched fair trade histories, 
while in the former group of states the issue might not be 
significant enough to create an effective opposition.
Table 7, which is also compiled from Table 5, expresses 
the same developments in terms of retail sales volume. It 
shows that the percentage of retail sales traded in states 
which have effective fair trade acts dropped from 88.15 
per cent in 1951 to 56.60 per cent in 1961. The fact that 
it has been on the average the states with relatively small­
er populations which invalidated the effectiveness of their 
fair trade acts explains why the percentage of retail sales 
traded in states with effective fair trade acts fell less 
than the percentage of the total number of fair trade acts 
that did survive the period 1951 - 1961.
As will be amplified in Chapter VIII, the per­
centage drop of the total retail sales traded in fair trade 
areas can hardly be accepted as a true quantitative measure 
of the decline in fair trade due to legal developments.
The more non-fair trade areas drive a wedge between the 
states which have legally solidly established fair trade
41
acts on the statute books, the harder becomes the enforce­
ment problem to maintain the successfulness of individual 
fair trade programs, causing several practitioners to aban­
don their programs. Regardless of the significance or in­
significance expressed in the percentage of total retail 
sales of the states that have invalidated the fair trade 
acts, the trend that they seem to have established in their 
legal reasoning undoubtedly has discouraged present fair 
traders in possible expansion plans for their existing pro­
grams and has kept out of the fold of fair traders potential 
participants who were weighing the pros and cons of a fair
trade program in relation to the long run market develop-
32ments for their products.
Summary of Statistical Data 
The available statistical information on the in­
fluence of fair trace legislation is highly inadequate to 
substantiate theoretical conclusions. However, most esti­
mates in terms of fair traded volume of retail sales lead 
to the general conclusion that the existing fair trade 
legislation has effected the pricing of a fraction of the 
total retailed volume of goods during any year the fair
32 Infra. Chapter VIII, pp. 229-38.
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trade laws have been on the statute books.
The data on the composition of the fair trade popu­
lation indicate a strong concentration of fair trade pricing 
practices in a few industrial classifications, while fur­
thermore a small number of large manufacturers handle a re­
markably large percentage of the total fair-traded retail 
sales,
Effective fair trade acts extended their influence 
over a smaller geographic area in 1961 than in 1951, and, 
however to a lesser degree, affected a smaller percentage 
of total retail sales in 1961 than in 1951. Especially 
these statistics need extensive descriptive qualification 
before they can be used to indicate the quantitative decline 
in actual fair trade pricing due to developments during the 
last decade.
CHAPTER III
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND LEGAL JUSTIFICATION
This chapter reviews the most important develop­
ments in the fair trade situation up to the beginning of 
the last decade. The first section pertains to develop­
ments under federal law before 1937. The next section 
covers the development of the fair trade structure by 
state legislation. The enactment of the first federal 
fair trade statute in 1937 is treated in a separate sec­
tion. This development meant an important deviation from 
the spirit and interpretation of the federal antitrust 
laws, and strengthened the effectiveness of state fair 
trade legislation. The U. S. Supreme Court formulated 
the prevailing legal Justification of fair trade provi­
sions in 1935. The final section of this chapter presents 
the Court's line of reasoning on this point.
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Developments under Federal Law
Prior to the enactment of the federal antitrust 
laws, the legality of resale price maintenance rested on 
common law and on state laws regulating monopoly and un­
fair trade practices. Up to the close of the nineteenth 
century "... the legality of the manufacturer's right to 
set and to maintain resale prices was unlimited if not 
unquestioned."^ In the few instances in which the courts
were faced with price maintenance in sales involving inter-
2state trade, they generally upheld the practice. The 
development of large scale national advertising of identi­
fied goods during the last half of the nineteenth century 
stimulated the development of various schemes of resale 
price maintenance which represented the modern form of 
cooperation between manufacturers and their distributors 
for the elimination or softening of the rigors of price 
competition among the latter.^ Since 1900, one by one the
^E. R. A. Seligman and R. A. Love, Price Cutting 
and Price Maintenance (New York: Harper & Bros., 1932),
p. 84.
2U. S. Congress, House, Select Committee on 
Small Business, Fair Trade: The Problems and Issues,
Report No. 1292, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952, p. 27.
^Federal Trade Commission, Resale Price Mainte­
nance, Part I, 1929, p. 99.
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different schemes have been brought before the courts from 
time to time to test their legality as restraints of trade 
under patents, copyrights or trademarks, or as violations 
of the common law or of specific legislation.^ Since there 
were no price maintenance statutes passed by the U. S. Con­
gress prior to 1937, the law in relation to resale price 
maintenance was a product of judicial interpretation. 
"Consequently the outcome was a result of a process of 
evolution, was largely patchwork rather than systematic, 
and was marked by decisions governing special cases in­
stead of broad, general principles."^
The Sherman Antitrust Act, enacted in 1890, for 
the first time brought price maintenance within the scope 
of federal law. in 1892 Mr. Louis FÎ. Greene of Ohio was 
lodged in jail by the U. S. marshal for having promised a 
purchaser of his alcohol a liberal rebate on condition 
that the buyer would refrain from reselling the product 
at less than the seller's list prices. The court ordered 
the release of Mr. Greene and held that he had only ar-
^ Ibid.. p. 98.
^E. T. Grether, Price Control under Fair Trade 
Legislation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1 9 3 9 ) ,
p .  1 5 .
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ranged a reasonable protection for his business not vio­
lative of the Sherman Act.^ The general rule under the 
Sherman Act that contracts for maintaining prices are 
illegal restraints of trade subject to criminal and civil 
penalties was not accepted until 1911. Prior to that 
date, the great majority of decisions sustained the va­
lidity of resale price maintenance contracts covering 
patented, copyrighted and secret process commodities.^
The experience of the Edison Company may be cited as an 
indication of the status of resale price maintenance be­
fore 1911. In over fifty cases which the company insti­
tuted between 1904 and 1911, the courts without exception
upheld and enforced the company’s price maintenance pro-
3gram.
In 1911 the celebrated Dr. Miles Medical Co.
9case reached the U. S. Supreme Court for final deter­
mination. The Miles company had made contracts with over
^In re Greene, 52 Fed. 104 (1892), as cited in 
S. A. Weigel, The Fair Trade Acts (Chicago: The Founda­
tion Press, 1938), p. 23.
^Ibid.
QSeligman and Love, 0£. cit., p. 84.
QDr. Miles Medical Company v. John D. Park & 
Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373 (1911).
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400 consignee-wholesale dealers and with some 25,000 re­
tailers, who were selected by the Miles Company's con- 
signee-vrtiolesalers, to maintain stipulated prices at whole­
sale and retail. The Court established the principle that 
resale price maintenance contracts involving interstate 
sales constitute unlawful restraints of trade at common law 
and accordingly are invalid and unenforceable by injunctive 
relief or other civil remedies. By implication the Court 
held that such contracts also contravened the Sherman Anti­
trust Act.^^ The Court argued that:
... where commodities have passed into the chan­
nels of trade and are owned by the dealers, the 
validity of agreements to prevent competition 
and to maintain prices is not to be determined 
by the circumstance whether they were produced 
by several manufacturers or by one, or whether 
they were previously owned by one or by many.
The complainant having sold its product at prices 
satisfactory to itself, the public is entitled to 
whatever advantage may be derived from competition 
in the subsequent traffic.
The effect of this decision on subsequent cases 
under the Sherman Act and on cases arising since. 1914 under 
the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act was 
that effective resale price maintenance in interstate trade
^^House Report 1292, op. cit., p. 28. 
Dr. Miles V. Park, op. cit., at 409.
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became impossible except by resort to the agency device or
by provisions in a bona fide license under a patent as to
12patented articles. Within a decade the U. S. Supreme 
Court restricted resale price maintenance by holding il­
legal: affixing a notice to a patented article warning
that cut price sales would constitute infringement of pa­
tent r i g h t s ; t h e  use of a license to allow the usage of
a patented article where the license was obviously a guise
14to protect prices; espionage to ascertain price cutters 
and thereupon refusing to sell to them and to resume sales 
to them after their assurances of price maintenance.^^ The 
U. S. Supreme Court condemned the practices of the producer 
who attempted to maintain resale prices by various methods, 
including causing dealers to be enrolled on lists of un­
desirable purchasers who were not to be supplied with the 
commodity; employing agents to report dealers who cut prices 
and utilizing symbols on cases containing the merchandise to
^^Weigel, 0£. cit.. p. 27.
^^Bauer v. O'Donnell. 229 U. S. 1 (1913).
l^straus V. Victor Talking Machine Co., 243 U. S. 
490 (1917), and Boston Store v. American Graphophone Co.,
246 U. S. 8 (1918).
Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing 
CO., 257 U. S. 441 (1921).
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ascertain the names of dealers who cut prices.
This general development^^ reached by 1931 a 
state in which the producer who sold his goods outright was 
denied most of the devices which are essential to an effec­
tive refusal to sell to maintain resale prices, "... so that
in many instances there remained little more than the privi-
18lege of suggesting resale prices." Grether summarizes the 
legal status of resale price maintenance in 1931, insofar 
as the law had become distilled in specific form, as follows:
1. The presumed preferential basis for the treat­
ment of secretly processed, patented, and copy­
righted products had been shown to be existent in 
presumption only, and not in law.
2. A number of methods employed in enforcing 
resale prices, such as group action, license, 
notice, contract, pseudo-agency, and avowed or 
implied cooperative action to coerce dealers, 
had been declared unlawful.
3. It was held that a purchaser with full title 
was not subject to interference for purposes of 
price control.l9
^^Ibid.. at 448-450.
^^The detailed legal history in this field down to 
the enactment of the first state fair trade act in 1931 can 
be found in: Seligman and Love, 0£. cit., Part I and Appen­
dix 3C.; F.T.C., 1929, 0£. Cit., Part I, Chapter VII; A. 
Haring, Retail Price Cutting and Its Control by Manufacturers 
(New York: The Ronald Press, 1935), pp. 81-122.
18Seligman and Love, o£. cit., p. 84.
^^Grether, 0£. cit.. pp. 16-17. It is interesting 
to observe that the legal status of vertical price fixing in
50
Demands for passage of a Federal Act legalizing 
resale price maintenance contracts covering articles sold in 
interstate commerce took form in 1912, as a reaction on the 
U. S. Supreme Court's decision in the Dr. Miles case. The 
growth in the importance of branded goods and advertising 
had significantly increased the manufacturer's incentives to 
maintain resale prices. The early drive for the legaliza­
tion of resale price maintenance was spearheaded by the 
American Fair Trade League, an association of manufacturers 
of branded goods, organized in 1913. Throughout the approxi­
mately 20 years of its leadership in the fair trade movement 
the league, witn the more or less active cooperation of 
various distributor associations, concentrated unsuccessfully 
its efforts on securing federal legislation sanctioning re­
sale price maintenance c o n t r a c t s . T h e  passage of the Na­
tional Industrial Recovery Act in 19 33 brought the activities
the State of Texas, which never passed a fair trade act and 
where vertical price agreements fall under the scope of the 
Texas Antitrust Act of 1889, is significantly similar at 
present to the national situation in this respect in 1932. 
See: Ford Hall and Alfred L. Seeley, "Vertical Price Fixing
in Texas," Texas Law Review. 35 (1957), pp. 772-811.
20statement of E. S. Herman before a Subcommittee 
on the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Hear­
ings on H. R. 10527, etc.. House of Representatives. 86th 
Cong. 2d Sess., 1958, p. 631.
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for a federal resale price maintenance statute temporarily 
to a standstill. Until the National Industrial Recovery 
Act was declared unconstitutional on May 27, 1935, the fair 
trade proponents did have what they wanted through the re­
tail codes legalized under this act which established re- 
sale prices. The rapid developments in state fair trade 
legislation and the resulting federal enabling legislation 
in the form of the Miller-Tydings Amendment to the Sherman 
Act can be explained from the fact that the NRA codes 
"... left a deposit not in law but in trade experience,
23practices, and attitudes" as to resale price maintenance.
^^The first national resale price maintenance bill 
was introduced February 12, 1914, and was known as the Ste­
vens Bill. About 25 witnesses, the majority of them retail 
organizations, testified in favor of the bill and there were 
no witnesses in opposition. Still the bill was not eancted. 
Next the Stephens Bill was introduced in the first session 
of the 64th Congress. During the following years until the 
enactment of the National Industrial Recovery Act, the so- 
called Capper-Kelly Bill was continually introduced every 
session of Congress. Hearings on this bill in 1926 pre­
sented the first active opposition. Among other things a 
witness challenged the value of the favorable testimony of 
a National Housewives* League which had allegedly truthfully 
represented many consumers in these and previous hearings 
on the issue. (Federal Trade Commission, Report on Resale 
Price Maintenance. 1945, pp. 39-43.)
22c. I. Ranter and S. G. Rosenblum, "The Operation 
of Fair Trade Programs," Harvard Law Review. 69 (1955), 
p. 318.
2^Grether, o£. cit.. p. 17.
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The development was "... the response to a cry of distress
from groups of people who have found their voices, and who
have learned, particularly during the days of the NRA, how
24to use them in unison and effectively."
Developments under State Law 
New Jersey was the first state to enact an actual 
resale price maintenance law. The act, passed in 1913, per­
mitted resale price fixing by notice in order to protect the
good will of makers of branded goods and made a violation of
2 5the terms in the notice actionable.
In the early thirties active leadership of the fair 
trade movement shifted from the manufacturers-dominated 
league^^ to various associations of wholesale and retail 
merchants, of which the National Association of Retail Drug­
gists was by far the most important. The new leadership of 
the fair trade movement temporarily abandoned the attempt to 
secure favorable federal legislation on resale price main­
tenance and sought passage of state laws to the same ef-
Shulman, "The Fair Trade Acts and the Law of 
Restrictive Agreements Affecting Chattels," Yale Law Journal, 
49 (1940), p. 623.
ZSNote, Harvard Law Review. 69 (1955), p. 318.
Z^supra. p. 50.
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2 7feet. The first resulting state fair trade act which was 
worded in the modern form was enacted during 1931 in Cali­
fornia. This statute merely permitted producers and owners 
of trademarked goods to establish resale prices by contract 
if the products were in free and open competition with 
similar products, but the statute specifically denied such 
contracts for horizontal price fixing. "At the time, this 
act aroused no great interest, nor did it lead to new devel­
opments in the state or nationally, because it added nothing 
to the existing law under judicial interpretation in the 
s t a t e . B u t  in 1933 the California legislature added a 
one sentence amendment to the Fair Trade Act of 1933 - the 
famous nonsigner provision - which became the heart of the 
whole statutory fair trade scheme. Without that provision, 
"... fair trade contracts in any state would be meaningless,
because the firms who precipitate price wars are the very
29ones who would not sign the fair trade contract." This
2 7statement of E. S. Herman, Hearings on H. R. 
10527, etc■. loc. cit.
^^Grether, 0£. cit., p. 18.
^^Opinion of the Department of Commerce in the 
U. S. Congress, House, Hearings on Resale Price Maintenzince 
before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the Committee on the 
Judiciary. H. R. 4365, etc., 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952,
p. 602.
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30amendment incited renewed activity, interest and enthusi­
asm. Regardless of the federal inactiveness and view on 
resale price maintenance, the state legislatures definitely 
seemed to favor it after California had set the example. 
"Under the efficient propulsion of retailers' organized 
efforts, especially those of the retail druggists," other
states began to imitate California. By the end of 1936
32fourteen states had followed the California lead.
The period 1933-1936 was characterized chiefly by 
testing in the courts. The constitutionality of a fair trade 
statute containing a nonsigner provision was first^^ con­
sidered in New York in the case Doubleday, Doran & Co. v.
^^The author of the famous nonsigner provision is 
reportedly E. S. Rogers, an attorney, who happened to be in 
Los Angeles when the inadequacy of the 1931 fair trade stat­
ute was painfully apparent. One of his clients arranged for 
a luncheon meeting with a group of business men and trade 
association executives. it is reported that the attorney 
pondered the fair trade problem, reached for a menu lying 
handy, wrote a sentence, passed it to a member of the group 
and said, "I think that will do it." The actual California 
nonsigner provision (and consequently of many other states) 
is identical to this draft with the exception of only one 
word. (Weigel, 0£. cit.. p. 36.)
^^Grether, op. pit., p. 18.
32%bid.. p. 19.
33"A Symposium on the Fair Trade Laws," Fordham 
Law Review, 27 (1958), p. 69,
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R. H. Macy & Co.^^ The court presented several grounds on
3 5which it held the nonsigner provision unconstitutional.
Later in 1936, appeals were taken to the U. S. Supreme Court
from decisions of the highest court of Illinois which had
upheld the whole fair trade act of that s t a t e . I n  Old
37 *Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp. the 
U. S. Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the Illinois 
court, and promulgated the dubious trademark theory of fair 
trade.
Following this U. S. Supreme Court decision there 
was a tremendous boom in the fair trade movement throughout 
the United States. During 1937, 27 additional states enacted 
fair trade l a w s , b r i n g i n g  the total of fair trade states 
to 41. This total increased later to 45 out of 48 states.
The California Fair Trade Act of 1933, together with a pro­
posal drafted in 1937 by tlie National Association of Retail
3^269 N. Y. 272, 199 N. E. 409 (1936).
35chapter V, infra, p. 96.
^^Seagram-Distillers Corp. v. Old Dearborn Dis­
tributing C O ., 363 111. 610, 2 N. E. 2d 940 (1936).
3^299 U. S. 183 (1936).
Grether, o£. cit.. p. 19.
^^Missouri, Texas and Vermont never enacted a fair 
trade act. Hawaii and Puerto Rico did, Alaska did not.
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Druggists, has served as a model for the 44 other states 
which enacted fair trade statutes.^0 in general all stat­
utes are similar in purpose, but there are numerous varia­
tions in d e t a i l . T h e  all-important California nonsigner 
provision was copied in all state statutes;
This amendment ... was responsible for a major 
amendment to the Federal Antitrust laws; was 
the basic factor in revolutionizing the market­
ing policies of scores of nationally known 
manufacturers and the sales practices of thou­
sands of retailers; and was the center of 
renewed controversy, throughout the nation, 
as to the merits of sanctioning private control 
over resale p r i c e s . 42
The fair trade proponents like to bring out as an 
indication of the public acclaim and the wide acceptance of 
the fair trade policy by the people's representatives, the 
favorable voting records by which most state fair trade laws 
were e n a c t e d . T h e  spontaneous public support becomes doubt­
ful, however, if it is known that the National Association of 
Retail Druggists made a deliberate and systematic effort to
4^The California act was copied verbatim by 20 
states. Of those states 10 copied t w o _serious typographi­
cal errors in the original California act. (Ibid.)
^^House Report 1292, £p. c i t ., p. 33.
^^Weigel, op. c i t .. p. 37.
43 Statement of H. S. Waller;, National Associa­
tion of Retail Druggists, in Hearings on 10527, etc., o p . 
ci t .. p. 465.
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prevent public hearings on fair trade bills introduced in 
state legislatures and that it was eminently successful 
in this regard as public hearings on the fair trade bill
were only held in three of the first thirty-two states in
anwhich fair trade legislation was passed.
The Milier-Tydings Act 
Following the decision of the U. S. Supreme Court 
in 1935̂  declaring the National Recovery Act unconstitu­
tional, federal legislation which would legalize resale 
price maintenance contracts for commodities moving in inter­
state commerce was again sought through the Miller-Tydings 
45Bill. This bill was designed to obviate the possibility 
that fair trade acts would be invalidated for conflicting 
with the Sherman Act. Or, which is the same, to negate the
46U. s. Supreme Court decision in the Dr. Miles case of 1911,
in which resale price maintenance contracts were held to be
4'7in restraint or trade.
The National Association of Retail Druggists de-
44Statement of E. S. Herman, ibid., p. 603.
^^F.T.C., 1945, 0£. cit., p. 43.
46Supra, pp. 46-7.
J. Kohrs, "Fair Trade and the State Consti­
tutions," Vanderbilt Law Review. 10 (1957), p. 416.
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48veloped an elaborate system of pressure on Congress. In 
the absence of a federal enabling statute it would namely 
have been "... necessary for a manufacturer to be incorpo­
rated in each state in which he wished to issue fair trade 
49contract" on the basis of state fair trade provisions to 
prevent violation of the Sherman Act in relation to inter­
state trade. This enabling statute, known as the Miller- 
Tydings Amendment to the Sherman Act, was passed by Congress 
in 1937 as a rider to an appropriation bill for the District 
of Columbia, after attempts at enacting it as a separate 
statute had failed. The vigorous opposition of the Presi­
dent apparently had doomed the act; its final acceptance 
demonstrated the weight of the pressure behind it.^^ The
President signed the bill into law under protest, objecting
51that the measure would increase the consumer prices. This 
amendment, modifying the Sherman Act and limiting applica­
tion of the Federal Trade Commission Act accordingly, re-
^^F.T.C., 1945, OP. cit., pp. 64-66.
49 C. H. Fulda, "Resale Price Maintenance," Uni­
versity of Chicago Law Review, 21 (1954), p. 176.
S^Grether, 0£. cit., p. 22.
^^For a detailed account of the legislative his­
tory, see CCH Trade Regulation Reporter. Vol. i, 1959, p. 
4303; also Pepsodent Co. v. Krauss Co., 56 F. Supp. 922 
(1944).
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moved the bar of illegality to the marking of resale price 
maintenance contracts covering commodities sold in inter­
state trade if they were to be resold in a state where such 
contracts had been legalized with respect to intrastate 
trade. This amendment was generally held to have removed 
all obstacles to the enforcement of state fair trade acts 
in interstate commerce including the use of the nonsigner 
provisions.
Legal Justification : Trademark Theory
By far the most important court decision concern­
ing resale price maintenance was contained in the Old Dear­
born case^^ decided by the U. S. Supreme Court in December
1936. This decision represented a signal victory for the
55fair trade movement.
Although the Court by the use of arguments pre­
sented in strong language did indicate a conviction that 
state fair trade legislation was constitutional, this was 
not the issue before the Court. Neither did the Court re-
SZp.T.C., 1945, 0£. ci±., p. XXVII.
53 See e. g. Pepsodent v. Krauss, o p . cit, 
54gupra. p. 55.
S^House Report 1292, o£. c it., p. 34.
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verse the Dr. Miles decision. The Court settled in this 
case the question of whether or not the constitutionality 
of such legislation was a matter of determination by the 
state through its legislature and its courts or by the U. S.
Supreme Co u r t . R e g a r d l e s s  of this limited scope of the
decision, the Court delivered a substantial and influential 
justification for fair trade legislation.
The main points covered by the Supreme Court's 
decision can be summarized as follows:
1. The provision of the state fair trade act 
which declares as not in violation of the laws 
of Illinois certain contracts for maintenance 
of resale prices on identified articles does 
not infringe upon the property right of the
owner to fix the price himself at which he will
sell his property; it does not attempt to fix 
prices; it does not delegate to private per­
sons the power to fix prices in violation of 
the due process clause of the Constitution.
2. The nonsigner provision of the fair trade 
act does not result in a denial of due process; 
does not result in a denial of equal protection 
of the laws.
3. The phrase "fair and open competition" as 
used in the act is not so vague and indefinite 
as to deny due process.5?
Mr. Judge Sutherland, who delivered the decision,
began by reviewing the contrary precedent of the Dr. Miles
^^McGraw Electric Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., 
159 Neb. 703, 68 N. W. 2d 608, at 617 (1955).
57p.T.C., 1945, 0£. cit.. p. 92.
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case. In that case it was stated: "Nor can the manufacturer
by rule or notice, in absence of contract or statutory right 
even though the restriction be known to purchasers, fix 
prices for future s a l e s . T h e  fact that those agreements 
were now permitted under state law was of decisive influence.
The Court based its approval of the nonsigner pro­
vision on the trademark theory. This theory is an attempt 
to answer the fundamental constitutional objections to the 
fair trade scheme, "... which stems from the fact that an 
individual may acquire unconditional title to goods and still
be restricted in disposing of them, by the terms of a con-
59tract to which he was not a party." The Court's justifi­
cation of the subjection of a party to the terms of an agree­
ment he never made is contained in the following quotation 
concerning the nonsigner provision.
(It) does not deal with the restriction upon the 
sale of the commodity qua commodity but with that 
restriction because the commodity is identified 
by the trademark, brand or name of the producer 
or owner. The essence of the statutory violation 
then consists not in the bare disposition of the 
commodity, but in the forbidden use of the trade­
mark, brand or name in accomplishing such dis­
position.GO
^®As cited in Old Dearborn, op. cit., at 191, 
S^Kohrs, op. cit., p. 416.
^^Old Dearborn, op. cit.. at 193.
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The Court classified good will as a real property, distinct
from the physical product:
... injury to which ... is a proper subject for 
legislation....61 There is nothing in the act 
to preclude the purchaser from removing the mark 
or brand from the property ... and then selling 
the commodity at its own p r i c e . . . . 6 2
In this way the nonsigner could separate the physical prop­
erty, which he owns, from the good will, which is the prop­
erty of another. This solved the due process objections to 
the nonsigner provision according to the Court.
The primary purpose of the fair trade scheme was
stated as :
... to protect the property - namely, the good 
will of the producer, which he still owns. The 
price restriction is adopted as an appropriate 
means to that perfec^^y legitimate end, and not 
as an end in itself.
Finally, the Court pointed out that there is a
great body of fact and opinion
Glfbid., at 194.
6^Ibid., at 195. At this point the Court justi­
fied the very serious due process objections to the non­
signer provision to a large extent on the impossible. Trade­
mark and brand names, not even mentioning registered forms
of products and packaging, are quite frequently inseparable 
without the actual destruction of the physical product.
G^Ibid.. at 193.
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... tending to show that price cutting by retail 
dealers is not only injurious to the good will 
and business of the producer and distributor of 
identified goods but injurious to the general 
public as well.G4
It was admitted that "... there is evidence, opinion, and
argument to the c o n t r a r y b u t  the Court considered that
... where the question of what the facts estab­
lished is a fairly debatable one, we accept and 
carry into effect the opinion of the legisla­
ture.
This decision and the trademark theory of fair trade 
contained in it, blindly accepts the purpose of fair trade 
legislation to be the protection of the value of good will 
as s\TTÜ30lized by trademarks. One writer remarks that if the 
Court would only recognize the open secret that the primary 
accomplishment of fair trade laws is to protect the smaller 
independent retailers from price competition by discount 
houses and other rivals, it would seem to automatically de­
flate the trademark theory as a basis for sustaining the fair 
trade laws.^^ Another authority remarks concerning the func­




^^Kohrs, o p . cit., p. 425.
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... is not to protect the good will symbolized 
by the trademark, but to alleviate the rigors 
of price competition between distributors.... 
The concern of the acts with trademarked goods 
is accidental and incidental....*^®
®®Shulman, op. cit., p. 623.
CHAPTER IV
THE SCHWEGMANN AND WENTLING DECISIONS THE MCGUIRE AMENDMENT
The course of fair trade ran smoothly in favor of 
the fair trade proponents after the passage of the Miller- 
Tydings Amendment to the Sherman Act.^ The depressed econ­
omic condition of the ly3ü's and the following Second World 
War years created the special circumstances in which a 
scneme like fair trade seemed to find fertile soil to flour­
ish. With the return of more normal economic conditions the 
restrictive characteristics or rair trade legislation in 
relation to price competition at tne retail level oecame too 
face strong opposing economic pressures. As one author 
generalizes :
^R. Stachler, "The Protective Veil Given Mail 
Order Houses in Fair Trade Jurisdiction," University of 
Cincinnati Law Review. 25 (1956), 495.
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An expanding economy in its wealthiest period strains 
at every restraint upon the free market, whether tne 
particular restraint be considered good or bad.^
Ti'ie transition of industry from war production to 
tne production of consumer goods had more or less erased the 
depression and war-time created backlog in tne demand for 
consumer goods by tne end of t ne 19'- L ' s , and the market for 
tnose goods adopted by tnxs t.iii'e at an accelerated rate tne 
cnaracteristics of a "buyers" market. In this situation new 
developments in rerailing to facilitate the sale of mass 
produced consumer goods cou ! (J r.ot be prevented. /o 1 urne 
sales nao keen ne i ;mper at rvc for tne pi anning and operation 
of tne .UL'dern proc.ucrion process. Fair trade meant basi­
cally t .e elimination of t .c i.,ost potent item in a sales 
pro..iotioa scneme, i.e. its intent '..as ti; prevent tie devel­
opment of mass prod action _n industry to oe copied in re­
tailing of vnicsi t le resulting économie:: could oe passed on 
to tae cono'amor i ; retail orice reductions. Consumer
''•n. K . Bates, "Constitutionality of State Fair 
Trade Acts," Indiana baw Journal, 37 (195 1), i 3 .
“'Economists in many instances nave regarded the 
percentage of distribution cost to total cost as too nigh. 
See G. R. Smith and I. C. Smith, ^  Economic Appraisal of 
Resale Price l-iaintenance (New Orleans; Loyola University,
1957), p . 65.
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attraction through price reductions was of paramount impor­
tance for the development of large volume, low margin sales
4at the retail level. The consumer goods industry was 
caught in the middle of the controversy. By adhering to a 
rigid fair trade program the important loyalty of numerous, 
but small high-margln retailers would be assured, giving the 
manufacturers products an extensive exposure and sales pro­
motion. The frequent laorge orders from large volume, fast 
turn-over retailers would however be forsaken by a tightly 
enforced fair trade program. Tnis situation led to much 
double dealing in relation to fair trade.^
It was under those circumstances that two legal 
decisions in 1950 and 1951 struck severe blows at the fair 
trade structure from which it never fully recuperated. In 
the Schwegmann case^ the U. S. Supreme Court construed the
^It has been estimated that the average retail 
margins was approximately 28 per cent in 1948. It is fur­
ther mentioned that this average remained almost unchsuiged 
since the 1920's. "Distribution Costs: Really Going Down?," 
Business Week, January 12, 1952, p. 124.
^See especially John Harms, Our Floundering Fair 
Trade (New York: Exposition Press, 1956).
^Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,
341 U. S. 384 (1951).
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Miller-Tydings Act as not applying to nonsigners of fair 
trade contracts since it sanctioned only "contracts and 
agreements" to maintain resale prices and did not contain 
any nonsigner provision exemption from the Sherman Act. 
Shortly after this decision tne U. S. Supreme Court vacated 
and remanded a decision oy the Circuit Court of Appeals of 
the Third Circuit in which another flaw in the federal law 
was uncovered.^ This court has held that a state fair 
trade act could not control a nonsigner retailer, although 
living and doing business in the fair trade jurisdiction, 
whose sales were made in interstate commerce by direct mail 
and express.
Those two decisions resulted in a frantic activ­
ity of the fair trade proponents to repair the damage done. 
Those efforts resulted in a new federal enabling act - the 
McGuire Act - passed by Congress slightly over a year after 
the Schwegmann decision, which allowed the enforcement of the 
state nonsigner provisions in interstate transactions and 
also negated the Wentling decision.
^Sunbeam Co. v. Wentling, 185 F. 2d y03 (3d Cir. 
1950), vacated and remanded. 341 U. S. 944 (1951), modified, 
192 F. 2d 7 (3d Cir. 1951).
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The Schweqmann Decision 
The U. S. Supreme Court's Schvegmann decision, 
which was announced on May 21, 1951, struck a most serious
QGlow at the Êtr trade movement. In that case Maryland and 
Delaware distributors of gin and whiskey sought to enjoin 
Schwegmann from New Orleans who had refused to sign a resale
price maintenance agreement covering the complainants'
- 9product from selling their product below fair trade prices.
Schwegmann, whose retail business had originated, and after 
that had grown rapidly, on a price appeal minimum service 
o a s i s , f o u g h t  vigorously to maintain this policy of opera­
tion for the widest assortment of goods possible, by oppos­
ing the fair trade regulations. According to the Louisiana 
Fair Trade Act Schwegmann should have abided by the prices 
stipulated by the manufacturers or distributors in con­
tracts with other retailers in Louisiana. On the strength 
of the Louisiana nonsigner provision Calvert brought suit
®U. S., Congress, House Select Committee on Small 
Business, Fair Trade: The Problems and Issues, Report No. 
1292, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952, p. 35.
^C. H. Fulda, "Resale Price Maintenance," Univer­
sity of Chicago Law Review, 21 (1954), 176.
lÛTestimony of John Schwegmamn in U. S., Congress., 
House, Antitrust Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judi- 
cicury. Hearings on H. R. 4365, etc., Resale Price Mainten­
ance, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952, pp. 282-335.
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to enjoin Schwegmann from selling below the stipulated fair 
trade price, which had been part of the provisions of over 
one hundred fair trade contracts with other retailers in 
Louisiana. Schwegmann*s main argument of defense was that, 
in his opinion, the nonsigner provision of the state fair 
trade statute could not be applied to products moving in 
interstate trade as the Miller-Tydings Amendment to the 
Sherman Act did not exempt this provision as a violation 
of the latter federal statute.
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
upheld the nonsigner provision of the state fair tiade act in 
this case.^^ Schwegmann, however, carried the issue to the 
U. S. Supreme Court. By a five to three vote this Court re­
versed the decision of the two lower courts. The opinion 
was written by Justice Douglas. Justices Frankfurter,
Black, and Burton constituted the dissenting minority.
The Court argued that it was clear that this 
price maintenance scheme as authorized by the state was 
completely valid in intrastate trade. But as far as inter­
state trade was concerned the provisions eind leading cases 
of the Sherman Act were conclusive in condemning the scheme
l^House Report No. 1292, loc. cit.
71
If it were not for the exceptions allowed hy the Miller- 
Tydings Amendment. According to the Court the real ques­
tion therefore had to do with the determination of the 
scope of the exceptions of the Miller-Tydings Act. This 
Act clearly permitted specific contracts to maintain re­
sale prices, out
What is granted is a limited immunity - a limitation 
that is further emphasized by the inclusion in the 
state law of the nonsigner provision. The omission 
of the nonsigner provision from the federal law is 
fatal to the respondents' position unless we are to 
perform a distinct legislative function by reading 
into the Act a provision that was meticulously 
omitted trora it.^^
In respect to this matter the Court reviewed the legisla­
tive history of the Miller-Tydings Amendment and found no 
evidence in congressional debates or committee reports 
that Congress intended to grant an exception to non­
contractual price maintenance,which form of price
1 ?^ Schwegmann v. Calvert, op. cit., at 388.
l^Although the legalizing of the state nonsigner 
provisions in interstate commerce appeared at different 
occasions in the congressional debates on the Miller- 
Tydings Bill and similar legislative proposals, the Court 
relied heavily on the following statement of the co-author 
of the bill that ultimately was passed by Congress. Senator 
Tydings stated on the floor: "What does the amendment do?
It permits a man who manufactures an article to state the 
minimum resale price of the article in a contract with the 
man who buys it for ultimate resale to the public ...
(81 Cong. Rec. 7495, as cited in, ibid. , at 394.)
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maintenance was termed by the Court as:
That is not price fixing by contract or agreement; 
that is price fixing by compulsion. That is not 
following the path of consensual agreement; that 
resorts to coercion.
The fair trade proponents' interpretation of the
Miller-Tydings Amendment was repudiated by the Court in its
concluding remark when it said;
We could conclude that Congress carved out the vast 
exception from the Sherman Act now claimed only if 
we were willing to assume that it took a devious 
route and yet failed to make its purpose plain.15
The Court could find no indication from what the
Congressional sponsors wrote
... that the distributors were to have the right to 
use not only a contract to fix retail prices but a 
club as well.lG
The whole opinion of the Court reflects the degree to which 
the Court was disturbed by both the coercive characteris­
tics of the nonsigner provision and its effect on compe­
tition. The Court refused to believe that Congress had




... desired to eliminate the consensual element from 
the arrangement emd to permit blanketing a state with 
resale price fixing if only one retailer wanted it 
Contracts and agreements convey the idea of a coopera­
tive arrangement, not a program whereby recalcitrants 
are dragged in by the heels and compelled to submit to 
price fixing.
Justice Frankfurter, who wrote the dissenting 
opinion, based his contrary conclusion largely on the fact 
that when the Miller-Tydings Amendment was enacted, every 
state law then in existence contained a nonsigner provision. 
In his opinion the purpose of Congress was to support these 
laws as they were, not as they should have been. To ex­
clude the nonsigner provision was in his opinion contrary 
to the word of the statute and to the legislative histoiy^^ 
The many expressions of hostility employed by 
Justice Douglas with reference to the nonsigner provision 
should not obscure the technical reason of the decision:
The plain language used oy Congress in the Miller-Tydings
Act limited the application of that amendment to parties to
19a contract. It should however be noted that this impor­





extensive condemning remarks at the address of the all- 
important nonsigner provision of the fair trade structure. 
The fact that this path was not followed by the Court re­
sulted in the probably unique situation that the argumen­
tation of this decision had a profound and long lasting 
effect in weakening the whole fair trade scheme after the 
actual decision had neen reversed by congressional action 
in the McGuire A m e n d m e n t . T n e  loss of prestige which fair
trade suffered as a result of the hostile Schwegmann decisioi
21could not be erased by this amendment.
The Wentling Decision 
Already before the Schwegmann decision, the U. S. 
Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit had intiated the un­
favorable fair trade developments by reversing on November 
iO, 1950 a district court decision which had granted an 
injunction against a nonsigner retailer forbidding him to 
sell below fair trade prices both in intrastate and inter-
^^Many examples to this effect are contained in 
Chapter V, infra.
21see for example Bates, op. cit., 130.
75
22State commerce. The case concerned the activities of 
wentling, a Pennsylvania mail-order operator, who was sell­
ing Sunbeam's electric shavers by mail to other states from 
his by fair trade legislation covered home state at prices 
below those stipulated by Sunbeam.
The court argued that at least some of the 
defendant's business was interstate trade. If it we* alone 
for the fact that
... the purchase of advertising space in a publication 
published in another state and of national circulation 
is interstate commerce.
The interstate commerce clause of the Federal Constitution,
according to the court, has as one aim
... the protection of the interstate trade against 
state interference. As a limit on state powers, it 
is a free trade charter for national c o m m e r c e . 24
22The U. S. Supreme Court later granted centi- 
orari, vacated the judgment of the Circuit Court, amd re­
manded it for consideration in the light of the Schwegmauin 
decision. On remand the Third Circuit held that under the 
Schwegmann doctrine. Sunbeam was not entitled to any pro­
tection against Wentling, even in intrastate transactions: 
Supra. Note 7.
22sunbeam v. Wentling, op. cit., at 906.
24r . Rottschaefer, The Constitution and Socio- 
Economic Change; (Ann Arbor; University of Michigan Law 
School, 1948), p. 102, as cited in ibid., at 907.
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The court considered it not very difficult to put a case
in which non-uniform state laws in the price regulation
field will result in a complete block to trade between
states in fair traded commodities. The court asked the
interesting question;
... if a state may regulate the price at which 
an article must be sold if it is to be shipped 
out of state, may it not equally well regulate 
the price for which the article must have been 25sold before it is allowed to come into the state?
The court could see no justification for this restricting
aspect of fair trade legislation on interstate commerce
and remarked:
Tariff barriers are but feeble obstacles compared 
with such a blockade on the interstate movement 
of goods.26
These constitutional difficulties formed the 
basis on which the court refused to give the Pennsylvania 
Fair Trade Act a more extensive than purely local applica­
tion. The court ruled that price cutting retailers could 
not be enjoined under the state fair trade act if their 




State nonsigner provision in such a case would constitute 
an unlawful burden on interstate commerce.
Although mail-order retail sales do not amount 
to a very significant portion of the total retail volume, 
this decision was one of the first serious assaults on fair 
trade after the Second World War, and was considered impor­
tant enough by the fair trade proponents to be reversed 
oy the subsequent McGuire Amendment.
Economic Consequences of the Schweqmann Decision
Just one week had passed after the Schwegmann 
decision, when the R, H. Macy Company of New York announced 
the cutting of prices on several previously fair traded 
items of merchandise." Other New York department stores 
had little choice out to follow Macy's lead. The resulting 
price war was widely publicized in the p r e s s . T h e  price
27por a detailed account of the causation, scope, 
peculiarities, and actual developments of the New York price 
war, see R. Cassady, Jr., "Tne New York Department Store 
Price War of 1951: A Microeconomic Analysis," Journal of 
Marketing, No. 1, 12 (1957), 3-11.
S., Congress, Senate, Prevalence of Price 
Cutting of Merchandise Marketed under Price Maintenance 
Agreements, prepared for the Joint Committee on the Econ­
omic Report and the Select Committee on Small Business, 
ti2d Cong., 1st. Sess., 1951, p. 1.
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war spread to other cities as well, but it was in New York
that the war raged wildest oecause of a "temporary buying
29hysteria" of its bargain hungry shoppers.
The interest in those events was nation-wide. 
Many questions were asked and much concern expressed about 
the possible unfavorable effects on small independent re­
tailers resulting from the price cutting practices of the 
large-scale operators in retailing.Congress acted 
through the Join Committee on the Economic Report and the 
Select Committee of the U. S. Senate, which ask the firm 
of Dun & Bradstreet to furnish it with a report on the 
price wars.31
A major contribution of this report consisted of 
the fact that it deflated the extent and severity of the
Schwegmann decision induced price war as it had been por­
trayed by the national press coverage.
Among many other facts concerning the issue, the 
report indicates that in the period from May 28 to June 16, 
1951, price cutting of fair traded merchandise occurred in
29lbid.
30pulda, op. cit., p. 177.
3Iprevalence of Price Cutting, op. cit.
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43 of the 143 leading trading centers which were covered 
in the survey. In New York, Detroit and Denver, 70 per 
cent of all the price cutting stores were to be found.
Of the 77,000 stores which handled one or more of the fair 
traded lines of merchandise, only b25 stores were found to 
have cut prices below those set in resale price mainten­
ance agreements. In 20 of the 43 cities in which price 
cutting took place, less than four stores were involved 
in price cutting. Only in 5 cities were more thain 10 price 
cutting stores to be found. The merchandise of which the 
prices were cut was restricted to electric household appli­
ances, cosmetics and drug specialties, men's wear and alco­
holic beverages. By June 17, 1951, the activity and
interest in the price cutting of fair traded merchandise
32started to diminish noticeably. The price war was log­
ically restricted to those stores which had refused to 
sign fair trade contracts for the merchandise involved.
The McGuire Amendment 
The more important effect of the Schwegmann
32 Ibid.. pp. 1, 2 and 7.
^^Signers of fair trade contracts were still 
legally bound to maintain stipulated prices.
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decision and the one accutely feared by the fair trade 
proponents was the possible complete breakdown of all fair 
trade laws.^^ The price war was actually turned into a 
strong tool by the fair trade proponents to argue for the 
rehabilitation of fair traders and to save it from more 
severe consequences by state court interpretations. Thus, 
in spite of the ephemeral character and relatively small 
area of the price war, the pressure for federal legisla­
tion that would restore the legal status of the fair trade 
scheme did not diminish. The influence of the brief and 
rather isolated price war culminated in the issue of a re­
port entitled; "Fair Trade: The Problems and Issues" by the
37House Committee on Small Business. Although this report 
represents as objectively as possible an examination in
^^Note, Virginia Law Review. 37 (1951), 884.
^^For this "boomerang effect" of the department 
store price war on the fair trade opposing activities of 
those companies that started it and culminating it in the 
McGuire Amendment, see R. Cassady, pp. cit., 10. A con­
trary opinion based on less extensive emd clear evidence is 
contained in w. Adams, "Fair Trade and the Art of Prestidig­
itation," Yale Law Journal. 65 (1955), 205, note 41.
^^Fulda, pp. cit.. p. 178.
^^House Report 1292, pp. cit.
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some detail of the opposing views for and against fair 
trade, the Committee apparently was guided in its final 
recommendation by the few extreme price reductions which 
had occurred during the post-Schwegmann decision price 
war. Those had resulted in below-cost or so-called loss- 
leader sales. The Committee concluded namely that it was 
impressed by the complexity of the problem and the weight 
of evidence at both sides of tne issue, but it was con­
vinced that
... deceitful and misleading price cutting is not 
in the public interest smd that small business 
enterprises in particular need protection against 
loss-leader and similar unfair business practices.
The Committee recommended therefore that Congress should
make it possible to enforce fair trade contracts in inter-
3 9state commerce. This tempts the assumption that the 
Committee took the post-Schwegmann decision price war as 
an indication in reverse of tne effectiveness of the fair 
trade scheme to eliminate the evils of loss-leader selling. 
It would seem more justifiable to consider the limited 
price wear as a temporary phenomenon: a hasty market
^^Ibid., p. 1. 
^^Ibid.
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adjustment after the change of am import am t exogenous insti­
tutional factor in the market mechanism, a process which 
caused, in the few instances of loss-leader selling, the 
prices to go below the newly to oe found equilibrium.^^
The agitation for Congressional action to restore 
the strength of fair trade in interstate commerce after the 
Schwegmann decision was basically a retailers' show. The 
legislative history of the McGuire Amendment is replete 
with statements to this effect. Among the organized group 
of distributors the National Association of Retail Druggists 
played the leading role in organizing effective pressure on 
C o n g r e s s . T h i s  organization is quite proud of the
4 0 For zurgumentation and facts deflating the 
merits of fair trade in relation to loss-leader sales, see 
Prepared Statement of Edward S. Herman. U. S. Congress. 
House. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. 
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Inter­
state zmd Foreign Commerce on H. R. 10527, and other bills, 
bSth Congr., 2d Sess., 1958, pp. 632-4.
4 1 The House Committee on Small Business lists 17 
national non-drug retail and wholesale groups which had 
appeared in favor of fair trade at public hearings held in 
recent years prior to 1952. Listed as such are: National 
Association of Retail Grocers; National Retail Jewelers 
Association; Radio Wholesalers Association; National Feder­
ation of Radio, Associations; International Beauty euid 
Barbers' Supply Dealers Association; National Stationers' 
Association; Meat Dealers Protective Association; National 
Institute of Wine and Spirit Distributors, Inc.; National 
Institute of Manufacturers and Distributors; National
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pre-eminent position of the druggists in the fair trade 
movement. It claims credit for the passage of the state 
fair trade acts but also for the passage of the Miller- 
Tydings Act^Z and its efforts to secure the passage of the 
McGuire Amendment or similar legislation are apparent from 
any Congressional Hearings on the subject of fair trade.
In relation to the McGuire Amendment its efforts can be 
illustrated by a special bulletih*^ sent to the "Presidents, 
and Secretaries of State, Local, and Metropolitan City 
Pharmaceutical Associations" after the McGuire Bill had 
just been reported favorably by the House Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce Committee. Those leading retail drugstore 
officials were urged to:
Automobile Dealers' Association; Americam Book Sellers 
Association; Toilet Goods Association; National Associa­
tion of Independent Tire Dealers; National Retail Hardware 
Association; Retail Tobacco Dealers of America, Inc.; 
National Retail Furniture Association; and United States 
Wholesale Grocers' Association. (House Report 1292, 
op. cit., pp. 22-23.)
42Letter from John Daurgavel to John Anderson, 
dated August 22, 1951, cited in Hearings on H. R. 4365, 
etc., op. cit., pp. 797 and 799.
4^As reprinted in Hearings on H. R. 4365, e tc.,
o p . cit., p. 605.
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... get not only other druggists but the members 
of their families, all other independent merchants 
and everyone else you possibly can to write their 
Congressmen to call for support ... get busy ... 
to start the flow of letters and telegrams to the 
members of the ... House.
The most effectively organized pressure was probably that
of the Oklahoma Pharmaceutical Association. It had adopted
a so-called "push-button" plan according to which 150
druggists from every part of the state were appointed as
a committee to warn druggists in every town "within a few
hours when the time comes to give Congressmen an extra
45nudge in order to get the fair trade bill tnrough."
The manufacturers, for whose trademark eind good 
will protection the fair trade legislation is allegedly 
meant, took a much less active role in promulgating the
A f ,virtues of fair trade. In 1952 it was stated that
44This appears to be a repetition of the pressure 
technique employed at the time of the Miller-Tydings Amend­
ment. Professor J. M. Klamon of Washington University 
called this "Government by Western Union and coercion" and 
further mentioned that Mr. Sara Rayburn got 2000 wires in 
one day concerning the Miller-Tydings Bill. Statement be­
fore U. S., House, Subcommittee of the Committee of Inter­
state and Foreign Commerce. Hearings on H. R. 10527, etc., 
86th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958, p. 223.
45
46
Hearings on H. R. 4365, e t c ., o p . cit., p. 599.
House Report No. 1292, op. cit., p. 41.
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... very few manufacturers other tham those in 
the drug, cosmetics eind toilet goods industry either 
individually or through their associations have 
publicly urged price maintenance legislation upon 
Congress in recent years.4?
An explanation for the manufacturers' mild and restraint in­
terest in the fair trade controversy can be read in the 
following quotations which very possibly represent truth­
fully the sentiments of the majority of manufacturers con­
cerning fair trade. A mamufacturer of small household appli­
ances stated that his company considered the fair trade pro- 
graim "as the small shop-keeper's minimum wage l a w ,  "48 while 
the council for the Illinois Pharmaceutical Association was 
quoted as saying that: "The fair trade movement is a re-
qtailers' show with a manufacturers' sign or label over it."
The most vigorous opposition to fair trade, and 
as such to the McGuire Bill, has been presented by the 
group of retailers who consider fair trade programs a
"̂ Îbid., p. 23.
4&U. S., Congress, House, Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Interstate smd Foreign Commerce, Hearings on 
H. R. 5767, Minimum Resale Prices, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 
1952, p. 143.
49Hearings on H. R. 4365, o p . cit., p. 438.
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50threat to their laeurketing methods. The economic philos­
ophy and retailing technique of those businessmen clashes 
with the effects of fair trade legislation. Some of the 
salient factors involved were brought out by the most 
famous of them, Mr. John Schwegmann, who ironically said 
that he was not appointed his customers' first fighter to 
preside over the liquidation of the free enterprise system,51 
and then described the economies of the supermarket opera­
tions which permits warehousing and retailing under one 
roof and buying of many supplies directly from manufacturers. 
Since the customer serves himself on a cash and carry basis, 
there is no need for sales clerks. These cure not, however, 
the only savings which are passed on to the c o n s u m e r . ^2 
Mr. Schwegmann's two stores are not air-conditioned, and 
one of them is "a big shed", almost like a Quonset h u t . 53
5 Among the organizations which are directly re­
lated to retailing and are opposed to fair trade due to 
harmful effects on their business operations, are: National 
Retail Dry Goods Association, composed of large department 
stores; Mail Order Association of America; R. H. Macy &
Co.; and several other independent large retail outlets. 
House Report No. 1292, op. cit., p. 23.




They sure 8 miles from the center of New O r l e a n s . C o n s e ­
quently he fights against fair trade since;
... it prevents economical variations in types of 
retail establishments because the manufacturers 
are compelled to fix the retail price to fit re­
tail operations with high overheads and costly 
services. Overhead emd services then become 
automatically a part of the commodities' cost to 
the consumer, whether she can afford it or wishes 
to pay for extra s e r v i c e s . 55
The critics of fair trade further consists of 
groups which represent a much larger diversity of economic 
interests than the proponents of fair trade do. Labor, 
farmer, and consumer organizations,^^ and several govern-
"̂̂ Ibid., p. 282.
55ibid., p. 314.
^^The following witnesses in this category were 
reported most active before Congressional hearings in 
opposing fair trade: American Horae Economic Association; 
American Federation of Labor; American Farm Bureau Federa­
tion; Cooperative League of the United States of America; 
Consumers Research, Inc.; National Housewives League; 
General Federation of Women's Clubs; National Grange ; 
National Dairy Union; American Association of University 
Women; and the Federation of Citizens Associations. (House 
Report No. 1292, pp. cit., p. 23.)
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mental departments and a g e n c i e s ^ ?  have consistently opposed 
the underlying philosophy of fair trade. Many newspapers 
and magazines are anti-fair trade oriented. Among others, 
"Business Week" and the "Wall Street Journal" hailed the 
Schwegmann decision as a major victory for the consumer and 
the free competitive enterprise system."Fortune"  maga­
zine has repeatedly attacked the fair trade laws as econ­
omically unsound and harmful to the best interests of the 
consumers. It opposed the McGuire Bill on the serious 
allegation that none of the arguments in favor of the McGuire 
Bill had ever been substantiated.^^
The McGuire Amendment to the Federal Trade Commis­
sion Act was enacted on July 14, 1952, granting antitrust
letters to this effect from the U. S. De­
partment of Agriculture, the Federal Trade Commission, and 
the U. S. Bureau of the Budget (U.S. Congress, House, Com­
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Fair Trade,
House Report No. 467, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959, pp. 25- 
30.) Also the U. S. Department of Justice, and even the 
U. S. Department of State expressed opposition. (U.S. 
Congress, Senate, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com­
merce, Hearings on 3850, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958, 
pp. 131 and 281.)
^ Hearings on H. R. 4365, etc., op. cit., pp.
312-312.
A Chance for Really Fair Trade," Fortune, 45 
(March 1952), p. 79.
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exemption to the state nonsigner provisions and declaring 
that those statutes would not constitute an unlawful burden
on interstate commerce. Thus Congress reversed the Schweg-
60mann and Wentling decisions.
^^C.C.H. Trade Regulation Reporter, Vol. I, 
1959, p. 4305.
CHAPTER V
LEGAL ATTACKS ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS
It is ... within the framework of the individual 
state court systems that Fair Trade is finally 
meeting defeat. With its tenuous justification 
for existence hanging by the threat of denial of 
Federal certiorari, the current of authority 
appears to be fast moving in favor of the op­
ponents of Pair Trade.1
In the previous chapter a review was given of the 
all-embracing attack on the main pillar of fair trade - the 
nonsigner provision - by the U. S. Supreme Court in the 
Schwegmann decision. Congress counteracted this move rap­
idly by the enactment of the McGuire Amendment to the Federal 
Trade Commission Act. This aunendment nullified the U. S. 
Supreme Court's decision and established firmly, although
^Richard K. Bates, "Constitutionality of State 
Fair Trade Acts," Indiana Law Journal, 32 (1957), 149.
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2not completely, the individual state nonsigner provisions' 
applicaLbility and enforcement to interstate commerce. By 
the McGuire Amendment Congress expressly lifted the bar of 
the interstate commerce clause of the Federal Constitution 
with respect to fair trade states; thus obliterating the 
major Achilles* neel of the legal fair trade structure.
Axter the enactment of the McGuire Amendment, 
the only possibility left to the fair trade opponents to 
cripple this system of price fixing in one vital blow was 
the constitutionality question of this amendment. The 
U. S. Supreme Court did not pass judgment on the consti­
tutionality of the Miller-Tydings Amendment in the first
3Schwegmann decision. Tnis indicated already the reluc­
tance of the Court to get itself involved in the determi­
nation of the wisdom employed in the economic policy of 
the legislature in relation to resale price maintenance
The McGuire Amendment is an enabling act 
Supra, Chapter IV, pp. 88 -9.) and not a Federal Fair 
Trade Act. It does not provide for the enforcement by 
the states of fair trade prices of commodities that move 
in interstate commerce from an non-fair trade state to a 
fair trade jurisdiction. (Infra, Chapter VI, pp. 180-1.)
3Schwegmann Bros, v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 
341 U. S. 384 (1951). Hereafter cited as 'the first 
Schwegmann decision.'
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regulation. This attitude became more apparent shortly 
after the enactment of the McGuire Amendment. The U. S. 
Supreme Court refused an attempt by the archenemy of fair 
trade - Mr. Schwegmann - to obtain the highest court's 
opinion on the constitutionality of the McGuire Amendment.^ 
Up to the present day the Court has maintained this policy 
of refusing to consider this question, contending that the 
cases presented and requiring its judgment on the consti­
tutionality of the McGuire Amendment did not constitute 'a 
substantial federal question'.  ̂ The fair trade proponents
^Schweqmann Bros. Giant Super Market v. Eli 
Lilly & Co., 205 F. 2d 788 (1953); certiorari denied, 346 
U. S. 856. Some of the reactions of fair traders after 
the U. S. Supreme Court refused review of the Schwegmann 
V. Eli Lilly decision are gross exaggerations of the facts. 
Mr. John w. Dargavel, executive secretary of the National 
Association of Retail Druggists, according to Business 
Week, said that the constitutionality issue of the McGuire 
Act had been ‘definitely settled* by this refusal of the 
court. Doeskin Products, Inc., an ardent advocate of re­
sale price nalntenance, trumpeted in an ad: "Thanks to nine 
wise men - the law of the jungle can no longer decide the 
price of what you buy." Business Week, Nov. 7, 1953, p. 43.
^See also, Lionel Corporation v. Grayson-Robinson 
Stores Inc., 15 N. J. 191, 104 A. 2d 304, appeal dismissed 
for want of a substantial federal question, 348 U. S. 859 
(1954); General Electric Co. v. Masters, Inc., 307 N. Y.
229, 120 N. E. 2d 802, appeal dismissed for want of a sub­
stantial federal question, 348 U. S. 892 (1954).
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had won a significant battle. The legal status of fair 
trade seemed stronger and more solidly established than 
ever before. However, the loss of prestige which fair
trade suffered as a result of the first Schwegmann deci-
6Sion was never fully regained. This decision and its 
resulting economic events had put the fair trade issue in 
the limelight of the public attention. It must also be 
assumed that it did enhance the interest of the state 
courts in this timely matter, increasing their willingness 
to scrutinize the issue more closely as soon as the oppor­
tunity arose. Regardless of the opinion of Congress ex­
pressed by the McGuire Amendment, the opinion of Mr. Jus­
tice Douglas expressed in the first Schwegmann decision 
concerning the nonsigner clause must have had great influ-
7ence on the legal fraternity.
The fight around fair trade did not cease. By 
necessity the fair trade opponents had to switch their 
approach from an all-out attack to a fragmentary warfare. 
The remaining weaknesses in the legal fair trade structure
^Bates, pp. cit., p. 130.
Ŝupra. Chapter IV, pp. 71-4.
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proved to be most instrumental in the subsequent attempts 
to emasculate fair trade pricing. Vehement attacks were 
now made upon the validity of the statutes which legalized 
price maintenance agreements. As the attackers were mainly 
nonsigners, they concentrated the fight on that provision 
which made fair trade agreements binding on them.
It is the purpose of this chapter to trace the 
legal reasoning followed and the special circumstances that 
existed in the decisive cases through which the highest 
state courts showed an increased willingness to review 
either their respective fair trade act in general or the 
nonsigner provision in the light of the states' constitu­
tional provisions.
Adverse Decisions Concerning the Validity of State Fair 
Trade Acts or the Nonsigner Provisions 
The rapid development of the willingness of the 
Highest state courts to invalidate state fair trade laws 
is rather surprising in view of the fact that prior to 
1949, the constitutionality of such legislation under state 
constitutions had been upheld oy every state court in whicn
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It was attacked. This issue was widely considered as
ybeing permanently settled. In 1939 Grether could write 
that at no time the economic consequences of resale price 
maintenance were squarely faced or even at issue before 
the courts. "The judiciary was concerned primarily with 
the specific methods and arrangements employed to achieve 
the end, not with the end i t s e l f . S a t i s f a c t o r y  compar­
isons of the severity of the economic ills to be cured and 
the social and economic damage attached to the cure Itself 
were mostly beyond the scope of legal considerations.
^The seven pertaining states and cases are : Cali­
fornia, Pep Boys v. Pyroil Sales Co., 5 Cal. 2d 194, aff'd, 
299 U, S. 198 (1936); Illinois, Seagram Distillers Corp. v. 
Old Dearborn Distributing Co., 363 111. 610, 2 N. E. 2d
940, aff'd, 299 U. S. 183 (1936); Maryland, Goldsmith v. 
Mead Johnson & Co.. 176 Md. 682, 7 A. 2d 176 (1939); North 
Carolina, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 216 N. C. 163, 4 
S. E. 2d 528 (1939); South Dakota, Miles Laboratories, Inc. 
V. Owl Drug Co.. 67 S. D. 523, 295 N. W. 292 (1940); Con­
necticut, Burroughs Wellcome & Co. v. Johnson Wholesale Per­
fume Co., 128 Conn. 596, 24 A. 2d 841 (1942). The Washing­
ton Supreme Court also upheld the constitutionality of the 
state fair trade act prior to 1949, however, it reversed 
this decision later. (Infra, p. ISO.)
9Stanley D. Rose, "Resale Price Maintenance," 
Vanderbilt Law Review, 3 (1949), 27.
^^E. T. Grether, Price Control under Fair Trade 
Legislation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1939), 
p. 374.
96
Necessarily, the developments of the law in relation to re­
sale price maintenance were, and still are, linked more 
intimately with legal traditions and precedents and, the 
technical interpretation of the law than to the appraisal 
of economic consequences.^^ As will appear from the follow­
ing expose hy states, this situation changed considerably 
during tne last decade.
The unanimity of the federal and state courts 
concerning the constitutionality question during the early 
period of resale price regulation did not, of course, re­
flect the general state of opinion. The opponents at all 
times continued attempts to wedge tne solid constitutional­
ity opinion of the judiciary. For instance, in 1936 the 
Court of Appeals of New York struck down the fair trade 
law in a case involving a nonsigner.^^ The Court of AppeaQs 
had held tne nonsigner provision to oe a measure for price 
fixing, a purpose wnich tne legislature could not accom­
plish directly or indirectly. The damage was rapidly
lllbid.
^^Douhleday Doran & Co. v. R. H. Macy & Co.,
269 N. Y. 2/2, 199 N. E. 490 (1936).
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repaired when tne same New York court overruled this 
d e c i s i o n , o n  the authority of the U. S. Supreme Court's 
decision in Old Dearoorn v. S e a g r a m , i n  which this court 
disposed of smy 'due process' and 'equal protection' objec­
tions against fair trade laws arising under the federal 
constitution.^^ This line of attack bore for a long time 
such discouraging results that the advice given by an 
attorney of the Antitrust Division of the Department of 
Justice in 1949 - "... if no aid can oe expected from the 
courts, any opponent of these acts must devote his atten­
tion to the wisdom of the legislatures in passing the 
acts."!^ - was well justified.
However, even before the fair trade structure 
was bolstered stronger than ever by the enactment of the 
McGuire Amendment, signs of eventual decay within the 
legal framework of the individual state court systems ap­
peared. In 1949 tne Florida Supreme Court started a trend
13Bourjois Sales Corp. v. Dorfman, 273 N. Y.
167, 7 N. E. 2d 30 (1937).
1*299 U. S. 183 (1936).
l^Supra, Chapter III, pp. 59-63.
l^Rose, op. cit., p. 37.
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17which in an accelerating rate brought the current of legal 
authority in favor of the fair trade opponents. This change 
in policy with reference to resale price maintenance was 
not due to the discovery or better understanding of any 
legal doctrine or precedent. The increasing economic 
pressure seemed to play a similar significant role in the 
determination of those new legal developments as the econ­
omic depression had played in the determination of the legal 
opinion in the early period of fair trade legislation.
"The disappearance of the depression-born pressure on the 
courts to refrain from tampering with regulatory laws ...
occasioned a willingness to subject measures such as re-
1 Asale price maintenance to more thorough s c r u t i n y . " T h i s  
constituted a recognition of the existence of valid con­
flicting economic interests and would presumedly have im­
plied a new evaluation of the fair trade laws, and especially 
the nonsigner provisions, by carefully weighing the harm to 
remedied against the harm incidental to the remedy itself.
As will be shown, however, the balance of justice in the
^^See Table 8, p. 100.
^®Edward J. Kohrs, "Fair Trade and the State 
Constitutions," Vanderbilt Law Review, 10 (1957), 424.
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fair trade issue was not always treated as a precision in­
strument oy considering along with the important weights 
of economic interests all the - possibly decisive - snriLler 
economic weights. The approach was mostly rather one of 
suddenly transferring important legal considerations to the 
opposite scale of the balance of justice.
The developments in the different states that have 
invalidated or weakened their fair trade provisions through 
legal constitutionality decisions will be analyzed in 
chronological order of the courts' of last resort decisions. 
This method of presentation was mainly chosen to bring out 
the influence of decisions on subsequent considerations by 
the courts in other states. This is also the justification 
and purpose of Table which indicates whether the fair 
trade act in general or the nonsigner provision was the 
target of legal criticism and also presents the dates of 
the nighest state courts' decisions.
Florida
In no state have the fair trade proponents found 
steadfast adverse state court decisions over a longer per­
iod than in Florida. In the first adverse decision the 
Florida Supreme Court managed to invalidate the act on
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TABLE 8
SEQUENCE OF ADVERSE FAIR TRADE DECISIONS 
COURTS OF LAST RESORT®
States
Part of act held 
unconstitutional Date of decision
Florida nonsigner clause^ April 5, 1949^
Michigan nonsigner clause June 27, 1952
Georgia nonsigner clause^ February 24, 1953^
Arkansas nonsigner clause February /, 1955
Nebraska act in general February 11, 1955
Oregon nonsigner clause April lb, 1956
Louisiana nonsigner clause June 29, l95o
Colorado nonsigner clause August 27, 1955
Utah act in general September 22, 1956
Indiana nonsigner clause May 22, 1957
South Carolina nonsigner clause August 26, 1957
New Mexico nonsigner clause September 27, 1957
Ohio nonsigner clause January 22, 1958
Kansas nonsigner clause March 8, 1958
West Virginia nonsigner clause April 11, 1958
Kentucky nonsigner clause June 20, 1958
Washington nonsigner clause November 5, 1958
Minnesota nonsigner clause April 8, 1960
Montana act in general February 10, 1961
Iowa nonsigner clause April 4, 1961
Ok1ahoma nonsigner clause April 18, 1961
^Source : Compiled from data and references con-
tained in Chapter V.
^More than one adverse decision. Date of first 
decision given.
^Result of latest decision.
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technical grounds without actually declaring the subject 
of the act unconstitutional. It was as early as 1939 that
the nonsigner provision of the first Florida Fair Trade Act
19was held unconstitutional. In the title of this act was 
included the expression "... through the use of voluntary 
contracts." The Florida Supreme Court concurred in the 
lower court's holding that this restricted the subject of 
the act and implied that its provision only applied to re­
tailers who voluntarily enter into fair trade contracts.
The fair trade minded Florida legislature quickly cured 
the technical defects by a 1939 amendment to the act, 
squarely inviting the court to pass judgment on nothing 
but the constitutionality issue.
Judiciary and legislature came again to grips 
when in 1949 the Florida Supreme Court in the leading and
influential case of Liquor Stores, Inc. v. Continental Dis-
21tilling Corp. declared the state fair trade act of 1939 
to be unconstitutional and, immediately afterwards, the 
state legislature - with a few insertions - re-enacted the
^^Bristol-Myers Co. v. Webb * s Cut Rate Drug Co.,
Inc., 137 Fla. 508, 188 So. 91 (1939).
Z^Florida Laws 1937. ch. 18395. 6. As cited in,
ibid.
2140 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1949).
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22law. The Florida Supreme Court did not limit its decis­
ion in this case to the nonsigner provision, but held the 
entire fair trade act repugnant to the state constitution.
The court repudiated the economic philosophy upon 
which the validity of the price fixing feature of the Flor­
ida Fair Trade Act as it is applied to nonsigners is said 
to rest. The Florida Supreme Court justified its disregard 
of the overwhelming preceding body of legal authority in 
regard to fair trade by taking, "... on its own initiative 
judicial notice of what had long been apparent to writers 
on the subject - that the decisions upholding the fair
trade acts were based on erroneous assumptions as to their
2 3nature and purpose."
As to the legal justification of the nonsigner 
provision on the basis of the trademark theory as estab­
lished by the U .  S .  Supreme Court in the Old Dearborn c a s e , 2 4  
the Florida Supreme Court held: "The court of last resort of 
each sovereign state is the final arbiter as to whether the
^^Manuel Harnik, "The Florida Fair Trade Act 
Case," Washington and Lee Law Review. 7 (1959), 28.
^^Note, Harvard Law Review, 63 (January, 1950),
547.
2/■Supra, Chapter III, pp. 59-63.
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act conforms to its own constitution whereas the federal 
courts are concerned only with whether the act offends the 
federal constitution." This revolutionary attitude of 
the Florida Supreme Court deviating from the U. S. Supreme 
Court's established fair trade opinion discontinued a trend 
of state courts adopting almost automatically the authority 
of the highest federal court's legal reasoning.
The Florida Fair Trade Act was held to exceed 
the bounds of the legislature's police power because it 
served the private interest of one economic group to the 
detriment of the general public by allowing an interested 
person the power to fix a price without any review of his 
act. This lack of a 'yardstick' standard, the court found, 
made the price fixing statute arbitrary, unreasonable and 
violative of the constitutional right to own and enjoy 
property. The court expressly held that legislation of 
this type "is constitutional and can be constitutional only 
in situations wherein our economic structure is seriously
2^40 So. 2d 371, 375.
2&see e. g. the New York case, cited above.
Supra, p. 95 .
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2 7endangered," thus branding fair trade legislation as a 
typical depression measure without justification in a 
sound and dynamic economic situation.
The contention that fair trade did not serve the 
interest of the general public was mainly determined by 
the extensive study on resale price maintenance through 
which the Federal Trade Commission came to the conclusion 
"... that in the absence of effective Government super­
vision in the public interest, resale price maintenance, 
legalized to correct abuses of extreme price competition, 
is subject to use as a means of effecting enhancement of 
prices by secret agreements and restraint of competition 
by coercive action on the part of interested cooperating 
trade groups of manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers 
in such a way and to such an extent as to make it econom-
2 4ically unsound and undesirable in a competitive economy." 
The court contradicted the contention that fair trade
2740 So. 2d 371, 388.
28pederal Trade Commission, Report on Resale 




legislation serves the general welfare by quoting from 
page LXI of this report: "The essence of resale price main­
tenance is control of price competition. Lack of adequate 
enforcement of the antitrust laws leaves a broad field for 
the activities of organized trade groups to utilize it for 
their own advantage and to the detriment of consumers ..."
Fair trade proponents and some legal writers 
failed to be impressed by the Federal Trade Commission's 
findings, or by the opinions of influential personalities 
and agencies opposing fair trade as quoted in the study.
It was held, for instance, that the logic of the Florida 
Supreme Court's decision was vulnerable in that this court, 
upon an argumentative non-judicial report, assumed to find 
as a fact that fair trade did not advantage the general pub­
lic interest, although the contrary determination by the
32legislature was clearly within its cxjwer. This criticism
30(40 So. 2d 371, 375.)
31p.T.C., 1945, 0£. cit., pp. LXII-LXIII.
3^A. L. Beaudette and M. H. Berens, "The nonsigner 
clause of fair trade acts; constitutionality and theory of 
enforcement," Notre Dame Lawyer, 25 (1950), 529. See also: 
Harold Harper and Dorothy Atwood, "Fair Trade in the Courts," 
The Basis and Development of Fair Trade (New York: The 
National Wholesale Druggists' Association, 1955), p. 21.
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implies, that the Florida Supreme Court would have been 
correct if it had, instead of relying on the Federal Trade 
Commission's finding of facts, followed either of three al­
ternatives. (a) It could have refrained itself from consid­
ering the economic aspects by settling the question on legal 
precedents and blindly accepting the legislature's economic 
justification of the act; (b) it could have given the facts 
concerning the public interest on the basis of which the 
Florida legislature approved the fair trade act priority 
over the empirical evidence of the Federal Trade Commission; 
or (c) the court could have conducted an extensive (judic­
ial) economic fact finding investigation itself to deter­
mine the public interest issue of fair trade legislation.
By not employing the first alternative the court recognized 
that the problem was broader in scope than could be cov­
ered by pure legal interpretation. The court showed also 
a high degree of realism by preferring the conclusions 
based on the most extensive study available and conducted 
by the beet qualified experts and least partial agencies. 
This attitude eliminated the second as well as the third 
alternative. It would have been obviously beyond the means 
and capabilities of the Florida Supreme Court to improve on 
the Federal Trade Commission's empirical study.
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The Florida legislature, in the hope of convinc­
ing the judiciary branch that its decision in the Liquor
Stores case was erroneous and that a reasonable basis did
33exist for this type of regulatory law, passed a third 
fair trade act similar to the act of 1939, to which a 
lengthy preamble entitled "Findings of Fact" was annexed. 
This preamble in effect declared that the statute was a 
lawful exercise of the police power and would serve the 
public interest. A novelty in the act was the provision 
that the attorney general was empowered to bring an action 
to restrain the performance or enforcement of any price 
maintenance agreement if he finds that the given agree­
ments prevent competition with regard to the same general 
case or that the commodity in question is not in free and 
open competition with merchandise of the same general 
class. This provision was presumably inserted to calm the 
critics of the monopolistic tendencies of the fair trade
act.34
In 1951 the Florida Supreme Court also struck
^^Kohrs, op. cit., p. 419,
34Bates, pp. cit., p. 135.
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35down this attempt to legalize fair trade in Florida. In 
a brief opinion the court affirmed the action of a trial 
court which had looked behind the "findings of fact" of 
the most recent fair trade act and had found them wanting. 
Something of the act was salvaged this time, however, as 
the court only held the nonsigner provision invalid on the 
authority of the first Schwegmann decision. The court found 
it apparently unnecessary to rule on the effectiveness of 
the supervisory task of the attorney general as provided 
for in the new act. This neglect gave the fair traders in 
Florida new confidence in their ability to bend the court's 
opinion in their favor when the federal McGuire Amendment 
beccime an accomplished fact in 1952. The legislature re- 
enated the 1949 fair trade act in 1953. Thus leaving the 
fair trade issue in Florida once more legally unsettled. 
Although, by now, the position of the Florida Supreme Court 
could hardly be more obvious.
The court agreed to settle the doubt in the Miles 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Eckerd^^ case. The question whether
^^Seaqram-Distillers Corp. v. Ben Green, Inc.,
54 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1951).
36?3 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1954).
lo9
the principle enunciated by the court in the Seagram v.
Ben Green case had been superseded by the McGuire Amend­
ment was disposed of by holding that “It is hardly necessary 
to point out that the decisions of this Court interpreting 
the Constitution of Florida are supreme and will not be 
overthrown by act of Congress or the Federal Courts unless 
some Federal constitutional question is involved."
The court, by now bolstered in its critical atti­
tude toward fair trade by the highest courts' decisions in
38two other states, condemned the nonsigner provision 
again. "This Court has expressed its views on fair trade 
and has consistently and unequivocally rejected, on consti­
tutional grounds, both the underlying theory and the econ­
omic facts on which they are sought to be predicated ... as 
we have stated before, the real effect of the nonsigner 
clause is anti-competitive price-fixing, not the protecting 
of good will of trade marked products as other courts have 
held ... the nonsigner clause must fall as an invalid use
'̂̂ Ibid., at 681.
^^Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman* s Tool Shop Sport­
ing Goods Co., 334 Mich. 109, 54 N. W. 2d 268 (1952); Gray- 
son-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Oneida, Ltd., 209 (Ga. 513, 75 
S. E. 2d 161, certiorari denied. 346 U. S. 823 (1953).
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39of the police power for a private, not a public purpose." 
Justice Terrell theorized, that good will should be deter­
mined by the price which the goods can command in the com­
petitive market, and not by the ability of the manufacturer
40to sell at a pegged retail price which he himself selects.
The court saw the real vice of the nonsigner pro­
vision in the absence of a standard for the protection of 
the consuming public. The court was not impressed with the 
legislature's provisions in this respect in the re-enacted 
1949 Act.^^ "Legislative 'findings of fact' as to the policy 
beyind the law, does not remove the lack of the 'yardstick' 
standard, neither does the delegation of the power to the 
attorney general provide such administrative supervision
in the public interest as will overcome the innate vice in 
4?the act."
Justice Terrell considered the provided supervision 
by the attorney general a poor substitute for the concepts
^^Miles V. Eckerd, op. cit., at 681-82.
^^This statement was probably adopted from E. R. 
Corey, "Fair Trade Pricing: A Reappraisal", Harvard Busi­
ness Review, 30 (Sept.-Oct., 1952), 60.
4 1supra, pp. 107-8.
4 2Miles V. Eckerd, pp. cit., at 682.
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of free competition, which have traditionally been the
43yardstick for the protection of the consuming public.
An indication of the finality of the Miles Labor­
atories decision and a further weakening of the status of 
fair trade in Florida is contained in the holding of the 
Florida Supreme Court^^ reviewing a circuit court decision 
which had dismissed a fair trader's complaint for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Sun­
beam Corporation had brought this complaint on the grounds 
that the defendant had interfered with Sunbeam's uniform 
fair trade contract system whereby all of its products were 
sold through distributors who had entered into price main­
tenance contracts with the company. The defendant had in­
duced those distributors to sell Sunbeam's products to the 
defendant in violation of these contracts. In tne court's 
opinion, which affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the 
complaint. Justice Hobson quoted from the lower court deci­
sion; "... preventing nonsigners from buying goods diminishes 
the scope of competition just as surely as preventing them
^^Ibid.
^^Sunbeam Corporation v. Gilbert Simmons Ass. 
Inc.. 91 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 1956).
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from selling them below the fair trade price, though it is 
true that it is a more indirect means of accomplishing the 
same o b j e c t i v e . T h e  court further stated: "The pattern 
of operation ... represents a slightly different approach, 
on the part of tne manufacturer, from those which we have 
previously considered, but the end result is the same as 
that which we have repeatedly condemned as violative of the 
public policy of Florida." This broke the last feasible 
stronghold of the fair trade structure in Florida.
In summary, the nonsigner provision of the Florida 
Fair Trade Act was held unconstitutional in that it (1) 
violates public policy, (2) bears no relation to the public 
health, morals, peace, safety or general welfare, and, as 
such, is an abuse of the police power, and (3) it attempts 
to delegate the sovereign power of the state for a private 
purpose.
Michigan
Just before the passage of the McGuire Amendment 
by the U. S. Congress, the Michigan Supreme Court followed 
the example of the Florida court and invalidated the
"̂ Îbid. , at 336.
46lbid.
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nonsigner provision of the Michigan Fair Trade Act. The 
Michigan Supreme Court held that the fair trade act pro­
vision prohibiting sales by nonsigners of fair trade con­
tracts of trademarked and fair traded articles at less than 
fixed price, was violative of the due process clause of
the Michigan Constitution and was not sustainable under
47the police power.
The court recognized that the constitutionality 
of similar legislation, as applied to nonsigners of fair 
trade agreements, had been upheld in most states consider­
ing this question and by the U. S. Supreme Court in the Old 
48Dearborn case. Nevertheless the court followed the uni­
que example of the Florida Supreme Court, which, according
to the Michigan Supreme Court, gave a suiarior reasoned view
49in the Liquor Store case.
The court contended that laws prohibiting theft, 
larceny and conversion do bear a relationslhip to public 
morals and welfare, but it failed to see that the good will,
^^Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman's Tool Shop Sport­
ing Goods Co., 334 Mich. 109, 54 N. W. 2d 268 (1952).
Supra, Chapter III, pp. 59-63.
^ ^Shakespeare v. Lippman. o p . c it., at 269.
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trademark or brand name is wrongfully appropriated or
stolen by means of cutting resale prices.
Justice Dethmers agreed that the manufacturer's
good will may be adversely affected, but this was, in his
opinion, not different from the result of a competitor's
50placing a better product on the market for less money. 
Important is the description of the scope of trademark 
legislation in relation to resale price maintenance. The 
function of a trademark, the court argued, is simply to 
designate the goods as the product of a particular manu­
facturer or trader and to protect his good will against the 
sale of another's product as his and to prevent confusion 
of the public regarding the origin of goods of competing 
vendors. Trademark rights do not go as far that cut-rate 
sales constitute a breach of such rights. "They do not 
enable it to sell its cake and have it, too."
The argument that the fair trade law including 
the nonsigner provision is a valid exercise of the state's 




and the evils of a price war, was considered by the court 
as the controlling question. The court refused to be im­
pressed by this argument and held this reasoning to be 
repugnant to the concept upon which America's competitive 
economy was developed. "Can it be said that by the pro­
cess of reducing prices, either war, destruction or evil 
are visited upon the public health, safety, morals or the 
general welfare?" The fair traded product in question 
in this case was a trademarked line of fishing tackle. In 
its well reasoned opinion the court could not possibly com­
prehend now the sale of fishing tackle was in any wise 
connected with the public interest.
The court failed to see how the plight of the 
small retailer against the large could be solved by fair 
trade legislation, as fair trade provisions are restricted 
to branded and trademarked goods. "Is not the survival of 
the small retailer made as difficult by the large retailer's 
cut-rate sales of bulk, unbranded and non-trademarked 
staples as by the like sale of branded and trademarked 
goods? The difference, if any, is scarcely such as to 
render the restriction on price cutting valid in the one
^^Ibid.. at 271.
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instance and invalid in the other."^3
In 1955 the Michigan Supreme Court rendered the 
state fair trade act almost totally ineffective by denying 
a temporary injunction to restrain a nonsigner from tortlous- 
ly interfering with the manufacturer's written contracts 
with wholesalers and r e t a i l e r s . ^4 The enforcement request 
was held to be in violation with another state statute, 
which provides that a defendant is privileged to induce 
the nonperformance of a contract of which "the purpose or 
effect ... is to restrict his business opportunities in 
violation of a defined public p o l i c y . "55 This public policy 
question as to the nonsigner provision was considered to 
have been settled in the Shakespeare case.
Justice Butzel came to the defense of the fair 
trader's position in his dissenting minority opinion. He 
held that the rights of a party evolving from a legal con­
tract between private parties should be honored by third 
parties. To induce a party to the contract to break it,
53 Ibid.
^^Argus Ccimeras, Inc. v. Hall of Distributors, Inc., 
343 Mich. 54, 72 N. W. 2d 152 (1955).
^^Restatement, 1939, Torts 766, 774, as cited in 
ibid., at 154.
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is a wrongful act without legal or social justification.^^ 
This leads necessarily to the implication that the mono­
polistic possibilities of private contracts which as such 
do not violate the scope of an existing anti-monopoly law,
are socially justifiable. The opinion and public policy
57rule expressed in the above mentioned statute is radi­
cally opposed to this view. The majority of the court be­
lieved that the social justification for its decision lay 
in the maintenance of horizontal price competition. By re­
stricting the enforcement of fair trade contracts to the 
actual parties of the contracts, the Michigan Supreme Court 
virtually nullified fair trade in Michigan.
The significance of the Michigan Supreme Court 
decisions is the excellent policy argument it employed.
This argument is actually a two-point attack on fair trade 
at its very source. The stated purpose of fair trade is 
the protection of the good will, trademarks and brand 
names. Yet the federal trademark legislation as well as 
the doctrine of unfair competition provides extensive pro­
tection for those items of good will. Such protection
^ ^ A r g u s  V. Hall, op. cit., at 155. 
S^supra. p. 116, note 55.
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should be sufficient and the real purpose of fair trade is 
really not to render such protection at all.^® This elimi­
nated any justification of the main objectionable feature 
of the statute, i.e., the obstruction of price competition.
Georgia
The Supreme Court of Georgia was the first to
invalidate a state fair trade law after the passage of the
McGuire Act. In Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Oneida,
59Ltd. this court rejected Oneida's petition for injunctive 
relief from defendants' use of Oneida's 'Community' mer­
chandise as 'loss leaders' and held the whole Georgia Fair
Trade Act null and void, because it had conflicted with the
60Sherman Act at tne time of its passage and had not been 
validated by repassage after Congress removed the conflict 
by enacting the Miller-Tydings amendment. The court raised 
by way of dictum due process objections to the statute 
under the Georgia Constitution, indicating the attitude of 
the court to fair trade in general. Justice Head, in
S^Rose, op. cit., p. 148.
59209 Ga. 613, 75 S. E. 2d 161. (1953)
GOMarch 4, 1937.
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concurring specially in the judgment of the court re­
marked, "... the sole unfair competition alleged in this 
case is a violation of contracts based on the minimum re­
tail resale prices established by Oneida, Ltc. ... the 
petition did not seek relief for any alleged acts of the 
defendant in deceiving, misleading, and confusing the pub­
lic, and capitalizing on the reputation and good will of 
the petitioners."^^
It is especially in relation to low-raargin re­
tail outlets which try to reduce their mark-ups proportion­
ally on the complete stock they carry, that fair traders 
will find it difficult to bring any of the allegations 
mentioned by Justice Head against such retailers, neither 
do the trademark protection merits of fair trade sound very 
convincing in such cases.
The odds were against the Georgia legislature 
when it repassed the Georgia Fair Trade Act in 1953. This 
accounts probably for the inclusion in the act of certain 
findings of fact. The caption of the Georgia Fair Trade Act 
of 1953 provides an interesting and typical example of
G^Grayson v. Oneida, op. cit., at 165.
62Georgia Laws, November - December Session, 
p. 549, as cited in Cox et al. v. General Electric Company, 
211 Ga. 286, 85 S. E. 2d 514 (1955).
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the fair traders' notion of competition. It provides that
the act has for one of its purposes;
... to declare the public policy of Georgia with 
respect to property rights, trademarks, good 
will, and the right and freedom to contract, and 
to exercise the policy power of the State of 
Georgia so as to forbid the conduct of business 
in such manner as to infringe the equal rights 
of others, and to protect the general public 
against practices which may have the effect, or 
be intended to have the effect, of defeating or 
lessening competition or encouraging monopoly, 
by authorizing contracts stipulating minimum 
resale pricescn commodities bearing trade-marks, 
brands or nairaes, and defining as unfair com­
petition and making actionable knowingly and 
wilfully to advertise for sale, offer for sale, 
or sell such commodities at less tnan the mini­
mum prices established in or under the contracts 
authorized by this Act, whether the person so 
advertising for sale, offering for sale or selling 
is or is not a party to such contracts.
It is rather difficult to reconcile this state­
ment with tne economic notion of price competition in the 
market to which all productive units (retailers included) 
are supposed to be subjected in our competitive free enter­
prise system and under the antitrust laws. The differences 
in definitions of economic concepts does contribute consid­
erably to the confused controversial situation in which the 
fair trade issue remains.
^^Ibid., at 519 - 520.
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The above declaration carries the contradictory 
implication, that it is good public policy to restrict 
price competition for a particular category of commodities 
in order to prevent that this price competition eliminate 
or lessen price competition in the trade of the remaining 
commodities. Price competition in trademarked commodities 
supposedly stimulates oligopolistic or monopolistic devel­
opments at the retail level.
The Georgia Supreme Court considered the fair
64trade issue most tnoroughly in 1955 and rendered the non­
signer provision of the 1953 Georgia Fair Trade Act uncon­
stitutional. This provision was characterized as a clear 
violation of the provisions of tne due process clause of 
the Constitution of Georgia.
After a review of some cases in which the U. S. 
Supreme Court had condemned price fixing practices, the 
Georgia Supreme Court commented remarkably and critically 
on the delegation to the states the right to enact fair 
trade laws, applicable to nonsigners in interstate trade, 
through the provisions of the federal McGuire Amendment.
64Cox V. G.E., op. cit. 
^^Ibid., at 519.
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"This attempt by the Congress to delegate to the States 
this power seems to be in the reverse of the power of dele­
gation as we have always understood this subject under our
system of government and under the provisions of the Consti-
66tution of the United States."
It is hardly surprising that the court, which had 
previously ruled that the regulation of the milk price by a
board authorized by the legislature was in violation of the
67due process clause of the state constitution could find 
no justification for the fair trade nonsigner provision. 
"Certainly, if milk is not affected with a public interest, 
electric appliances are not ... if the General Assembly can­
not authorize a board created by the State to fix prices,
68certainly it cannot give this right to an individual."
The court continued to defy the fair traders' 
arguments one after another. The contention that the price 
fixing feature of the act was incidental to the real purpose 
of protecting the property right of the manufacturer in his 
trade name and trademark, was rebuted: "If the price fixing
^^Ibid., at 517.
^^Harris v. Duncan, 208 Ga. 561, 67 S. E. 2d
692 (1951).
68Cox V. G.E., op. cit., at 517-518.
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provisions are stricken from the act, the act is destroyed. 
Surely a provision so vital is not merely incidental.”
The self-confidence of the court in the accuracy 
of its decision is expressed in a statement made after the 
court had branded the findings of fact, which the General 
Assembly had included in the 1953 Act, as simple arguments 
as to the reasons why they considered the act necessary, 
and their conclusions as to the effect of the act. "We 
(the Court) are convinced that any findings of fact in con­
flict with what has been held in this opinion would be an 
attempt by the General Assembly to find a fact that does not 
exist, and of course, no court is bound by that sort of 
finding of fact by a legislative body."^^
The court refused to be impressed b\ what other 
state supreme courts or the U. S. Supreme Court may or may 
not have decided. It considered the constitutional question 
of a statute like the fair trade law under the state consti­
tution one of the few powers left to states to decide for 
themselves. The court would not strike down the constitution 
for the "modern trend to allow the government to more and
^^Ibid., at 518. 
7°ibid.
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more encroach upon the individual liberties and freedoms,"
71neither would it follow the crowd.
The proponents of fair trade hardly could have 
asked for a more straight forward and clearer adverse 
decision.
Arkansas
The Arkansas Supreme Court "... did not hesitate
to investigate the political-economic aspects of fair trade
72legislation in reaching its decision." The court declared
the nonsigner provision of the Arkansas Fair Trade Act un-
7 3constitutional less than a month after the similar Geor­
gia decision. Although the Arkansas Supreme Court restricted 
its consideration of tne nonsigner provision to the due 
process clause of the state constitution, it stated; " ... 
in doing so we do not intend to intimate that otner sec­
tions (of the state constitution) are not relevant to the 
.74issue here."
71lbid., at 519.
72Bates, op. cit., p. 141.
72Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. White River 
Distributors. Inc.. 224 Ark. 558, 275 S. W. 2d 455 (1955).
^"^Ibid., at 456.
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The court refused to consider the fair trade act 
on the ground that it prevents ruinous competition caused 
by selling below cost, simply because the nonsigner-price 
cutter made a profit by selling "Prestone" anti-freeze 
$ 0.78 below the $ 3.75 per gallon fair trade price.
The fact that under the existing fair trade law 
a manufacturer must have at least one contract with a re­
tailer to employ the nonsigner provision, was labeled as 
"... a desparate attempt to hedge against the charge of 
unconstitutionality ... If securing a contract with one 
dealer binds all otners, thain the corollary would be that, 
absent such contract, the others are not bound. It is 
frightful to think a device so easily concocted could de­
stroy the constitutional bulwark protecting our personal 
liberties and the public welfare.
The court agreed with a statement not originating 
with the court, to the effect that: "It is a generaliza­
tion, but not an overstatement, to say that the effort to 




for more than the sponsoring group believes that the pur­
chasing public would pay for that 'something* without an
7 7enforced fixed price."
The court leaned heavily on the economic opinion
7ftof the Federal Trade Commission and on House Report No. 
1292,^^ to determine its opinion concerning the effects of 
fair trade in relation to the public welfare.
A negative approach to justify the invalidation 
of the nonsigner provision of the Arkansas Fair Trade Act 
-on the basis that it is not protective of the public wel­
fare sounds most convincing. The court stated: "Nowhere
has our attention been called to any demand by the public
80for the enactment of such legislation."
It has been argued, that violation of the due 
process clause of state constitutions as a basis of an 
attack on the nonsigner provisions does not have the 
stability and performance that constitutional protection
^^Ibid., at 461.
^^Report, 1945, op. cit.
79U. S., Congress, House, Select Committee on 
Small Business, Fair Trade : The Problems and Issues, 
Report No. 1292, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952.
80Union Carbide v. White, o p . cit., at 458.
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should afford in a democratic society. "These courts which 
during a period of general prosperity and few bankruptcies 
have found nonsigner statutes not reasonably related to the 
public welfare, may change their minds and reverse them­
selves if the next constitutional test of such statutes is 
brought during a recession."®^ The Arkansas Supreme Court, 
after its approximately 5000 words long decision, crammed 
with due process objections to the nonsigner provision, can 
hardly be accused of creating instability in constitutional 
protection as it will not easily reverse its elaborate 
opinion as expressed in this case.
Nebraska
The Supreme Court of Nebraska declared the entire
82Nebraska Fair Trade Act unconstitutional. It challenged 
the act on not less than eight specifications. Although of 
little interest in the context of this treatise, the Ne­
braska decision can function as a beautiful example of the
Q 1Michael Conant, "Resale Price Maintenance: 
Constitutionality of Nonsigner Clauses," University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review. 109 (February, 1961), 551.
^^McGraw Electric Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., 
159 Neb. 703, 68 N. W. 2d 608 (1955).
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rejection of fair trade purely on legal principles and 
argumentation.
Among other things, the Nebraska Supreme Court 
held that the purpose of the act was broader than its 
title; the act was in violation with the state's anti­
trust statute; it provided for unconstitutional delega­
tion of legislative power without the imposition of any 
standards or review; it makes an irrevocable grant of 
special privileges and immunities to private persons; and 
the fair trade act constituted legislation beyond the
police power of the state violating the due process clause
8 3of the Nebraska constitution.
The court argued that tne nonsigner provision 
enables to establish and maintain on a horizontal level 
for all retailers a minimum retail price by only one fair 
trade contract with a single retailer. "An effect of this 
legislation is to permit one producer and one retailer to 
do on behalf of a class of retailers that which legally 
the class is forbidden to do as a class . .. (The nonsigner 
provision) immunizes against competition between and among
^^Ibld., at 612-513.
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a Aretail competitors handling such commodities in trade."
The grant of power to individuals to fix and en­
force the prices of merchandise, without the imposition of 
any standards was found to be particularly obnoxious to the 
concept of due process of law.®^
Oregon
In 1951 tne validity of Oregon's fair trade law 
as applied to nonsigners came before the Supreme Court of 
Oregon. On the authority of the first Schwegmann decision, 
the nonsigner clause was declared invalid and void.^^
Because of tne uncertainty engendered by the 
passage of the federal McGuire Amendment and the doubt as 
to what the U. S. Supreme Court would ultimately decide as 
to the effects of this federal amendment upon fair trade 
acts, the Supreme Court of Oregon was willing to consider 
the issue under the Oregon constitution.®'" The nonsigner
R4Ibid., at 615.
GSibid., at 617.
Q^Lambert Pharmaceutical Co. v. Roberts Bros., 
192 Or. 23, 233 P. 2d 258, 260 (1951).
^^General Electric Co. v. Wahle, 207 Ore. 302, 
296 P. 2d 635 (1956).
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provision was held to violate the state constitutional 
rights of contract and property and was termed by the court
as "... a flagrant violation of the constitutional provis-
88ion respecting the delegation of legislative power." A 
comment typical of th^se state courts rejecting the argu­
ments that fair trade acts are valid exercises of the state
o qpolice power was made by the Oregon court. "Viewed from 
a realistic standpoint, it is difficult to find any justi­
fication for the fair trade act based upon considerations 
of public health, safety, morals, and welfare. We can see 
no real and substantial connection between the nebulous 
theory that fixed minimum resale prices are necessary to 
protect the good will of the trademark owner and the wel­
fare of the public.
Regardless of how the true nature of fair trade 
may be camouflaged by high sounding terms such as ‘free and 
open competition', 'unfair competition', 'protection of 
goodwill", etc., the court held a matter of common knowledge
^^Ibid., at 648.
®^Case note, "The Constitutionality of the Vir­
ginia Pair Trade Act," Virginia Law Review, 47 (May, 1961), 
638.
E. V. Wahle, op. cit., at 544.
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that the nonsigner provision is designed principally to
91destroy competition at the retail level.
The court also objected to the fact that the fair
trade provisions were justified by the fair trade propon­
ents indirectly in terms of the public welfare through the 
manufacturers' interests involved, while the group really 
interested in fair trade remained unmentioned. The court 
brought this out by stating; "... it is obvious that the
whole scheme ... is one of private, rather than public,
gain, a scheme fathered by highly organized groups of dis­
tributors and retailers, interested not in the public weal,
92but only in their own selfish ends." The court consid­
ered the facts, statistics and observations of Professors
q  *5Shulman and Fulda as a plain indication that the con­
sumer is not benefited, but on the contrary is harmed by 
the operation of the fair trade act. The court considered 
the accuracy of the two scholars' findings seemingly beyond
Slfbid., at 642.
^^rbid., at 645.
91Harry Shulman, "The Fair Trade Acts and the Law 
of Restrictive Agreements Affecting Chattels," The Yale 
Law Journal, 49 (February, 1940), 607-25; Carl H. Fulda, 
"Resale Price Maintenance," University of Chicago Law Re­
view, 21 (Winter, 1954), 175-211.
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question. The court more or less settled the whole issue 
in these words" "The consumer is the p u b l i c . A d a m  Smith's 
dictum that the ultimate goal of all production is con­
sumption must have been in the mind of the judge that wrote 
the decision. Well established economic principles and 
the classification of retailers as producers must also have 
played a role when the court held that fair trade sacri­
fices the consumer by compelling him "... to pay a higher
price ... in order that the retailer may be guaranteed a
95higher fixed, and often unreasonable, profit."
Louisiana
After the fair trade history made in Louisiana by
96Mr. Schwegmann in 1951 and 1953 it is not surprising that
9 7his name also appears in the name of the case by which 
94G.E. V. Wahle, op. cit., at 645.
^^Ibid.
^^1951, supra, pp. 69-74: 1953, supra, pp. 91-3.
^^The significant role Mr. Schwegmann has played 
in the fair trade developments during the last decade 
justify a reiteration of some of his activities as reported 
in "Taste of Conquest", Newsweek, July 23, 1956, p. 56.
Mr. Schwegmann is head of a New Orleans supermarket which 
sells everything from drugs to shotgun shells. He is 
passionately convinced of his right to set prices as low 
as he chooses, with the result that he grossed $ 22 million
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the Louisiana Supreme Court declared the nonsigner provi­
ngSion of the state fair trade act unconstitutional
The court's decision contained basically the 
same reasoning as was already employed in previous cases 
on fair trade decided by the highest courts in other states. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court considered the nonsigner pro­
vision from the standpoint of delegation of legislative
power and termed it "... legislative delegation in the most
99obnoxious form."
in 1956. He had to survive a hoard of lawsuits by manu­
facturers who insist that tneir retailers do not sell be­
low the stipulated price. Schwegmann becaune a national 
figure in 1951. The McGuire Act did not dismay him. He 
stuck to his guns, through volleys of subpoenas and a se­
ries of legal defeats, eventually accumulating 33 injunc­
tions from various manufaturers. He sponsored a bus motor­
cade to Baton Rouge to argue futilely against fair trade 
before the state legislature. In 1956he even ran for the 
legislature himself, solely on the fair trade issue (he 
finished third). But in the Dr. Tichenor v. Schwegmann 
case crusader Schwegmann proved that he could lose many 
battles and still win a war. A federal district court 
reacted on the Louisiana Supreme Court decision by sus­
pending all 33 injunctions against Schwegmann. Schweg­
mann 's militant reaction: "It is D-Day for all consumers 
in Louisiana."
98Dr. G. H. Tichenor Antiseptic Co. v. Schweg­





Olin Mathieson's firearms and ammunition broke 
the nonsigner provision stronghold of fair trade in Col­
orado. The influence of the general criticism in previous 
cases by courts in other states was strongly reflected in 
the opinion of the Colorado Supreme C o u r t . T h e  court, 
in its hostility toward fair trade based on a feeling of 
the economic unsoundness of this statute, stated: "The con­
tract in the instant case^^^ ... if enforced ... inevitably 
will result in m o n o p o l y . " The court declared that it 
failed to perceive how a consumer is in any way protected 
or benefited if he is required to pay a higher price. The 
court considered it equally obscure "... now this statute 
... can operate to accomplish its expressed purpose to 
foster and encourage competition.
^^^Qlin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. Francis, 134 
Colo. 160, 301 P. 2d 139 (1956).
^^^It was explicitly stated that Olin Mathieson 
had only one fair trade contract with a retailer in the 
entire State of Colorado. (Ibid., at 141.)
^Q^Ibid., at 147.
103 Ibid., at 144.
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A stinging criticism on the partiality of the
legislature's economic policy and the court's earnest
belief in the necessity of judicial review is contained in
the following quotation concerning the nonsigner provision:
Legislation of this kind evidences the ability of 
minorities to induce legislation for their special 
benefit at the expense of the unorganized pur­
chasing masses. During a recent decade numerous 
attempts were made to regiment the general public 
and in each instance they were struck down as 
violative of constitutional rights of a free 
people. We have not yet arrived at a place in 
America where the many must yield to the few, 
so that the latter may make ever increasing 
profits . . .
The court refused to place "tne power of the 
legislature above the constitution" in regard to the non­
signer provision. Tne statute was neid unconstitutional 
because it was lacking in due process; because it was con­
fiscatory; and because it tends to establish a monopoly.
L'tan
Utah is one of the three western states in which 
the respective supreme courts struck down the entire fair 
trade act.^^^ The Constitution of Utah, which forbids
^‘̂'̂ Ibid., at 152. 
^°^Ibid., at 139.
106Nebraska, supra, p. 127; Montana, Infra, p. 156.
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"... any combination ... having for its object or effect 
the controlling of the price ... of any article of manu­
facture or commerce" provided the Supreme Court of that
state with a firm basis for striking down resale price
.  ̂ 107maintenance.
The Utah Supreme Court reviewed extensively the 
justification of fair trade provisions as presented by the 
General Electric C o m p a n y . T h e  traditional fair trade 
arguments employed oy General Electric sounded so convinc­
ing to the court that it asserted: "The arguments that the 
intent and purpose of the Fair Trade Law are in harmony 
witn the anti price-fixing provisions of our Constitution 
are indeed plausible, and tne authorities holding such acts 
valid are eminent and i m p r e s s i v e . "^^9 The Court saw no
^^^Kohrs, pp. cit., 432. Michael Conant doubts 
the firmness of this basis: "But in other states with con­
stitutional proscriptions of monopolies, nonsigner clauses 
have been held not violative of such provisions. The usual 
reasoning of the courts in these cases is that their con­
stitutions prohibit only complete monopolies of a trade or 
Product and do not bar vertical price fixing agreements for 
individual products. This reasoning is applied even though 
the large majority of the producers of a type of product 
establish the same relatively high resale price for their 
comparable products." (Conant, pp. cit., 551.)
^^^General Electric Co. v. Thrifty Sales, Inc.,
5 Utah 2d 326, 301 P. 2d 741 (1956).
^°^Ibid., at 747.
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other objections to the fair trade law than that it consti­
tuted price-fixing, which is in violation of the specific 
language of the Utah constitution. The court refused to be­
come a 'super constitutional convention' and disregard the 
language of the constitution and "... impose an interpreta­
tion as to what they may secretly have intended or ought ha/e
done as divined by plaintiff.
The court, apparently not willing to offend any­
body, also found the defense's arguments against fair trade 
plausible. The court was impressed witn the evidence that 
the fair trade purpose in reality was not to'* protect the 
millions spent by General Electric to create superior qual­
ity products and to advertise them, all capitalized in the 
public's good will by the trademark 'GE', but to protect 
the retailer. The question was asked: "If the protection
of good will is so vital, why does not the manufacturer fair
trade all his products?"
The court saw no necessity to agree or to dis­
agree witn the many arguments for and against fair trade,
^^°Ibid., at 748.
^^^Ibid., at 749. Fair trade progreuns will most 
likely only be emphasized by manufacturers if they are to 
the mutual benefit of the manufacturer and retailer.
(Supra, p. 120.)
138
but it leaned toward the opponents' side in its contention 
that even if this type of price fixing under the nonsigner 
provision were for the salutary purposes as contended by 
General Electric, it violates the constitution of Utah.
"It is like sin: a little sin, properly so classified, is 
just as definitely sin as a great quantity of it, and 
hardly to be approved under the pretext that it is so small 
in amount that it can really be classified as a virtue. 
Regardless whatever forms or rituals are gone through, the 
basic essence of the nonsigner provision is 'price fixing'
Indiana
The Indiana Supreme Court used strictly legal
reasoning to invalidate the nonsigner provision of the
114State fair trade act. Neither the purpose of the law
nor the economic conditions or effects were taken into con­
sideration. According to the court the meaning of the con­
stitution is not affected by economic cyclical fluctuation;
^^^Ibid., at 751.
^^^Ibid.. at 752.
l^^Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co. v. Shane Co., 237 
Ind. 188, 143 N. E. 2d 415 (1957). #
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”... the Indiana Constitution on separation of powers and 
the vesting of the right to enact laws in the General 
Assembly have the same meaning whatever may be the busi­
ness or economic conditions."
The court held that the nonsigner provision had 
as a consequence that the ultimate retailer would be bound 
because of a manufacturer's contract and ” ... not because a 
statute said he should be bound when he did not consent."
The nonsigner provision was compared with the National In­
dustrial Recovery Act of 1933. The similar lack of standards 
and review, which had been characterized by Mr. Justice 
Cardozo in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States^^^ as 
"delegation running riot", constituted the Indiana court's 
main objection to the nonsigner provision of the fair trade
act . l l ü
Interesting is to notice, that in most important 
fair trade cases, the fair traders are much better repre­
sented than the opponents of fair trade. It is mostly the
^^^Ibid.. at 419.
^^^Ibid., at 417.
117295 U. S. 495 (1935).
118Bissell V. Shane, o p . cit., at 419.
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nonsigning retailer who has to fight a lonely battle. In 
the reviewed Indiana case e.g. there were among the fair 
trade proponents legally repnssented as 'amicus curiae'; 
General Electric Co., American Fair Trade Council, Indiana
Retail Hardware Association and four other manufacturing
119companies.
South Carolina 
It was also a fair traded General Electric pro­
duct whicn brougnt the fair trade issue before the South
120Carolina Supreme Court. As no distinction is made in
fair trade legislation between commodities affected with 
a puDlic interest and those tnat are not, the court found 
it difficult to justify the nonsigner provision upon con­
siderations of the public health, safety, morals and general 
121welfare. The court considered the trademark theory of
fair trade in the Old Dearborn case unsound. It held that 
a trademark or brand is not in the nature of a covenant 
running with property. If the manufacturer sells his
liq̂Ibid., at 417.
 ̂ Roger 3-Ken t. Inc. v. General Electric Co., 
231 S. C. 636, 99 S. E. 2d 665 (1957).
^^^Ibid., at 669.
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product for full value, he should not be able to retain 
"... some property interest which enables him to control 
the selling price in p e r p e t u i t y . court declared 
the nonsigner provision of the state fair trade act uncon­
stitutional upon the grounds that it constitutes a depri­
vation of property without due process of law.^23
New Mexico
The growing legal authority opposing fair trade 
is expressed clearly by the New Mexico Supreme Court in 
its decision that invalidated the nonsigner statute of that 
state. Not only does this decision^^^ contain many quota­
tions from previous decisions in other states, but also sev­
eral uncited phrases that can be traced as originating with 
other courts. The court noted that fair trade acts (at the 
time of the court's decision) had been before the highest 
appellate courts of 27 states, of whicn 16 sustained the 
constitutionality of fair trade legislation, while in 11 
states it was held unconstitutional. "The widely differing
^^^Ibid., at 670.
^^^Ibid., at 671.
124Skaggs Drug Center v. General Electric Co.,
63 N. W. 215, 315 P. 2d 967 (1957).
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theories” employed by the courts make those "figures by
125themselves almost meaningless." More significance was
attached to the fact that, although the majority of courts
upheld fair trade, "... the greater bulk of the decisions
declaring the statute unconstitutional have been by rul-
126ings of appellate courts in more recent years,"
Although the court conceded that a great deal of
conflict arises by reason of the fact that court after
court, regardless of its final holding, "... mentions the
question of the economic philosophy of the fair trade 
127acts," it did not agree with those courts, including the
U. S. Supreme Court, which "... have been adhering to the
128form of the statute and overlooking the substance."
From the wealth of conflicting legal authorities, 
the New Mexico court selected the Colorado decision as
containing "... language, the reasoning of which ... should
129be adopted in New Mexico."
^^^Ibid.. at 968-969.
^^^Ibid., at 969.
^̂ "̂ Ibid., at 971.
^^^Ibid.. at 974.
^^^Ibid., at 973. For part of the language re­
ferred to, see quotation, supra, p. 135/
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In holding the nonsigner provision unconstitu­
tional and void as an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise 
of police power without any substantial relation to the 
public health, safety, or general w e l f a r e , t h e  court 
asserted that it “... should not require any argument what­
soever to point out tnat the sale of electric irons having 
a General Electric label can in any sense affect the public 
health."
Ohio
The Onio Supreme Court considered that it would 
not serve any useful purpose to discuss the pros and cons
of fair trade in detail, since it had already been done in
132many cases. In a short decision the court ruled that the 
nonsigner provision "... represents an unautnorized exer­
cise of the police power in a matter unrelated to tne public 
safety, morals or general welfare, delegates legislative 
power to private persons, unconstitutionally denies the 
owner of property the right to sell it on terms of his own
130lbid., at 974.
^^^Ibid., at 972.
132union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, 
Inc., 167 Ohio St. 182, 147 N. E. 2d 481 (1958).
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133choosing and is invalid." This decision is significant
in relation to the fact that the Ohio legislature passed 
another fair trade act after this decision, which tries to 
elude the legal objections to the typical nonsigner pro-
134vision, but which has the same purpose and consequences.
In the Ohio decision the first indication of the 
economic consequences of the decline in the legal status of 
fair trade is to be found. "Many manufacturers have aban­
doned reliance on the fair trade acts to stipulate tne 
prices . .. realizing the difficulty of enforcement and the 
further facts tnat arbitrary price fixing is monopolistic
in character, has an anticompetitive effect on the economy
13 5and works to the disadvantage of the consuming public."
The first part of this explanation sounds quite logical, the 
latter part, however, more or less asserts that those manu­
facturers cherish competition and implies a social, rather 
than a private, acquisitive spirit motivating the manu­
facturers' actions to abandon their fair trade programs,
^33ibid., at 481.
134This new fair trade act was subsequently held 
unconstitutional by a lower court. For description of the 
act and reference to this decision, see, infra, pp. 203-8.
135union Carbide v. Bargain, op. cit., at 483.
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which is alien to the competitive free enterprise system.
Kansas
By the time of the Kansas decision, the Kansas 
Supreme Court could refer to 31 state supreme court deci­
sions on fair trade l e g i s l a t i o n . B y  now the balance had 
shifted in favor of the fair trade opponents - sixteen
courts held the nonsigner provision unconstitutional and
137void; fifteen sustained it.
The court refused to accept the declared purpose 
of the fair trade act and held that "... the essence of re­
sale price maintenance is control of price competition, and 
the backbone of the act is tne nonsigner provision without
1 oowhich the law is ineffective to maintain retail prices."
The nonsigner provision was declared unconstitu­
tional and void as constituting an attempt to delegate legis­
lative power. "The legislature is powerless to clothe a
private person with power to fix minimum resale prices,
139binding upon all ..."
l^Gpuality Oil Co. v. E. ^  Pont de Nemours &
Co., 182 Kan. 488, 322 P. 2d 731 (1958).




Cases in which the stipulated facts contain infor­
mation concerning the fair trade price and the selling price 
of the nonsigner-retailer, contain always the explicit 
statement that such sales were made at a profit by the re­
tailer. In the Kansas case the product in question was 
'Zerex' antifreeze, sold by Quality Oil Company at a profit
for $ 2.25 per gallon, while du Font's fair trade price was
140exactly one dollar higher per gallon.
West Virginia 
The West Virginia Supreme Court, referring to the 
confusing situation of the number of states sustaining and 
states invalidating nonsigner provisions, agreed that "... 
with such respectable authority in favor of tne position of 
both plaintiff and defendant, it would not be too difficult 
to substantiate either position . The court inter­
preted the fair trade issue in relation to the police power 
of the state. It relied heavily on the previous Georgia 
and New Mexico d e c i s i o n s . I t  ruled that the nonsigner
"̂̂ Îbid.. at 733.
^^^General Electric Co. v. Dandy Appliance Co.,
143 W. Va. 491, 103 S. E. 2d 310, 313 (1958).
l^^Cox V. G.E., op. cit.; and Skaggs v. G.E.,
o p . cit.
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provision is "... unconstitutional and void as an arbitrary
and unreasonable exercise of the police power because of
having no substantial relation to the public health,
143safety or general welfare."
Kentucky
The Kentucky Court of Appeals phrased its objec­
tions to the nonsigner provision of the state fair trade 
act as "... a legislative invasion of the broad constitu­
tional liberty of the people to acquire and protect their 
property and engage in free trade." it held tne nonsigner 
provision unconstitutional.^^^ After a comprehensive summa­
tion of all reasons in support of the constitutionality of 
the nonsigner provision and also of the reasons holding 
the nonsigner statute invalid, the court rejected the 
necessity to accept the rationale of all the adverse opin­
ions "... but upon the wnole we regard the reasons as 
better and more in accord with our own jurisdiction than 
the reasons assigned for sustaining the law."^^^ The
V. Dandy, op. cit., at 311.
144General Electric Co. v. American Buyers Coop., 
Inc., 316 S. W. 2d 354, 361 (Ky., 1956).
^^^Ibid., at 360.
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court posed the pertinent and hard to answer question: 
"What is wrong with a man selling his own property for 
what he pleases?" Msfhen General Electric received its own 
asking price, the retailer acquired the commodity, G.E.'s 
brand and symbol upon them included. "If it choose to do 
so, it could, without violating the law ..., nave given 
any of the articles away or have destroyed them, including 
the brand and G.E.'s good will as well if that be deemed 
to have adhered to the p r o d u c t , "^^6 but when the retailer 
wants to sell the article at a price satisfactory to him, 
he comes under the condemnation of the nonsigner statute 1 
The court thereupon sharply remarked tnat in its opinion 
this so-called fair trade statute actually "... is the 
antithesis of fair t r a d e . T h i s  meant another defeat 
for the stalwart defender of the virtues of fair trade - 
General Electric Company.
Washington
The Washington Supreme Court is the only court 
of last resort on record which first upheld the
"̂̂ ^Ibid., at 361.
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148constitutionality of the nonsigner provision and later
149reversed this decision. In the earlier decision the
court held that the nonsigner provision provided for 'verti­
cal price fixing' and did not contravene with the state 
constitution prohibiting monopolies. However, the court 
rested its later decision on a re-examination of the hold­
ing in the Sears case that the nonsigner provision of the 
state fair trade act was a valid exercise of the police pow­
er. The theory in the Sears case had been adopted at
the time from the U. S. Supreme Court's Old Dearborn deci- 
sion^SI and in the reversing decision the court stated 
twice that it "... did not point out (in the previous deci­
sion) how the health, safety, morals, or welfare of the 
public was affected by the legislation." This neglect 
in the Sears case of the judicial test of reasonableness 
that this exercise of the police power must pass, formed
^^^Sears v. Western Thrift Stores of Olympia, Inc., 
10 Wash. 2d 372, 116 P. 2d 756 (1941).






the basis of the condemnation of the nonsigner provision
153in the state of Washington eighteen years later. The
court did not reject the trademark theory of the Old Dear­
born decision, but came to an interesting and convincing 
modificatrn of the extent to which it can be employed to 
justify nonsigner legislation.
In selling the product to the retailer, the manu­
facturer exacts a price for the use of his trade­
mark and the benefit of the good will associated 
with it, as well as for the physical components of 
the product, and unless he also exacts an agreement 
that the retailer will not resell the product at 
less than a stipulated price, we can see no equity 
which should entitle him to the special protection 
of the law.
The Washington court reversed its earlier decision 
and declared the nonsigner provision invalid as an im­
proper exercise of the police p o w e r . 155 j,-j .̂he Sears 
case, in which the nonsigner provision had been upheld, 
three judges had dissented, in the Remington Arms case, 







The Minnesota Supreme Court set the stage for its 
condemnation of the nonsigner provision of the state fair 
trade act in 1951. The conclusive decision did not come, 
however, until 1960.
In Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Sachs^^^ the 
court in conformity with the U. S. Supreme Court's decision 
in the first Schwegmann case, recognized the binding ef­
fect of this decision and held the nonsigner provision of 
the state fair trade act invalid and inoperative insofar 
as it authorizes tne enforcement of minimum resale prices 
against nonsigners of contracts with respect to commodities 
in interstate c o m m e r c e . T h e  court gave no indication as 
to the validity or invalidity under the Minnesota constitu­
tion. It can be inferred, tnerefore, that the court had 
neither the intention nor the necessity to invalidate the 
nonsigner provision with respect to commodities in intra­
state commerce, or to change its opinion concerning fair 
trade in general. The court simply accepted and applied 
the opinion of the highest federal court on this matter as
156234 Minn. 303, 48 N. W. 2d 531 (1951).
l^^Ibid., at 533.
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related to interstate commerce, at the time that the McGuire 
Amendment had not yet negated this authority. "The omi­
ssion of the nonsigner provision from the federal law is 
fatal to respondents' position unless we are to perform a 
distinct legislative function by reading onto the Act 
(Miller-Tydings Amendment) a provision that was meticulously 
omitted from it."^^®
In an opinion of tne Attorney General of the 
159State of Minnesota after the enactment of the McGuire 
Amendment, it was contended that as tne purpose of this
act was to cnange tne U. S. Supreme Court's ruling in the
first Schwegmann case, it automatically changed the Minne­
sota Supreme Court's rule in Calvert v. Sachs to the end 
that the nonsigner provision was now effective again.
In 1960 the Minnesota Supreme Court considered 
the fair trade problem more extensively. This time the 
court was willing to compare the economic aspects of fair 
trade with the provisions of the state constitution. Con­
sequently the court invalidated the nonsigner provision of 
the state fair trade act.^^^
^^^Ibid.
Ç. H. Trade Cases: 1951-1952; #67, 391.
Remington Arms Co. v. G.E.M. of Louis,
Inc., 257 Minn. 562, 102 N. W. 2d 528 (1960).
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This Minnesota decision contains a brilliant ex­
pose of legal and economic argumentation against the non­
signer statute. In relation to the alleged purpose of the 
fair trade act to protect the manufacturer's trademark good 
will against destructive loss-leader selling, the court 
drew a clear distinction between the state unfair trade act 
(sales below cost) and the fair trade act. The former act, 
the court held, "... is clearly aimed at suppressing preda­
tory practices," it denounces sales below cost "... for the 
purpose or with the effect of injuring competitors or 
destroying competition."'^ The fair trade act, however, 
the court argued, undertakes to make lawful, contracts 
which were unlawful prior to its passage. "The nonsigner 
provision in reality, eliminates competition in price hon­
estly based on differences in selling costs as between mer­
chants wnose costs of business may differ as a result of 
normal and natural competitive practices." This "... type 





The court found nowhere in the recod, or in the 
great volume of material submitted to it, persuasive con­
siderations of public welfare or economic need. "We are 
convinced that the reasons advanced for the grant of price- 
fixing power are not so compelling that we are forced to 
concede that tne interest of the consumer are of so little 
importance that hearing and other safeguards may be dis­
pensed with."^°3 The court viewed with grave concern the 
exercise of arbitrary power debgated to unofficial persons, 
"... especially ... when, as here, the grant is given to 
the very persons who will benefit most by an arbitrary and 
wrongful use of that p o w e r . "1^4
Most interesting in the Minnesota decision is
the way in which the court fits the specific ramifications
of the case in question into the framework of the fair trade
opponents' theory contending that this legislation works
as a boost to monopolistic and oligopolistic power.
The record in this case contains the testimony of 
a respected economist to the effect that resale 
price maintenance under the so-called Fair Trade 
Act is detrimental both to the consumer and to the 
economy. He was of the view that the producer of 




member of a monopoly or oligopoly, because if 
there were numerous producers of a competing com­
modity few would abide by the pricing practices 
of one or two. His opinion that the policy of the 
act makes possible a price monopoly inimical to 
the public welfare is clearly borne out by the 
record. There is in force a fair trade contract 
in respect to Remington Shells produced by plain­
tiff. The major competing shells are manufactured 
by Olin Mathieson Corporation under the name of 
"Winchester". Olin Mathieson's shells are also 
fair traded. These two manufacturers control 87 
to 90 per cent of the production of shells in the 
United States. It appears from the record that 
for almost all types of shells produced by each 
of these manufacturers, in fat for every type 
which is common to the production of both of them, 
the price is identical to the penny. This is sig­
nificant considering that the elaborate price lists 
of both manufacturers were printed and published 
3 days apart. It is apparent that the record 
nere establishes that the act, rather than regu­
lating and controlling monopoly power creates a 
climate where monopolies may flourish. These 
views are in accord with the thought of author­
ities who have written and reported on the subject^^^ 
of retail price maintenance in the past few years.
After such a profound legal and economic review of 
the real purpose and effects of fair trade, it is not 
amazing tnat tne Minnesota Supreme Court declared the non­
signer provision unconstitutional as an unlawful delegation 
of legislative power.
Ibid., at 53b. The court did not supply the 
name of the economist referred to. However, several sources 
substantiating the court's economic reasoning were men- 




Tne Montana constitution contains a section which 
quite explicitly rejects fair trade. “No incorporation, 
stock company, person or association of persons ... shall, 
directly or indirectly ... make any contract ... for the 
purpose of fixing the price ... of any article of commerce 
On the basis of this constitutional provision the 
Montana Supreme Court neld the entire state fair trade act 
unconstitutional.
The court found tne fair trade decisions of other 
jurisdictions "in nopeless conflict and cannot be ration­
alized with eacn other. Tne discussion of the economic
merits, pros and cons, of fair trade legislation was con­
sidered to be within tne province of legislative powers;
"... this court is only to measure the statute against con-
1 70stitutional standards." The controlling question was
whether fair trade provisions constitute price-fixing. The 
court refused to accept the fair traders' argument that it 
cannot be regarded as price-fixing since the purpose of the
16 7As cited in Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. 





act is to protect the good will symbolized in the mêuiufac- 
turer's trademark. The court branded fair trade as price- 
fixing:
We do not have to go outside the stipulated facts 
in the instant case to ascertain the truth of 
this proposition. In this case the plaintiff 
set the minimum retail resale price of Prestone 
at $ 3.25 per gallon. It was also stipulated 
that various competing brands sold at a range 
of prices from $ 1.95 to $ 3.25 per gallon. In 
other words, the minimum price at which Prestone 
can be sold is as high or higher than the price 
of any other brand of antifreeze. It also ap­
pears that the retailer makes a healthy profit 
at the price of $ 3.25 per gallon since the 
defendant found it possible to make a satis­
factory profit by selling the commodity at 
$ 2.49 per gallon. We think it is elementary 
that the Fair Trade agreements of the plaintiff 
have the necessary effect of setting the exact 
price at which Prestone is sold. Since the Act 
accomplishes this result it must be characterized
as p r i c e - f i x i n g . "171
The Montana court drew support from the New Mexico
decision to qualify fair trade as price-fixing, while the
Uteih decision served as a further justification to hold
fair trade as violating the constitutional provision re-
172lating to the validity of price-fixing.




The Iowa Supreme Court considered resale price
maintenance by contract already a substantial privilege.
With respect to resale price maintenance by con­
tract, the Fair Trade Act not only affirms the 
Iowa judicial tolerance of binding immediate 
vendees but also goes beyond all common law de­
velopment in this state to extend enforcebility 
to contracts binding subvendees as well.^^3
The court held the nonsigner provision an unconstitutional 
delegation of authority^^^ and to substantiate this deci­
sion the court made the following comparisons:
When we hold it an unconstitutional delegation 
of legislative authority to permit the highway 
commission to establish rules governing the 
stopping of vehicles upon a highway, to permit 
the conservation commission to determine how 
many fish a fisherman may catch and for a court 
to fix the boundaries of a city, it is an 
obvious non seguitur to permit a manufacturer 
to regulate the sales policy of a retailer not 
privy to any contract or agreement with the man­
ufacturer. ^
The price cutting wholesaler had cnosen not to 
defend its position before the Iowa Supreme Court. The
1 7 1Bulova Watch Co. v. Robinson Wholesale Co., 
108 N. W. 2d 365 (Iowa 1961), at 3b7.
^̂ "̂ Ibid., at 370.
^^^Ibid.. at 366.
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court implied that economic pressure might have been the
cause of this sudden “lack of interest" when it stated:
... it would be improper for us to assume it 
is solely because of loss of confidence in their 
position as sustained by the trial court.
The court refused to consider resale price main­
tenance a right of property inherent to the trademark 
property right.
Oklahoma
The fair trade island, which Oklahoma formed
177among its six adjacent non-fair trade states, disap­
peared definitely in the early part of 1961 when the Okla­
homa Supreme Court affirmed a trial court decision which 
had held the nonsigner provision of the Oklahoma Fair Trade 
Act unconstitutional and void "... as being an improper 
delegation of legislative power of price fixing to private 
persons ... and (2) in violation of due process provisions 
..., in that there was no real and suostantial relation be­
tween the price fixing provisions as applied to nonsigners
^^^Ibid., at 369-70.
■^^^Texas and Missouri never nad a fair trade act; 
New Mexico, Colorado, Kansas and Arkansas invalidated 
their nonsigner provisions. Supra.
•>
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and prevention of injury to the economic, social and moral 
well-being of the state."
The Oklahoma court cited several decisions to\
prove the improper delegation of legislative power occasioned 
by the nonsigner provision. "There is no provision for an 
official or court review of the fixed price for the protec­
tion of tne nonsigner or the consumer who represents the 
public. "
Among the due process objections to the nonsigner
provision the court remarked that the police power of the
state must be exercised for public purposes only and not for
the exclusive benefit of particular individuals. The court
recognized that it was just as much in the interest of the
public to have the forces of competition retained at the
retail level of the production, column as it was beneficial
to have "free and open competition" among manufacturers.
None, including the consuming public, has any 
voice in the matter except the parties to the 
price fixing contract. The retailer who by 
skill and energy has reduced his operation ex­
pense and may be satisfied with a smaller
178American Home Products Corp. v. Benny Hornsey 
and Associates, 361 P. 2d 297, 299 (Okl. 1961).
179%bid., at 300.
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180profit is regimented with less efficient and 
less industrious seller of the same commodity.
Most important the consumer public must pay this 
price and is deprived of the benefit of the 
free and competitive economy so important to the 
progress of this nation.
The Oklahoma court's double-barrel execution - 
unlawful delegation of legislative power and due process 
violation - of the nonsigner provision will mean a hard 
time for a statute of this character to revive in Okla­
homa, and is a solid example for other courts to follow.
Summary and Conclusion 
In a 1955 publication of a group of ardent fair 
trade proponents it was stated without any further comment 
or justification that the state fair trade laws would 
"... only stay on the statute books as long as they are in
1 Q 2the best public interest." The wisdom of this state­
ment was farther reaching them the author apparently hoped, 
The foregoing review of adverse legal fair trade decisions
18Upresuuà>ly meant as 'a smaller profit per unit* 
and not as 'a smaller total profit'.
131American Home Products v. Benny, op. cit., at
302.
182E. A. Newcomb, “The Fair Trade Laws," The Basis 
and Development of Fair Trade (New York: The National Whole­
sale Druggists' Association, 1955) p. 6.
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indicates that the courts in many of those cases came spe­
cifically to their fair trade condemnation from the stand­
point of the public interest involved.
The influence of such expert opinions on fair 
trade as those of the Federal Trade Commission, eminent 
legal and economic scholars, the Antitrust Division of the 
U. S. Department of Justice, and others, could not indef-
1 H1initely fail to be reflected in the attitude of the courts.
The three states in which fair trade met complete 
d e f e a t , t h e  argumentation of tne courts of last resort 
in invalidating the fair trade act in general was mainly 
based on special state constitutional provisions prohibit­
ing price fixing combinations and/or monopolies.
The 18 state courts tnat negated the effective­
ness of the fair trade provisions by holding the nonsigner 
provision unconstitutional, used one or more of the follow­
ing legal argumentations:^®^
183 See especially one Florida and Minnesota 
decisions, supra.
I Q A Montana, Nebraska, and Utah.
^®®Robert G. Clayton, "The Present Constitutional 
Status of State Fair Trade Laws", University of Cincinnati 
Law Review, 25 (1956), 473.
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1. The nonsigner provision deprives an individual of his 
property and liberty without due process of law.
2. The nonsigner provision impairs the freedom of the indi- 
vidui to contract for the price at which he wishes to sell 
his property.
3. The nonsigner provision unlawfully delegates the legis­
lative power of the state to private individuals since it 
confers upon them the power to fix the prices without 
standards, hearing and review.
4. The nonsigner provision bears no real and substantial 
relation to the public interest and therefore is beyond the 
police power of the state.
5. The nonsigner provision is confiscatory and discrimina­
tory and such factors cannot be hidden under the guise of 
public interest.
Michael Conant contends that the different con­
stitutional objections to the nonsigner provision based on 
the due process provision of the state constitutions, have 
a fundamental w e a k n e s s , b u t  that unconstitutional delega­
tion of legislative power is a more soundly reasoned attack
X8 6Supra, p. 127.
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on nonsigner c l a u s e s . T h e  preceding review contains 
four states^^^ in which the nonsigner provision was inval­
idated solely on the ground of unconstitutional delegation 
of state legislative power. Six other states regarded this
argument as one ground, though not the sole basis, for hold-
189ing their nonsigner provisions unconstitutional. They
generally argued that when governmental power to use com­
pulsion in enforcing rules is delegated to private per­
sons, there is created a new, private government, and pri­
vate government violates tiie essential concept of a demo­
cratic society in which tlie legislative power is vested 
solely in the elected legislature.
Besides all the legal considerations, it appears 
to be extremely significant tr.at eacn state court which has 
addressed itself to the validity of fair trade has increas­
ingly come to face the economic realities. Although sev­
eral courts refused to take the real purpose and economic 
consequences of this price maintenance system as the basis 
to determine the constitutionality of those statutes, the
1 rt 7Conant, op. cit., p. 552.
188 Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana and Minnesota.
^®^Colorado, Florida, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma 
and Oregon.
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impact of those economic facts is noticeable in the legal 
reasoning of almost all of them, while a few courts ex­
plicitly condemned the economic philosophy of the scheme.
It seems, that once the courts are willing to detach the 
vague emotional appeal of fair trade from its real pur­
poses and e f f e c t s , t h e  backbone of fair trade has little 
chance to remain unbroken by the state courts. Although 
the U. S. Supreme Court's reluctance to intervene in the 
fair trade issue, apparently because it has come to 
realize tnat it does not have the investigative machinery
to determine whether particular economic regulations aire
191reasoncüe, some state courts have expressed themselves
in strong terms and arguments that they will not practice
the humility to abnegate tne power of judicial review of
192economic legislation, and want to remain the custodians
of the public interest. The other courts, while less out­
spoken, practiced the same rule by invalidating fair trade 
legislation on due process objections. All those courts, 
tacitly or explicitly, desired to balance the uneven
^^^Bates, op. cit., p. 143.
^^^Conant, pp. cit., p. 543.
192 See especially the Colorado decision, supra,p. 134.
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distribution of political and economic influence on the
legislatures, by taking the side of the consumer, who
"... most often neglected, could not conceivably organize
and maintain lobby and pressure groups so well as retail
193merchants and other sellers who are solid entities."
In relation to previous and following discussions 
it is significant to note, that in all adverse decisions 
the products in question were nationally advertised and 
marketed. Ten of tne twenty cases in wnich tne back of 
fair trade was broken, were concerned with the products of 
two national manufacturers. General Electric's products 
were involved in seven cases, wnile Union Carbide 6. Carbon's 
'Prestone' antifreeze appeared in three cases.
In an early practical fair trade guide for busi­
ness executives and members of tne bar, an almost naive be­
lief in tne infallioility of consumer choice through the 
channels of the legislature, is contained in a well founded 
warning :
It is the consumer in his capacity as a member of 
the public, whose representatives in tne legisla­
tures and the Congress passed the Fair Trade Acts.
The consumer having given, he can take away and
193Bates, op. cit., p. 129.
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the minute he feels that the privileges conferred 
by him are being used to his disadvantage, he will 
take them away - which impels the suggestion that 
the people interested in preserving the idea back 
of the Fair Trade Acts ought to be careful not to1 q4abuse their privileges.
195Although four state legislatures have stead­
fastly resisted the enactment of fair trade statutes and 
the attempts to pass a federal fair trade act have been 
tlius far unsuccessful, no single example has come to this 
writer's attention where the general public has been able 
to retract the special privileges given to the trademark 
owners and retailers groups through tne same governmental 
branch as tnrougn whicn these rights were conferred upon 
tnose groups. The preceding analysis can only lead to the 
conclusion that it is the judiciary branch of government, 
rather than the legislative brancn, tnat represents the 
general public's interest in tne fair trade issue. By ob­
jecting to legislation which grants special privileges with­
out standard or review, tne courts have emphasized that in 
their opinion, the interests of manufacturers of trademarked
S. Rogers, "Foreword," S. A. Weigel, The 
Fair Trade Acts (Chicago: The Foundation Press, 1938), 
pp. v-vi.
lySAlaska, Missouri, Texas and Vermont. The 
U. S. Congress has thus far also refused to pass a fair 
trade act for the District of Columbia.
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goods and their 'satellite' - 'independent' - small retailers 
do not necessarily coincide with the public interest.
Rather, they contend that those interests are diametrically 
opposed to each other.
In none of the above mentioned cases the price 
cutting issue pertained to sales prices below the cost of 
acquisition. In most cases it was explicitly stated that 
the so-called Unfair Trade Acts, which concern themselves 
with sales below costs, were not applicable to the circum­
stances of tne specific disagreements oefore the courts.
The courts apparently could not qualify price reductions 
as 'predatory' as long as this practice did not reach the 
lower limits of prices as established by the legislatures 
as reasonable in the state unfair trade laws. The courts, 
on tne contrary, considered those price reductions benefic­
ial and healthy in our economic competitive free enterprise 
system.
CHART 1
LEGAL STATUS OF STATE FAIR TRADE LAWS: 48 STATES
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No Decision - Law EîTecti
Constitutionality Upheld 
Law Unconst.: Highest Court 
Nonsigner Clause Unconst.: Highest Court
No Law Passed
o
Law Unconst.: Lower Court
Source: Table 1
CHAPTER VI
OTHER LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS WEAKENING FAIR TRADE
In 1954 a special "Fair Trade" Lawyers' Field 
Day Conference came to tne conclusion tnat tne main tnreats 
to tne fair trade structure consisted, in order of their 
respective importance, of: (a) The difficulties in elim­
inating the widespread price cutting practices of dis­
counters by fair trade enforcement procedures. (o) The 
unsettled question whetner sales originating from non­
signers in non-fair trade states could be covered by the 
nonsigner provision of tne state to which the goods are 
sold. (c) Tne uncatainty concerning the constitutionality 
of fair trade legislation under state constitutions. (d) 
The doubt concerning tne legality of a fair trade program 
of manufacturers having their own retail outlets.^
By the end of tne decade all those threats, and 
others, had materialized in severe attacks which
^"Fair or Unfair Trade: It All Depends Where You 
Sit," Business We e k , May 15, 1954, pp. 123-124.
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considerably weakened and restricted the practical appli­
cation of fair trade provisions to maintain resale prices.
It is the purpose of this chapter to cover the 
development of statutory issues wnicn arose primarily in 
legal proceedings concerned with tne enforcement of fair 
trade prices. This includes: (1) The problem of the fair
trade program of the vertically integrated manufacturer.
(2) Tne question concerning the extraterritorial applica­
tion of state nonsigner provisions. (3) The increased re­
luctance of the courts to grant injunctions against price- 
cutting retailers if tne trademark owner had not vigorously 
enforced his fair trade prices. (4) Tiie refusal of some 
courts to enjoin nonsigners who secured supplies from sig­
natories to a fair trade agreement, for inducement of breach 
of contract. And finally (5) tne new activity of the Anti­
trust Division of tne U. 3. Department of Justice in
2matters of resale price maintenance.
Fair Trade and the Vertically Integrated Manufacturer
An important restriction on the applicability of
2Other statutory problems, for example the 
problem of indirect price-cutting devices such as trading 
stamps and "free" gifts in relation to the maintenance of 
fair trade prices, are not reviewed in this study.
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fair trade was effectuated by the Antitrust Division of the 
U. S. Department of Justice, which contended that resale 
price maintenance agreements between manufacturer-whole- 
salers and competing independent wholesalers are a viola­
tion of the Sherman Act and illegal per se.^ The problem 
with which the U. S. Supreme Court had to cope concerned 
the interpretation of the McGuire Act provision which qual­
ified the fair trade exemptions from the federal antitrust 
acts.
Nothing ... shall make lawful contracts or agree­
ments providing for the establishment or mainten­
ance of minimum or stipulated resale prices ... 
between manufacturers, or between producers, or 
between wholesales, or between brokers, or be­
tween factors, or between retailers, or between 
persons, firms, or corporations in competition 
with each other.4
It was contended that if a party to a price maintenance
agreement have any operations which compete on the same
level of distribution, the exemption of the McGuire Act is
inapplicable because of the quoted qualification.^
^U. S. V. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 3bl U. S.
305 (1956) .
^66 Stat. 632, 5. As cited in, ibid., at 311-
312.
^Note, Harvard Law Review, 67 (1954), 893.
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Since many manufacturers engage in some retailing 
or wholesaling of their products, the question concerning 
the scope of the restricting qualification of the McGuire 
Act exemptions was important. The certified issults of a 
survey made by tne American Fair Trade Council of known 
fair trading manufacturers revealed that 86 per cent of 
all such manufacturers, who returned the survey question­
naires, sold fair traded products to wholesalers. Of this 
86 per cent, who sold to wholesalers, 82 per cent also sold 
to retailers, 34 per cent also sold to consumers, 10 per 
cent also had wholly-owned or controlled subsidiaries tnat 
sold to wnolesalers, 9 per cent also had wnolly-owned or 
controlled subsidiaries that sold to retailers and 4 per 
cent also had wnolly-owned or controlled subsidiaries that 
sold to consumers.'^ Thus, the majority of tne surveyed 
fair trading manufacturers would be vitally effected by 
the court's decision one way or tne otner.
The Government had brought action^ against the 
largest drug wholesaler in the United States: McKesson &
^Note, Michigan Law Review, 55 (1957), 587. 
^U. 5. V. McKesson op. cit., at 3U5.
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Robbins, Inc.^
McKesson had refused to sell its own manufactured 
and trademarked products to independent wholesalers tnat 
nad not entered into fair trade agreements obliging them to
yadhere to the wholesale prices fixed oy McKesson. A dis­
trict court held tnat tne fact tnat McKesson qua wholesaler 
competed with independent wnolesalers in tne distribution 
of commodities manufactured oy McKesson did not automatically 
prevent McKesson from entering into resale price mainten­
ance contracts with independent wholesalers, and this court 
denied tne Government's motion for sn injunction restrain­
ing price stipulation affecting competing wholesalers.^^
The court argued tnat tne fair trade agreements of such a 
trademark owner were capable of having an operative effect
^In 1954 it was reported tnat McKesson manu­
factured and packaged over 4üü different items in the drug 
field. In 1928 the corporation oegan to acquire control 
of wholesale drug companies and continued to acquire them. 
Its wholesale drug Business operated 7’4 wholesale drug 
divisions located in 35 states and those activities amounted 
to b5 per cent of the total sales of the company. (G. E. 
Weston, "Resale Price Maintenance and Market Integration: 
Fair Trade or Foul Play?" George Washington Law Review, 22 
(1954), 669.)
^U. S. v. McKesson, oo. cit., at 305.
V. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 
333 (S- D. N. Y. 1954).
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in Doth a "horizontal" and "vertical" direction, and the 
court was unwilling to find either label more appropriate 
than the other or to pin its decision on factors having 
little more taan semantic significance.^^
The U. S. Supreme Court in reviewing the lower
court decision recognized clearly that the Government
... does not question the so-called vertical "fair 
trade" agreements oetween McKesson and retailers 
of McKesson Drand products. It challenges only 
... price-fixing agreements with independent whole­
salers with wnom i t  is in c o m p e t i t i o n . ^ 2
An agreement between a non-integrated manufac­
turer and wholesaler or retailer to maintain a resale 
price on the manufacturer's product is between parties 
who are not competing on the same functional level of 
enterprise. The contacts are "vertical" and clearly with­
in the scope of the fair trade legislation,^^ but when a 
manufacturer owns retail or wholesale outlets and util­
izes resale price maintenance legislation to bind compet­
ing retailers or wholesalers, the practice takes on
lllbid., at 337.
S. V. McKesson, op. cit., at 309.
^^Schweqmann Bros, v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 
341 U. S. 384 (1951), at 389.
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14strongly "horizontal" price-fixing characteristics.
The Government argued that resale price mainten­
ance contracts of integrated manufacturers with independent 
competing wholesalers would eliminate price competition on 
two levels of the distribution system, and as such would 
leave the manufacturer-wholesaler to undersell freely the 
independent wholesaler oy dealing directly with retailers 
through its manufacturing division. It was further held 
that the efficiency or inefficiency of the manufacturer's 
wholesaling operations would partly determine the magni­
tude of the fair trade prices without the influence of new 
entries in the field or the influence of existing competi­
tion. None of those dangers are present, it was argued, 
if the price fixing exists between independent wholesalers 
and non-integrated manufacturers,^^ because the non-inte- 
grated manufacturer's fair trade price is normally geared 
to the marketing cost of the independent wholesaler and re­
tailer of average efficiency.
Use of Resale Price Maintenance by Integrated 
Manufacturers: A New Loophole for Aouse of Monopoly Power," 
Yale Law Journal, 64 (1955), 427.
S. V. McKesson, o£. cit., at 315, note 20.
H. Fulda, "Resale Price Maintenance," Uni­
versity of Chicago Law Review, 21 (1954), 191.
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The situation gets worse, however, when an integrated pro­
ducer stipulates fair trade prices, as his selling costs 
then will be substituted for the average of the independ­
ent wholesalers' in the determination of the fair trade
prices, because all competitive pressure to greater effic-
17iency will be lost. The only possible but uncertain 
solace for the consumer's interest in this situation would 
be that the manufacturer-wholesaler himself sets the example 
of high efficiency and forces this efficiency on the inde­
pendent wnolesalers by allowing lower margins in reduced 
fair trade prices.
McKesson argued tnat the economic effects of fair 
trading are the same whether or not the manufacturer has 
its own wholesale outlets, since the protection which fair 
trade provides for the manufacturer's trademark and good­
will eliminates price competition between different outlets 
for the manufacturer's own branded merchandise in either 
case. It was claimed that the manufacturer-wholesaler fair
^^Use of Resale Price Maintenance, pp. cit., 431. 
lbThe former part of this situation would be 
quite possible, the latter requirement, however, would go 
against the profit incentive of strongly monopolistic fair 
trading manufacturers, unless the demand for the products 
is clearly price elastic.
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19trades as manufacturer and not as wholesaler.
The U. S. Supreme Court, in reversing the lower
court decision, found for the Government. The Court could
not find in either the Miller-Tydings Act's or the McGuire
20Act's legislative history any indication which would
justify to interpret McKesson’s market arrangement as not
21to fall under the restrictive qualification of the McGuire 
Act's exemptions from the federal antitrust laws.
The influence of the first Schwegmann decision 
was quite apparent in the shaping of the Court's opinion 
in this case. In this prior case the Court had emphasized 
that fair trade should be considered as a privilege, re­
strictive of a free economy, which snould be limited to the
22purposes for which it was clearly intended. In the 
McKesson case the Court refused to read tne McGuire Act pro­
visions in any otner way than "in their normal and customary 
m e a n i n g . T h e  Court found McKesson's fair trade agreements
19U. S. V. McKesson, op. cit., at 315-316.
^^Ibid., at 313-315.
2^Supra, p. 173.
22Schwegmann Bros, v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,
341 U. S. 384 (1951), at 389-390.
23u. S. V. McKesson, pp. cit., at 312.
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to be agreements between wholesalers, not exempted by the
McGuire Act and thus violative of the Sherman Act's per se
24interpretation regarding horizontal price fixing.
Under the established methods of marketing the
effect of this decision was to foreclose considerably the
25possible use of resale price maintenance. The Court's 
literal reading of the McGuire Act provisions has been 
criticized as overreaching congressional intent by limit­
ing this act's applicability too severely. One source 
argues that it would seem proper to interpret the McGuire 
Act by requiring only that a fair trace contract be between
one selling a product bearing his trademark and the buyer
27who acquires the product for resale. The courts, how­
ever, continued to follow the McKesson decision. A gaso­
line refiner, for instance, who sold to commercial fleets 
of vehicles in competition witn gasoline retailers, could
"̂̂ iDid.. at 313.
^^Note, Michigan Law Review, 55 (1957), 587.
Three justices dissented mainly an the argu­
ment tnat tne legislative intent of the fair trade laws was 
to eliminate price competition for the purpose of protect­
ing the manufacturer's trademark, regardless whetner it was 
a non-integrated or an integrated manufacturer's trademark. 
(U. S. V. McKesson, op. cit., at 317-319).
2?Note, Harvard Law Review, 67 (1954), 892.
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not employ tne McGuire Act provisions to exempt nis fair 
trade program from tne Sherman Act provisions. *' A ny 
competition for customers is an absolute oar to price 
maintenance agreements between the competitors."^^
Mail Order Sales From Non-Fair Trade Jurisdictions
Another serious shortcoming of the McGuire Act 
in relation to the strength of the fair trade structure was 
the hiatus in its coverage created by the failure to "... ex­
pressly lift the bar (of the interstate commerce clause 
concerning the state nonsigner provisions) in respect to 
free trade s t a t e s . T h i s  gap in the McGuire Act provi­
sions meant that non-signing mail order vendors located in 
non-fair trade jurisdictions could not be enjoined, and in 
effect restricted the application of the state fair trade 
provisions, enabling enforcement of fair trade prices with­
out violating the federal antitrust laws in interstate com­
merce, to the violators of fair trade laws located in fair 
trade states.
2 QEsso standard Oil Co. v. Secatore's, Inc., 346 
F. 2d 17 (1957).
^^Ibid., at 22.
Stachler, "The Protective Veil Given Mail . 
Order Houses in Free Trade Jurisdictions," University of 
Cincinnati Law Review, 25 (1956), 498.
182
Mail order sales from non-fair trade jurisdictions
constituted during the last decade a very urgent problem in
fair trade litigation. One source goes as far as to state;
It is not an unwarranted generalization to say that 
the future of fair trade legislation as it exists 
today is inextricably entwined with the legal im­
plications of mail order sales.
Although total mail order sales take up a small 
percentage cf total retail sales, to fair traders the below- 
fair trade prices of free state advertisers who used their 
location as a vintage point to ship fair traded goods across 
state lines into fair trade states at cut prices consti­
tuted a serious threat of undermining tneir fragile fair 
trade programs. Especially in areas where a dense popula­
tion was concentrated at both the free trade border side 
and the fair trade state border side, the enforcement of 
fair trade prices became next to impossible. Notorious ex­
amples are especially St. Louis, Missouri and Washington,
D. C.32
^^"A Symposium on the Fair Trade Laws," Fordham 
Law Review, 27 (1958), 107.
^^Ironically it was in Washington, D. C., the 
birthplace of the federal fair trade legislation, that the 
mail order houae was located which effectuated one of the 
most devastating blows at the national fair trade structure. 
The ambiguous attitude of Congress to pass federal enabling 
legislation for state fair trade laws, but to refuse to
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The difficulties concerning mail order houses 
arose in cases where there was no resale or contemplated 
resale within a fair trade jurisdiction, but where system­
atic advertising and offerings at below-fair trade prices 
took place in fair trade jurisdictrns in relation to sales
which were technically being made in free trade juris-
33dictions. The question whether state nonsigner provi­
sions could be used to enforce prices of out-of-state ven­
dors, became more urgent with the increasing number of states 
declaring their fair trade provisions u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . ^4
In all three leading cases through which this 
issue was s e t t l e d , i t  was the same mail order house which
pass a fair trade act for the District of Columbia, contri­
buted significantly to the practical defeat of the effective­
ness of the federal act. The best explanation for this 
strange situation can be found in a quotation concerning 
Congress' refusal to enact a fair trade law for the District 
of Columbia: "The big point against it in the District is 
that fair trade ... would mean Congressmen would have to 
pay more for their booze." ("Fair Trade: The War Is Not 
Over," Business Week, November 7, 1953, p. 44.).
^^The McGuire Act had extended the effectiveness 
of state nonsigner provisions in relation to interstate 
sales of mail order houses located within a fair trade 
state, and was interpreted as such for instance in Raxor 
Corporation v. Goody, 307 N.Y. 299, 120 N. E. 2d 802 (1954).
34gupra, Chapter V.
3 CRevere Camera Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co.,
128 F. Supp. 457 (D. Md. 1955); Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co.
V. Masters Mail Order Co., 240 F 2d 684 (1957); General Elec­
tric Co. V. Masters Mail Order Co., 244 F. 2d 681 (1957).
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fought the fair trade restrictions on his operations.
Masters Mail Order Company of Washington, D. C. This is 
a wholly owned subsidiary of the New York discount store: 
Masters Inc. In 1952 the parent company had specially 
organized the Washington, D. C. Masters Mail Order Company 
which fought the fair trade restrictions by selling fair 
traded products to consumers in fair trade states below 
fair trade prices by direct mail order. Customers seeking 
purchases at discount prices from the New York store were 
provided with mail order forms and instructed to send them 
to the Washington, D. C. company- Deliveries were made 
from Washington, D. C. The New York store further provi­
ded extensive services by conducting an advertising cam­
paign in New York for the Washington, D. C. company. Sim­
ilar advertising campaigns took place in other fair trade
 ̂  ̂ 36states.
In the three actions that were brought against 
the Washington, D. C. company the fair trading manufac­
turers contended that Masters had violated state fair trade 
laws and that the mail order company should be enjoined from
^^Note, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 
106 (1957), 139.
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"willfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or 
sel lin g"below fair trade prices prohibited by the state 
fair trade acts concerned.
38In Revere v. Masters it was held that the 
McGuire Act does not empower the states to prohibit de­
livery within their borders of merchandise purchased in 
other states, and that the place of sale as determined by 
the law governs the enforceability of fair trade agree­
ments. If the sale legally was made outside a fair trade 
state, its fair trade act could not be effective regard­
less whether the buyer was residing witnin the fair trade
39jurisdiction. In Bissell v. Masters it was argued that
advertising at cut-rate prices was a disruptive evil to
price maintenance, separate from the actual sale at cut
prices, and constituted oy itself a violation of the state
fair trade law. Tne court rejected this theory by saying;
We agree ... that advertising the sale of a commod­
ity at less them stipulated fair trade price is of 
itself unfair competition... whether or not a sale 
takes place; but we are satisfied that the adver­
tisement must relate to a sale of goods within the
3 7This phrase appeeirs in all state fair trade 
acts as part of the nonsigner provision.
OpRevere v. Masters, o£. cit.
3 9Bissell V. Masters, pp. cit.
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State in order to fall within the condemnation of 
the statute.40
The advertising operations were particularly 
prominent in the legal action which General Electric 
brought against Masters,41 under the fair trade act of 
New York, because of the activities of the parent company 
in the important market of New York and surrounding areas. 
General Electric argued that for the sales from Washington,
D. C. into the state of New York, although technically the 
sales were consummated in the District of Columbia, the 
economic impact was found in New York wnere the bulk of 
the consumers lived. Therefore, it was contended, those 
sales constitute for all practical purposes violations of 
the New York fair trade statute. The court, following the
4*̂ Ibid., at 687. Attention was drawn in this 
case to the active role played by the U. S. Department of 
Justice to get tne courts to interprets the McGuire Act as 
it actually did in this issue. In a 1954 fair trade case 
in St. Louis in the non-fair trade state of Missouri, the 
Justice Department filed an amicus curiae (Sunbeam Corp. v. 
Missouri Petroleum Prod. Co., Inc., Civil Action No. 9887,
E. D. Missouri.) asking the court to dismiss charges 
brought by Sunbeam Corp. against a price-cutter who had 
been using a non-fair trade - Missouri - location to ship 
Sunbeam's fair traded goods at cut prices into fair trade 
states. ("Justice Dept. Takes Anti-Fair-Trade Stand," Busi­
ness Week, November 20, 1954, p. 126.)
41ceneral Electric v. Masters , op. cit.
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McGuire Act interpretation as contained in the Revere and
Bissell cases, answered;
Plaintiff protests tnat our reading of tne stat­
ute will allow the District of Columbia to impose 
its policies on economic activities in New York.
But the opposite construction will simply allow 
New York to dominate the economic activities of 
the District of Coluraoia
The continuing influence of the first Schwegmann
decision was apparent again^^ in the argumentation of tne
court when, in relation to tne McGuire Act exemption of
resale price maintenance laws from federal fair trade acts,
it considered itself:
... bound to construe them strictly, since resale 
price maintenance is a privilege restrictive of a
free economy.^4
Those decisions did not leave any douDt that the 
freedom of pricing of mail order vendors in free trade jur­
isdictions, could not oe ourdened by the contrary activities 
of fair trading manufacturers, because this freedom re­
mained under the protective veil of the Sherman Act.’^^
4^Ibid., at ub4.
^^Chapter VIII, infra, pp. 236-9.
44General Electric v. Masters, pp. cit., at 683. 
Also, supra, pp.178-9.
^^Stachler, pp. cit., 499.
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Enforcement and Injunctive Relief 
Some states have further restricted the prac­
ticability of fair trade provisions oy denying injunctive 
relief against price cutting retailers in cases that the
trademark owners had not vigorously enforced their rignts
46in the area prior to tne action oefore the court. The 
courts in those instances reasoned that lax enforcement of 
a fair trade program could result in discriminatory effects 
on the different retailers. The manufacturer should pro­
vide comprehensive, or at least non-discriminatory, enforce­
ment against all violators.^' The judiciary, for instance, 
conditioned the fair trade program of the General Electric 
Company on the establishment of such an effective enforce-
4 '4ment program. An injunction restraining the Macy Company 
from cutting General Electric's fair trade prices was 
granted, but tne court warned that it was up to the manu­
facturer to police its fair trade contracts if any one con­
tract was to oe valid. To satisfy this condition the
K. Bates, "Constitutionality of State Fair 
Trade Acts," Indiana Law Journal. 32 (1957), 130.
4 'Note, Yale Law Journal. 65 (1955), 245.
°General Electric Company v. R. H. Macy & Co.,
199 Misc. 87, 103 N. Y. S. 2d 440 (1951).
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General Electric Company set up a special fair trade sec­
tion in 1952 in its Small Appliance Division which brought
49134 legal actions against price cutters within a year.
In 1954 a federal judge in Milwaukee denied the 
General Electric Company the injunction it was seeking to 
restrain the price cutting retailer in that city from ad­
vertising and selling General Electric appliances below 
fair trade prices. The judge argued that General Electric 
had "unclean hands"oecause it did not "diligently enforce" 
its fair trade program, not only in the Milwaukee area, but 
generally. The court came to tnis conclusion regardless of
'^^"Fair Trade: The War's Not Over," Business Week, 
November 7, 1953, p. 44.
manufacturer's "unclean hands" refers to 
discrimination in his enforcement of the fair trade prices. 
The defending retailer may claim that singling him out from 
a number of equally culpable price cutters for prosecution 
would unjustly disadvantage him in relation to competitors. 
(Note, Yale Law Journal, 69 (1959), 187.) Another source 
reports that interviews indicate that several techniques 
have been adopted to gather evidence supporting price cut­
ting retailers in their claims that manufacturers have "un­
clean hemds" before the courts. One attorney reports a 
case in which a shopper purchased the manufacturer-plain- 
tiff's product at a discount at the manufacturer's showroom 
from the president of the fair trading corporation. The 
court promptly dismissed the suit. (C. I. Ranter and S. G. 
Rosenolum, "The Operation of Fair Trade Programs," Harvard 
Law Review. 69 (1955), 342.)
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the fact that General Electric Company had spent $ 500,000 
during 1954 to enforce its fair trade program, and had put 
aside in its budget for 1955 $ 750,000 for this purpose. 
Although fair trade opponents hoped that this issue would 
develop into a major weapon in their hands to emasculate 
fair trade, most courts have denied the defending re­
tailer the argument of manufacturer's "unclean hands" as 
long as the courts were convinced that the manufacturer 
made a sincere effort to enforce the fair trade prices, 
regardless of the success of sucn an attempt. The re­
strictive element of tnose decisions in relation to the 
practical application of fair trade provisions is the fact 
that this legal device of resale price maintenance could 
now only be used by companies with sufficient financial 
means to have an enforcement program wnich would satisfy 
the courts and which thus would make the courts reject "un­
clean hands" allegations against tne manufacturer-plaintiff.
Court Enforcement of Fair Trade to All-or- 
Nothing Basis," Business Week, July 30, 1955, p. 54.
Ibid.
53"The Enforcement of Resale Price Maintenance," 
Yale Law Journal, 69 (1959), 187, note 113.
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54Inducement of Breach of Fair Trade Contracts
Especially in relation to the increasing number 
of states invalidating tne non-signer provision of the state 
fair trade statutes, some ardent fair trade manufacturers 
have tried to take enforcement action against price cutters 
who had not signed a fair trade contract, by restricting 
the supply of fair traded goods to retailers who had signed 
a fair trade contract with the manufacturer or his whole­
s a l e r . ^5 The price cutters were then accused of inducement 
of breach of fair trade contracts as they could have secured 
their supplies only through parties who had signed a fair 
trade contract with the manufacturer. However, some courts 
held that to sustain such an action would violate the pub­
lic policy of the state since the nonsigner provision had 
been held unconstitutional.^^ Moreover, the enforcement
54For a more detailed and technical coverage of 
this issue, see: Note, Iowa Law Review, 41 (1956), 715-718.
^^See for instance: Statement of H. T. Van Hell, 
Vice-President of Sunbeaun Corporation in U. S. Congress, 
House. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 10527, etc., 85th 
Cong., 2d Sess., (1958), pp. 275-291.
^^Two cases to this effect were previously re­
viewed. Sunbeam Corporation v. Gilbert Simmons Ass. Inc., 
91 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 1956), supra, pp. I/ll-Z : and Argus 
Cameras, Inc., v. Hall of Distributors, Inc., 343 Mich.
54, 72 N. W. 2d 152 (1955), supra, pp. 116-7.
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technique whereby only the signers of a fair trade contract 
could secure supplies, even if it had been fully sustained 
by all the courts, could not completely prevent the supply 
of the fair trader's products to price cutting retailers, 
since mail order houses and other sources in non-fair trade 
states could ship the goods into fair trade states below 
fair trade prices or without the restriction that they 
should be resold at a stipulated price. In those cases no 
enforcement action was available to the manufacturer.^^
U. Ŝ . V. Parke, Davis & Co.
It nas tnus far never been too clear what actions 
beyond those that are specifically authorized by the state 
fair trade laws a manufacturer may take to enforce resale 
prices, either by controlling the distribution of supplies 
or by contracts, without violating the provisions of the 
Shermcin Act.^^ Since 1919 the U. S. Supreme Court's Col­
gate doctrine^^ has governed the courts' reasoning regard­
ing a manufacturer's right to regulate the distribution of
5^See General Electric v. Masters, supra, PP*i86-7
58C. I. Kanter and S. G. Rosenblum, "The Opera­
tion of Fair Trade Programs," Harvard Law Review, 69 (1955), 
347.
S. V. Colgate & Co., 250 U. S. 300 (1919).
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his products by refusing to sell to a wholesaler or re­
tailer to whom he sells directly for the simple reason that 
those parties violated minimum resale prices as stipulated 
by the manufacturer.^^ This device has been extensively 
used to enforce fair trade programs and was strengthened 
considerably in the fair trade states by the fact that the 
McGuire Act allowed the manufacturer to contract with his 
wholesalers that the products would be resold only to re­
tailers who had signed fair trade contracts or who honored 
the manufacturer's prices without any contract. However, 
in non-fair trade states, wnere such contracts were illegal, 
only the "refusal to sell" device was available to maintain 
resale prices of the parties directly dealing with the man­
ufacturers, while m e  ultimate retail resale prices remained 
a completely separate question. Under the rationale of the 
Colgate doctrine, a trader or manufacturer has a right to 
exercise his own discretion in his selection of customers, 
and, if he does not intend to create or maintain a monopoly, 
to announce in advance the circumstances under which he will 
refuse to deal.^^ Thus, under the Colgate doctrine, a bare
°*^Kanter and Rosenolum, op. cit., 348.
Resale Price Maintenance and the Parke, Davis 
Case," Virginia Law Review, 46 (1960), 977.
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refusal to deal without any monopolistic intent or accom­
panied by any contract, could be used by the manufacturer in 
his pricing and distribution policy without violating the 
Sherman Act.^^
It was in 1956 tnat the Parke, Davis & Co. manu­
facturer was faced with tne problem of enforcing its mini­
mum resale prices upon price cutters located in non-fair 
trade jurisdictions,^^ and used for this purpose an "ex­
tended" form of the Colgate doctrine. Especially in re­
lation to tne pricing freedom in non-fair trade jurisdic­
tions, which has been of such a great influence in weaken­
ing the whole fair trade structure in other states, the 
5 success or failure of the Parke, Davis scheme to maintain 
prices and tnus to curtail this freedom of retailers in 
non-fair trade jurisdictions, was of great significance in 
the overall fair trade developments.
It was again Congress' inconsistency in passing 
federal enabling fair trade legislation but not enacting a
*^ F̂or a more detailed discussion of the limits of 
a manufacturer's rights to control the price by means be­
yond those provided by the fair trade laws, see: W. Adams, 
"Resale Price Maintenance: Fact and Fancy," Yale Law Jour­
nal, 64 (1955), 967-978.
63Virginia Law Review, op. c it., 977.
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fair trade law for the District of Columbia, which made it 
possible for the U. S. Department of Justice to hit Parke, 
Davis & Co. with a criminal indictment in 1957. In the 
indictment, a District of Columbia grand jury accused 
Parke, Davis of conspiracy with three Washington, D. C. 
wholesalers to (a) fix prices, forcing consumers to pay 
nigh, arbitrary, and not competitive prices, and (b) to re­
fuse to supply retailers who would not charge prices æt by 
the manufacturer.^^ Parke, Davis, in its attempt to con­
trol the resale prices of its products in non-fair trade 
jurisdictions, had sent out to all retailers a warning that 
price cutting would result in them being cut off from 
future sources of supply. Those sources, however, were 
mainly independent wholesalers, so that the manufacturer 
also had to tell the wholesalers that it would refuse to 
deal with them if tney supplied price cutting retailers.
A trial court, which first heard the evidence, dismissed 
the Government c o m p l a i n t , a s tne court was unable to
G4" Justice Department Tries Both Bsurrels at 
Parke, Davis Drug Pricing," Business Week, May 11, 1957, 
p. 144.
V. .Parke, Davis & Co., 164 F. Supp.
827 (1958).
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draw any inference of combination, conspiracy, or agree­
ment between Parke, Davis and the wholesalers and retailers
66involved, from the evidence presented. This court ar­
gued that the right of an individual to choose its own 
customers, as set forth in tne Colgate doctrine, was all 
that Parke, Davis employed to maintain its prices. The 
Government appealed this decision and the U. S. Supreme 
Court reviewed the case in 1960.^^ Although this Court 
argued also that the right of a company or an individual 
to choose its own customers, as set fortn in the Colgate 
doctrine, outweighs society's interest in unrestrained 
price competition and that therefore uniform resale prices 
brought about by an announcement of a price policy and simple 
refusals to deal, were l e g a l ; t h e  Court, however, consid­
ered Parke, Davis's conduct to have been beyond tliis legal 
device of price maintenance. The Court gave two reasons 
for this opinion, namely the Parke, Davis scheme had been 
beyond a simple refusal to deal oy (a) securing the acqui­
escence of tne price-cutting retailers in its scheme to
'̂G'lbid., at 635.
S. V. Parke. Davis & Co., 362 U. S. 29 (1960) 
^^Ibid., at 44.
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suppress the advertising of the prices at which the price- 
cutters were selling the products and by (b) involving the 
wholesalers in a plan to cut off price-cutting retailers. 
Those two factors in combination with a refusal to deal, 
was in violation of the Sherman Act according to the Court.69
Besides the great significance of this decision for 
the general enforcement of an effective antitrust policy, the 
importance of the decision in relation to resale price main­
tenance is well expressed in the following quotation:
... the control of retail prices by means of econ­
omic pressure on wholesalers was condemned as an 
unlawful restraint of trade. This would seem to 
imply that vertical price-fixing by means of a re­
fusal to deal in a non-fair trade jurisdiction can 
never exceed one link in the chain from manufac­
turer to retailer. Since most manufacturers in 
this country do not deal directly with retailers, 
but rather deal through a series of middlemen, it 
is most likely that, absent a fair trade statute, 
the manufacturer will have very little to say 
concerning the retail prices at which his goods 
eventually will be sold. Thus, wheraer a manu­
facturer sells to a retailer in a non-fair trade 
jurisdiction through one or more middlemen, the 
manufacturer cannot use a refusal to deal as a 
means of enforcing his suggested retail prices.
The pricing freedom of retailers in non-fair 
trade jurisdictions seems to be well secured by this decision.
69ibid.. at 45-46.
^^Virginia Law Review, pp. cit., 992-993.
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This freedom can thus continue as a bright example, causing 
for remaining fair traders in the remaining fair trade 
states a great amount of nuisance through the detrimental 
effects of those examples on their fair trade programs.
CHAPTER VII
F7W0RABLE LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS AND COUNTER-MEASURES
The three previous chapters were basically con­
cerned with adverse fair trade decisions and developments.
The significant successes achieved by the fair trade oppo­
nents might lead to the implication that the defense of fair 
trade proponents had been weak and ineffective. However, 
this is only partly true. The fight for and against fair 
trade during the reviewed period is characterized by active 
measures and counter-measures during each stage of the battle. 
The only generalization which might be justifiable is to 
state that the opponents' legal attacks and the economic 
factors working in their favor have been more effective in 
destroying the fair trade structure than the proponents' 
counter-measures were effective in sustaining this price 
maintenance scheme.
It is the purpose of this chapter to review some of 
the proponents' activities to defend and strengthen fair 
trade legislation as an effective price maintenance instrument,
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Favorable State Court Decisions 
The host of decisions invalidating the nonsigner 
provisions of state fair trade laws during the last decade 
should not lead to the conclusion that the fair traders were 
without any support in this particularly controversial part 
of the complete fair trade issue. The Old Dearborn case,^ 
in which the U. S. Supreme Court disposed of all objections 
to fair trade, as provided for by the states, under the Fed­
eral Constitution, served as the example for several state 
courts to refuse to find merit in the several constitutional 
objections to fair trade brought before them under the state 
constitutions. Since the beginning of 1950, 13 highest state 
courts held the nonsigner provision of their state fair trade 
laws constitutional. Of those 13 decisions, 3 concerned re­
affirmations of similar positions taken in cases prior to 
21950, while the other 10 decisions were rendered in states 
in which the highest court had not settled this constitutional 
issue previously.^ Significant is the fact that the majority
^Chapter IV, Supra, pp. 59-64.
2por favorable state court decisions prior to 1950, 
see Chapter V, supra, p. 95, note 8.
^The 13 states and cases are: Arizona, General 
Electric Co. v. Telco Supply, Inc., 84 Ariz. 132, 325 P. 2d 
394 (1958); California, Scoville Mfg. Co. v. Skaggs Pay Less
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Of those states belong to the more densely populated states 
in the Union.
The persistent refusal of those courts to examine 
the real economic purpose of the fair trade laws and the re­
fusal to evaluate the legislatures' wisdom to make the enact­
ment of fair trade laws part of their economic policy, con­
stituted the basis for sustaining those statutes.^ This was 
illustrated especially clearly when the validity of the fair 
trade statute was at issue before the Delaware highest court 
in 1954. The contention was made before this court that 
economic conditions had changed and that experience had dem­
onstrated that fair trade,legislation had not accomplished 
the intended purposes. The court answered:
Drug Stores, 45 Cal. 2d 881, 291 P. 2d 936 (1955); Delaware, 
General Electric Co. v. Klein. 34 Del. Ch. 491, 106 A. 2d 
206 (1954); Hawaii, Johnson & Johnson. Inc. v. G. E. M. 
Sundries Co.. 43 Haw. 103 (1959); Illinois, Kinsey Dis­
tillers Sales Co. V. Foremost Liquor Stores. Inc.. 15 111.
2d 182, 154 N. E. 2d 290 (1958); Maryland, Home Utilities Co. 
V. Revere Copper & Brass. Inc.. 209 Md. 610, 122 A. 2d 109 
(1956); Massachusetts, General Electric Co. v. Kimball 
Jewelers. Inc., 333 Mass. 665, 132 N. E. 2d 652 (1956); 
Mississippi, Sheaffer Pen Co. v. Barrett. 209 Miss. 1, 45 
So. 2d 838 (1950); New Hampshire, Corning Glass Works v.
Max Dichter Co.. 102 N. H. 505, 161 A. 2d 569 (1960); New 
Jersey, Lionel Corp. v. Grayson-Robinson Stores. 15 N. J.
191, 104 A. 2d 304 (1954); New York, General Electric Co. v. 
Masters. Inc.. 307 N. Y. 229, 120 N. E. 2d 802 (1954); 
Pennsylvania, Burche Co. v. General Electric Co., 382 Pa.
370, 115 A. 2d 361 (1955); Wisconsin, Bulova Watch Co. v. 
Anderson. 270 Wis. 21, 70 N. W. 2d 243 (1955).
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But upon examination it is found that these 
objections must depend for their validity upon 
the tacit assumption that the resale price main­
tenance act is so clearly unsound that the court 
can say without hesitation that the legislative 
finding to the contrary have no reasonable basis 
to support them.5
Along with the other 12 courts, the Delaware court because 
of lack of absolute certainty regarding the economic unsound­
ness of fair trade, refrained itself from reversing the leg­
islature's action in this area of economic policy. Thus the 
Old Dearborn decision remains the basis for the legal justi­
fication of fair trade in those states.^ It also continued 
to be settled fair trade rule as far as the Federal Consti­
tution is concerned. The U. S. Supreme Court's refusal to 
consider the constitutionality of the McGuire Act^ has un­
doubtedly stimulated the influence of the Old Dearborn trade­
mark theory on the favorable state fair trade decisions.
Most fair trade opponents feel that since the
'̂ E. J. Kohrs, "Fair Trade and the State Constitu­
tions," Vanderbilt Lav Review, 10 (1957), 417.
^General Electric v. Klein, op. cit., at 209.
^For an enumeration of the arguments used by those 
courts to refute the fair trade opponents' allegations, see: 
R. G. Clayton, "The Present Constitutional Status of State 
Fair Trade Laws," University of Cincinnati Law Review, 25 
(1956), 471-472.
^Chapter V, supra, pp. 91-3 .
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basis of these decisions, which is the assumption that the 
primary aim of fair trade acts is to protect the property 
right or goodwill of the manufacturer's trademark, is in 
question, the U. S. Supreme Court should re-examine its Old
QDearborn theory.
Counter-Measures by State Legislatures
The impressive list of highest state courts which 
could not agree with the fair trade rationale of the Old 
Dearborn case and which invalidated- their nonsigner pro­
visions led to legislative activities to accomplish the same 
result (as the nonsigner provision had) by different means.^ 
The two pioneering states in finding a new approach to cir­
cumvent the courts' adverse fair trade decisions are Ohio 
and Virginia. These states have enacted new fair trade laws 
which are an attempt to skirt the legal objections to the 
nonsigner provisions while maintaining the actual effects of 
those provisions, in the hope that those acts will be upheld 
as valid before the courts. These attempts are directly in
Bpii Lilly & Co. v. Schwegmann Bros.. 109 F. Supp. 
269, at 271-272, certiorari denied, 346 U. S. 856 (1953).
See also; C. H. Fulda, "Resale Price Maintenance," Univer­
sity of Chicago Law Review, 21 (1954), 208-211.
^"The Constitutionality of the Virginia Fair 
Trade Act," Virginia Law Review, 47 (1961), 634.
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line with the great significance which is attached to the 
characteristics of the nonsigner provisions by fair traders 
for effective enforcement of fair trade prices. In 1959 Mr.
H. S. Waller, General Counsel of the National Association of 
Retail Druggists, emphasized this again when he stated that 
experience since 1933 in the operation of resale price main­
tenance has shown that enforcement solely through contracts
. , 10 IS unfeasable.
After the Ohio Supreme Court in 1958 held the non­
signer provision of the state fair trade act unconstitution­
al^^ the Ohio legislature surfaced resale price maintenance 
for breath again by enacting a law, over the Governor's veto, 
to be effective October 22, 1959. " This law contained the 
following language:
It shall be lawful ... for a proprietor to es­
tablish and control by notice to distributors 
or by contract stipulated minimum resale prices 
for a commodity of which he is the proprietor 
and which is in free and open competition with 
commodities of the same general class produced 
by others and offered for sale in the same
 ̂u. S. Congress, House, committee on Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce, Fair Trade, Hearings on H. R. 768 and 
other bills, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), pp. 92-94.
^Chapter V, supra, pp. 143-4.
12"Legal Developments," Journal of Marketing.24 
(January 1960), 82.
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general market area. Such minimum resale prices 
may be differentiated as to the various levels of 
distribution, provided such differentiations are 
not unlawfully discriminatory. Such prices may 
be changed from time to time by written notice...
The most important difference of the provisions of this new 
fair trade act with those to be found in the traditional fair 
trade acts, concerns the maintenance of resale prices by no­
tice. Statutes with a nonsigner provision required at least 
one fair trade contract in a state to maintain prices. This 
system had run afoul in many courts of the reasoning that a 
nonsigner would be deprived from his property right if he 
was forced to abide by provisions of a contract to which he 
was not a party himself. By eliminating the indirect method 
of the nonsigner provision to get effective enforcement 
against all retailers, the Ohio legislature hoped to have 
also eliminated the legal objections to the coercive power 
of a private fair trade contract on nonsigners. This legis­
lative maneuver contradicts directly a statement in a fair 
trade proponents handbook:
The laws might just as well have allowed the manu­
facturer to establish minimum prices by announce­
ment or publication; however, they did in all cases 
say contracts, and contracts it is.14
l^Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (Supp. 1960), as cited in:
M. Conant, "Resale Price Maintenance: Constitutionality of
Nonsigner Clauses, " University of Pennsylvania Law Review.
109 (1961), 552.
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If the author meant "contracts" in combination with the non­
signer provision, it must be agreed that the effect is equal 
to a law that allows the establishment of prices by announce­
ment. However, the fact that the traditional fair trade laws 
used contracts was to emphasize the voluntary character of 
fair trade and this brought the coercive character of the 
later developed nonsigner provision under extra suspicion in 
the courts. A suspicion which might not have had such devas­
tating effects if the fair trade proponents had been able to 
push for fair trade legislation with the "announcement" de­
vice in the first place. It should be doubted, however, 
whether this would have been successful.
The success of the Ohio legislative attempt to 
satisfy the judiciary branch and at the same time achieve the 
same effects as the former statute which v/as declared uncon­
stitutional, is highly in doubt in Ohio. Two lower courts 
have already held the new act unconstitutional on the ground 
that it is an unauthorized exercise of the police power of 
the state and delegates legislative power to private persons 
without standard or r e v i e w . T h e  court in the Hudson case
l4E. A. Newcomb, "The Fair Trade Laws," in The 
Basis and Development of Fair Trade. (New York : The National
Wholesale Druggists' Association, 1955), p. 2.
l^Hudson Distributors, Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 1960
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refused to be impressed by the "high sounding phrases" of 
the revised fair trade act.^^ Those decisions in addition 
to the strong anti-fair trade language employed by the Ohio 
Supreme Court in its decision which invalidated the old stat- 
ute^^ leave the new legislative approach in Ohio little 
chance of success.
The situation in the state of Virginia deserves 
some special attention as it is unique among the several fair 
trade states. First, it is the only state in which the high­
est court invalidated a traditional fair trade act and later 
rehabilitated fair trade by upholding the constitutionality 
of an act with the same practical intentions. This new act, 
which was held constitutional, similar to the new Ohio act, 
does not contain the traditional nonsigner provision. It 
was the first time such an act received a favorable review 
from the highest court in a state. This situation can be 
partly explained from the fact that the highest court in
C. C. H. Trade Cases, #59778 (Ohio C. P. July 28, 1960), and 
Helena Rubinstein, Inc. v. Cincinnati Vitamin & Cosmetics 
Distributors Co., 1960 C. C. H. Trade Cases, #69720 (Ohio
C. P. May 23, 1960).
^^"Legal Developments," Journal of Marketing,
25 (October 1960), 75.
Chapter V, supra, pp. 143-4.
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Virginia never came to a decisive condemning decision on the 
old fair trade act. It held in 1956^® that the 1936 state 
fair trade act had been repealed by implication by the sub­
sequent passage of an anti-monopoly statute.
The great number of states in which the nonsigner 
provision had been held unconstitutional undoubtedly im­
pressed the Virginia legislature when it re-enacted a fair
trade act in 1958 to offset the highest court's decision on 
19the old act. Possibly fore-seeing constitutional pitfalls 
for the nonsigner provision, the Virginia legislature fol­
lowed Ohio's lead and did not include the typical nonsigner 
provision in the new act. Instead the new act defines a fair 
trade contract as "any agreement, written or verbal, or
actual notice imparted by mail or attached to the commodity
20or container thereof." Thus, theoretically this act does 
not concern nonsigners, but only parties to voluntary con­
tracts which come into existence as soon as a retailer ac­
cepts supplies with a notice attached to it. As the exist­
ence of this kind of contracts could not be based on common
l^Benrus Watch Co. v. Kirsch, 193 Va. 94, 92 S. E.
2d 384 (1956) 
19Virginia Law Review, op. cit., 635.
^^Va. Code Ann. 59-8.2, as cited in, ibid.
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law, the sole basis was formed by the validity of the pro­
visions in the new fair trade act.
In 1960 the highest Virginia court argued that 
if a retailer accepts trademarked goods for resale with 
actual notice of an imposed minimum resale price, he there­
by automatically contracts to honor that stipulated price
under the terms of the new Virginia Fair Trade Act, which
21is constitutional.
Although the Virginia court held that the new 
act "... has removed the chief ground and reason relied 
upon by courts that have held tneir fair trade acts uncon­
s t i t u t i o n a l ,  "22 the mere attachment of a new label to the 
traditional nonsigner provision does not obscure the essen­
tial similarity in result. The Virginia court had not pre­
viously condemned the nonsigner provision, however, as the 
lower court decisions in Ohio indicate already, for the 
state courts which have viewed the nonsigner provision with
21 Standard Drug Co. v. General Electric Co., 202 
Va. 367, 117 S. E. 2d 289 (I960) . This case concerned the 
price maintenance on one of the few General Electric prod­
ucts still being fair traded; namely, flash bulbs,
22Cited in: News Release, Bureau of Education on 
Fair Trade, dated November 29, 1960, p. 3.
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a jaundiced eye, the new Virginia fair trade provisions 
will not likely be more p a l a t a b l e . A  widespread success 
of this novel approach therefore can hardly be expected.
Activity for Federal Fair Trade Legislation
In view of the impressive series of legal set­
backs of the fair trade structure during the last decade, 
it is hardly surprising that the proponents of resale price 
maintenance would again seek to revitalize and strengthen 
fair trade tnrough federal legislation.
For a number of years now, the U. S. Congress has
debated several resale price maintenance bills, while on
24many of them hearings were held. This proposed legislation 
before the Congress would create a federal cause of action 
for violations of fair trade agreements, and would
^^Virginia Law Review, op. cit., 639.
^^Hearings on il. R. 1Ü527, 107 /u, 10847, 11048, 
11216, 11264 before a Subcommittee of the House Committee 
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1958); Hearings on S. 3850 before the Senate Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); 
Hearings on H. R. 768, 1253, 2463, 2729, 3187, 5252, 5602 
before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Inter­
state and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
2 R"A Symposium on the Fair Trade Laws," Fordham 
Law Review, 27 (1958), 110.
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further eliminate the nonsigner provision by employing the 
same general provisions as found in the new Ohio and Vir­
ginia fair trade acts.
It was basically the unsuccessful legal actions 
of Bissell Carpet Sweeper Company and General Electric Com­
pany against the Masters Mail Order Company of Washington,
D. C., which brought the fair traders to prompt Representa-
27tive Harris to introduce the so-called Harris Bill. Like 
most other proposals, the Harris Bill would amend the Fed­
eral Trade Commission Act, "so as to equalize rights in
28the distribution of identified merchandise." The special 
character of this "equalization of rights" aim of the pro­
posal is contained in the title of the bill:
... it is the purpose of tnis act to recognize 
the legitimate interest of the manufacturer ... 
who identifies merchandise ... in stimulating 
demand for his identified merchandise through 
effective distribution to ultimate consumers; 
to equalize rights in the distribution of iden­
tified merchandise by affording the small man­
ufacturer ... to compete on more nearly equal
Z^chapter VI, supra, pp.
^^H. R. 10527, 85th Cong. 2d Sess. Re-introduced 
as a bill of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com­
merce, Hon. Oren Harris, Chairman, H. R. 1253, 86th Cong., 
1st Sess.
28Hearings on H. R. 10527, etc., op. c it., p. 1.
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terms with the large manufacturer ... who can 
control the distribution of his merchandise 
through his employees and consignees, and by 
affording the small retailer an opportunity to 
compete on more equal terras with the large re­
tailer ...29
Herman has shown tnat the benefits of fair trade 
for the small manufacturers is very much in doubt. The 
value of a statute to protect the trademark rights is of mere 
benefit to the large manufacturer who has a sizeable adver­
tising budget to make the trademark a national concept 
which then in turn becomes valuable to price cutters to 
oe employed in their practices. He also argues that the 
fair trade program of a large firm has the tendency to 
consolidate its market position against which the small
2 9Ibid., pp. 2-3. Tne serious contradictory 
Character of those purposes and the fallacious assumptions 
underlying them are well-covered by Professor E. S. Herman 
of Penn State University in his testimony and prepared 
statement before the Subcommittee. (Ibid., pp. 502-642.)
He facetioBly recommended that the Harris Bill would be made 
more accurate and straight forward by changing in the above 
quotation from the bill "by affording the small retailer 
an opportunity to compete on more equal terms" to read:
"by affording the small retailer an opportunity to stay in 
business by permitting the elimination of retail price com­
petition on branded goods" (Ibid.. p. 606.) When this anti­
fair trade scholar after a lengthy and profound testimony 
was asked whether he had any practical business experience 
himself, the surprising answer was that he worked in his 
father's drugstore for many years, and that his father had 
given him his point of view with much vigor continually1 
(Ibid., p. 630.)
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manufacturer has little chance.
... fair trade agreements may be appropriately re­
garded as a form of cooperation between the manu­
facturer of a well-known and intensively adver­
tised brand and numerous retailers of that product, 
whereby, in exchange for price protection and sat­
isfactory margins, the dealers tacitly agree to 
carry and push that particular brand.
The small manufacturer witn less-known brand will in such
a situation have much difficulty to find interested dealers,
who prefer known brands which can be sold in volume with a
minimum of buyer's resistance and at prices allowing high
31retail margins. However, when discount stores get hold
of tne well-known brands, the small retailer might loose
interest in tnem and might start " switching" to less known
3brands of smaller manufacturers.
Fair trade proponents have long held that the 
right to maintain resale prices is identical to or a logi­
cal part of ti\e protective provisions of the patent,
S. Herman, "A Statistical Note on Fair Trade," 
Antitrust Bulletin, 4 (1959), 591.
Senate survey indicates that the smallest of 
the ten manufacturers, by retailers most commended for a good enforcement program of their fair trade prices, had sales in 
1955 of over $ 40 million. 56 per cent of the retailers sur­
veyed indicated that it is their policy to push products of 
manufacturers that operate active fair trade programs. (U.
S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Small Business,
Fair Trade, Report No. 2819, based on a Survey of Manufac­
turers and Retailers. 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 1956, pp. 18-19.)
^^Ibid., p. 18.
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33trademark and copyright laws. That the principal benefit 
of fair trade should accrue to the advantage of the larger 
manufacturers is implicit in the traditionally stated pur­
pose of fair trade, that is the protection against loss- 
leader selling by price cutting retailers. Since effective 
loss-leader selling requires the use of widely know, 
hea/ily advertised brands,
... it is not the firms of small size and limited 
reputation that are likely to find price protection 
very helpful, but rather the well-entrenched giants 
whose nationally advertised products are most 
suitable for this purpose.
This was also brought out by a manufacturer of one type of 
small appliances who stated that fair trade was not possible 
for his products because all the producers in tne field were 
relatively small operators without widely known brand nêimes; 
fair trade would only result in a severe loss in his sales, 
as competitors' prices could be set freely by the retail­
ers.^^ This would verify Bowman's thesis that fair trade 
will only be beneficial to the businessmen if there are
^^Newcomb, op. cit., p. 5.
34Herman, Statistical Note, op. cit., 590.
I. Ranter and S. G. Rosenblum, "The Opera­
tion of Fair Trade Programs," Harvard Law Review, 59 (1955), 
325.
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(1) monopsonistic elements of dealers organizations present 
in the market to pressure manufacturers into fair trade 
programs after which the retailers will obligingly push 
the fair traded products and/or (2) there are monopolistic 
powers in the hands of large manufacturers created by 
heavily advertised trademarked and expensive promotion 
activities.
If a manufacturer of small size wants to maintain 
prices, he most likely coid use just as well a method of 
carefully selecting his distributors. Under such a system 
the distributors knowledge tnat his franchise can be with­
drawn is then a potent weapon against price c u t t i n g . Under 
a market condition where such a resale price maintenance 
method would not work, a small manufacturer's fair trade
program to achieve the same result would require far too
3 bexpensive enforcement procedures. Others have argued, 
nowever, that the small manufacturer needs fair trade pro­
visions as it does not have the same recourse as large
S. Bowman, Jr., "The Prerequisites and 
Effects of Resale Price Maintenance," University of Chicago 
Law Review, 22 (1955), 825-827.
3 7Kanter and Rosenblum, op. cit., 324.
^^Herman, Statistical Note, pp. cit., 592.
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manufacturers to other methods of resale price maintenance,
such as consignment selling, exclusive dealerships or verti-
39cal integration. Herman, however, asserts that to assume 
such a high degree of substitutability of resale price 
maintenance alternatives for large manufacturers is not 
warranted in relation to the magnitude of the benefits of 
maintaining prices as compared with the drastic structural 
changes in the market relationships and necessary altera­
tion of selling strategy to switch to another method of re­
sale price maintenance.^^ This would again indicate that 
the large manufacturers have the most to gain by legisla­
tive fair trade.
To negate the detrimental effects on fair trade
programs of the existence of non-fair trade jurisdictions
within the Union, tne federal Harris Bill provides for the
whole country:
... it shall be unrawful for any person with actual 
notice of an applicable stipulated resale price ...
Adams, "Resale Price Maintenance: Fact and 
Fancy," Yale Law Journal, 64 (1955), 975.
^^Herman, Statistical Note, op. cit., 592.
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to sell, offer to sell, or advertise merchandise 
in commerce at a different p r i c e . ..^l
Another major restriction of resale price maintenance as 
created by the U. S. Supreme Court in the McKesson case^^ 
which dealt with the controversy concerning the distinction 
of horizontal and vertical price fixing schemes in relation 
to resale price maintenance programs of vertically integra­
ted manufacturers, was alleviated by providing in the Harris 
Bill that a manufacturer may
... Establish such resale prices for his distri­
butors, even though he sells in competition with 
them, so long as he sells at the applicable prices 
he has established for his distributors making 
comparable s a l e s . 43
Most likely for practical reasons to make the bill politi­
cally more palataole, this attack on a significant anti-trust 
decision was considerably softened wnen the bill was re-intro­
duced in the bbtn Congress. The provision to this effect 
then allowed integrated companies to fair trade tneir pro­
duct if:
^^Hearings on H. R. 10527, etc., op. cit., p. 4,
Tne "different" would indicate that this is both a minimum 
as well as a maximum resale price maintenance legislative 
proposal.
42Chapter VI, supra, pp. 172-7.
43 Hearings on H. R. 10527, etc., op. cit., pp. 3-4.
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... he is not a wholesale distributor of products 
other than products which he m a n u f a c t u r e s . 44
Thus resale price maintenance programs of integrated manu­
facturers would be protected from the horizontal price- 
fixing prohibitions of the Sherman Act, as long as the 
manufacturer's own wholesaling and retailing activities 
remained limited to its own manufactured products. This 
would still constitute, however, at least a reversal of 
part of the McKesson decision.
To soften tne blow of a federal fair trade act to 
those states that never had chosen to enact a fair trade 
act for themselves, the Harris Bill contained the practi­
cally meaningless stipulation for pricing-freedom-loving 
retailers in those states, tnat tne federal bill's pro­
visions :
... shall not apply to the merchandise of 
proprietors no substantial part of whose 
merchandise crosses State lines at any stage
of distribution.45
44y. S. Congress, House, Committee on Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce. Report No. 467. To accompany H. R. 
1253, 86th Cong. 1st Sess., 1959, p. 23. This favorable 
report stated explicitly that nothing in the proposed bill 
would upset or conflict with the McKesson decision. (Ibid., 
p. 19.)
^^Hearings on H. R. 10527, etc., op. cit., p. 4. 
This provision was deleted, however, in the next version of 
the bill, H. R. 1253. (House Rpt. 467, op. cit., pp. 21-24.)
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One group of bills eunong the m&ny federal fair 
trade proposals has been distinguished purposely from the 
"fair trade" approach, but has the same purpose. The lead­
ing example of these bills is the so-called Madden Bill,^^
which is actively sponsored by the Quality Brands Associ-
47ates of America, Inc. The Madden Bill takes the brand
control approach. The bill is referred to by its proponents
as the "Madden Quality Stabilization Bill". They argue that
if retail outlets through unrestrained price competition
become large enough to put pressure on the manufacturers
to lower their prices to those retailers, the manufacturers
are forced to lower the quality of their products to break 
4ceven. This argument for price stabilization through the
49indirect route of the necessity of quality stabilization
R. 2463, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. R. 116, 
87th Cong., 1st Sess.
^^This is basically an organization of manufactur­
ers interested in resale price maintenance. President is 
Mr. John W. Anderson, ex-president of the now defunct Ameri­
can Fair Trade Council. (Chapter II, supra, p. 23 . This 
change was probably occasioned through the belief that "the 
very name 'Fair Trade' has become anathemato the public." 
(Newsletter, Quality Brands Associates of America, Inc., 
September 1960, p. 2.)
^^Folder of the Quality Brands Associates of 
America, Inc., "Optional Quality and Price Stabilization," 
1950, pp. 4-5.
49Sunbeam Corporation for instance is trying
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is strongly deflated by the opponents who argue that re­
sale price maintenance is especially urged by manufacturers 
whose products' manufacturing cost is normally only a small 
percentage of the ultimate retail price.
Fair trade goods normally reveal a large margin 
between the manufacturer's selling price and 
his direct material and labor costs and also a 
liberal retail margin.51
The remedy proposed in the Madden Bill is simply
to allow the owner of the brand or trademark to deny any
further use of the brand to those who have utilized the
brand in a "destructive" fashion. Three grounds are set
out in the bill to allow tne owner of the brand to invoke
this remedy: (1) bait advertising, (2) selling at other
5 2than the established price, and (3) consumer deception.
since January 19ou to create an image of quality and to 
down-grade price as a selling tool by only reimbursing 
dealers for cooperative advertising expenditures for Sun­
beam products if the dealers' advertisements stress quality 
and do not indicate prices. General Electric Company has 
a similar advertising allowance plan forbidding advertis­
ing of prices below certain minimums. "Manufacturers Keep 
Pressure on Retailers to Stress Quality, Soft-Pedal Price," 
Business Week, January 9, 1960, p. 61.)
5^G. R. Smith and H. C. Smith, to Economic Ap­
praisal of Resale Price Maintenance (New Orleans: Loyola
University, 1957), pp. 18-19.
S. Congress, House, Select Committee on 
Small Business. Fair Trade: The Problems and Issues.
Report No. 1292. 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952, p. 20.
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This approach which constitutes a substantial 
extension of the existing legislation to protect trademarks 
and brand names, is supposed to be "consistent with modern 
concepts of the role and function of t r a d e m a r k s . " T h i s  
approach follows completely the trademark theory as promul­
gated in the Old Dearborn d e c i s i o n . I t  is on this U. S. 
Supreme Court decision tnat the hopes of the proponents of 
this and other federal fair trade legislative proposals 
rest concerning the constitutionality of those bills.
The pressure for tne passage of a federal fair 
trade statute under which fair traders would have the oppor­
tunity to start a federal action against violators is not 
new. It was also attempted shortly after the first Schweg- 
mann decision. At that time, however, the existence of the 
three non-fair trade states which would have been forced to
accept fair trade by such a federal act, was a major objec-
55tion for many representatives. The McGuire Act was enacted
52Separate Statement of Mr. Avery, House Rpt. No. 
467, op. cit., p. 74.
, p. 75.
54Chapter III, supra, pp. 59-63. A folder of the 
Quality Brands Associates of America, Inc., explaining the 
Madden Bill is illustrated by a picture showing a page from 
the Old Dearborn decision.
55For a detailed history of the legislative pro-
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to offset the effects on resale price maintenance of two 
U. S. Supreme Court d e c i s i o n s . T h e  more recent proposals 
for federal fair trade legislation, however, are aimed at 
(1) annihilating the effects of more than 20 highest state
C ncourt decisions rejecting fair trade, and further (2) to 
force resale price maintenance on those states that never 
chose to enact a fair trade act. That the persistent 
attempts in the last few years^^ for federal fair trade 
legislation have thus far been singularly unsuccessful in 
spite of the extensive attention paid to them as evidenced 
by the hearings, is at least partly explained by the two 
above mentioned purposes of the proposed bills. The un­
certainty of the constitutionality of the bills under the 
Federal Constitution is another drawback. Neither the 
constitutionality of the Miller-Tydings Act nor the consti-
posals and debates which ultimately led to the federal 
enabling statute - The McGuire Act - , see: Bissell Carpet




^^For similar attempts prior to the passage of the 
Miller-Tydings Act in 1937, see: E. T. Grether, Price Con­
trol under Fair Trade Legislation (New York: Oxford Uni­
versity Press, 1939), pp. 16-17.
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tutionality of the McGuire Act has ever been plainly upheld
59by the U. S. Supreme Court. The proponents, especially 
in relation to the Madden Bill, have the strongly reasoned 
trademark theory of the Old Dearborn Case as a legal prece­
dent. The opponents, however, can rely on the more recent 
decisions, probably better fitting under the present econo­
mic conditions. First, the U. S. Supreme Court's first 
Schwegmann decision, wnich condemned vigorously the price 
fixing characteristics of the fair trade scheme, and, fur­
ther, many state supreme court decisions which explicitly 
rejected the Old Dearborn trademark rationale after looking 
into tne real purposes and effects of fair trade, especially 
in relation to tne public's interest. Thus, even if Con­
gress passes a federal fair rrade or brand control act 
establishing resale price maintenance on identified merchan­
dise for the entire United States, the measure still will 
have to pass the scrutiny of the U. S . Supreme Court.
On the basis of the first Schwegmann decision and 
the state supreme court decisions invalidating the non­
signer provisions, the fair trade opponents generally hold:
The proposed federal resale price maintenance 
law ... is a clear delegation of federal legis-
59Chapter V, supra, pp. 91-2.
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lative power to private persons. The language 
of the statute Indicates its purpose of price
regulation and of giving power for such regu­
lation to private manufacturers.^0
Mr. H. A. Bergson, former Assistant Attorney General in 
charge of tne Antitrust Division of the U. S. Department of 
Justice, however, is convinced of the complete constitu­
tional soundness as far as it concerns those federal resale
price maintenance bills which extend the trademark protection
legislation to include the right to maintain prices.
The opposing forces seem to be equally strong 
politically,^^ wnile both apparently are also equally well 
supported by significant legal arguments. Only time will 
supply the answer what the ultimate role of resale price 
maintenance by legal sanction will be in the United States.
G^Conant, "Resale Price Maintenance: Consti­
tutionality of Nonsigner Clauses," University of Pennsyl­
vania Law Review, 109 (1951), 552.
^^House Rpt. No. 457, op. cit., p. 75.
^^The traditional greater lobbying strength of 
organized businessmen which was so evident in the fair 
trade history during the 1930*s, seems now, in relation to 
fair trade legislation, for one part to be offset by the 
opposition of a "matured" group of low-margin-minimum- 
service retailers and for another part by the more active 
opposition of economists, governmental departments, con­
sumer groups, etc., as evidenced in the more recent hearings 
on this subject.
CHAPTER VIII
SOME ECONOMIC FACTORS AND CONSEQUENCES
In the fair trade developments it is hardly pos­
sible to distinguish the causes and their effects. The 
adverse legal fair trade developments were basically ini­
tiated by economic forces straining at the restrictive 
characteristics of fair trade legislation in relation to 
price competition at the retail level. As became apparent 
in the preceding chapters, however, the breakdown of the 
legal fair trade structure occurred in a piece-raeal fashion. 
Each individual adverse development having specific eco­
nomic consequences through the reduction of the scope and 
feasibility of effective resale price maintenance. The 
ultimate effect of this constant trend on several important 
fair trade programs of large national manufacturers came 
after an accumulation of adverse state court decisions to 
which was added the unfavorable influence of federal de­
cisions. Those factors rendered effective enforcement of 
fair trade prices, where this was still legally allowed,
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increasingly expensive and next to impossible.
This chapter will first briefly review the magni­
tude of the fair traders' enforcement costs. It next 
enumerates the sequence of abandonments of major fair trade 
programs and the stated reasons for those policy decisions. 
The main characteristics of the discount revolution in re­
tailing which brought about a significant pressure on the 
fair trade structure to which it succumbed, are reviewed in 
some detail. The final section of the chapter devotes atten­
tion to the allegedly ultimate determinant and beneficiary 
of the free enterprise system's operations - the consumer - 
and his share and interests in those developments.
Enforcement Costs 
That the enforcement of fair trade prices can be 
very expensive may be inferred from the extensive litigation 
in this field. It is reported that the largest individual 
item in a manufacturer's fair trade enforcement budget is 
the expense of a fully contested law suit when a determined 
price-cutting retailer, after being detected, challenges the 
program.^ According to a survey conducted for the U. S.
^C. I. Kanter and S. G. Rosenblum, "The Operation 
of Fair Trade Programs," Harvard Law Review. 69 (1955), 329. 
In case the suit is lost in the lower court, the manufacturer
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Senate, a substantial number of small manufacturers con­
sidered a fair trade program an expensive luxury, beyond
their means, only available to the sizable firms that can
2afford to employ shoppers and expensive legal counsel.
The manufacturer's decision to fair trade neces­
sarily involves a comparison of the benefits with the costs. 
Not only the magnitude but also the uncertain character of 
the costs can be detrimental to effective fair trading.
Many manufacturers often lacked the incentive to bear down 
on price cutters for this reason.^ Other manufacturers 
wanted to "have the cake and eat it too," by officially 
managing a fair trade program to retain the favors of many 
small dealers, but at the same time filling the appreciated
4large orders of low-overhead, large-volume retail outlets. 
The few violators brought to court by those manufacturers
must appeal the case; otherwise, his fair trade program in 
the area will disintegrate. (Ibid.)
2U. S. Senate. Select committee on Small Busi­
ness. Fair Trade. Report on a Study on Fair Trade, Based 
on a Survey of Manufacturers and Retailers, Report No. 2819, 
84th Cong., 2d Sess., 1956, p. 6.
^S. M Lee, "Problems of Resale Price Maintenance," 
Journal of Marketing, 23 (1959), 274.
^see especially the provocative but poorly docu­
mented treatise by John Harms, Our Floundering Fair Trade. 
(New York: Exposition Press, 1956.)
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were usually to function as examples in various degrees 
either to show the dealers the good faith of the manufacturer 
or to actually discourage price cutting. Those manufacturers 
attempted to find an optimum between the enforcement costs 
and the wide-dealer-acceptance-of-his-product advantages of 
a fair trade program, the difficulty most frequently men­
tioned as of first importance (99 out of 368 manufacturers 
who answered this question) was the policing problem of fair 
trade prices and the costs of enforcement procedures.^ The 
Sunbeam Corporation, for instance, figured the costs of its 
vigorous enforcement program in 1953 at about $1 million.^
In the Senate Survey 61 manufacturers gave information on 
their fair trade program. Between $100,000 and $1,000,000 
enforcement cost was reported by 5 firms. The fair trade 
program of 25 firms cost between $11,000 and $100,000 year­
ly, while 31 firms spent less than $10,000 yearly for this 
purpose.^ These figures do little to indicate the effective­
ness of those programs but show that the implementation cost 
of fair trade is a strong deterrent to wide-spread use of 
the provisions.
^Senate Survey Report No. 2819, op. cit., p. 7.
^"Fair Trade: The War's Not Over," Business Week,
November 7, 1953, p. 44.
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Decline of Fair Trade Programs
The weakening of the legal fair trade structure 
during the last decade made conditions increasingly more 
favorable to price cutting retailers. Even for the sizable 
and prosperous firms this process reached ultimately the 
limit where the present and future advantages of a fair 
trade program had been so drastically reduced and the costs 
of counteracting the diversified assaults had so far risen, 
that abandonment of fair trade programs became the only 
choice. The path of many manufacturers with regard to fair 
trade has been leading in this direction, however, at dif-
gferent speeds.
One of the first fair trade set-backs was encoun­
tered by General Electric Company in its attempt to fair 
trade major appliances in the New York area. Retail compe­
tition circumvented this price fixing scheme rapidly by 
transferring price reductions to the allowance of higher 
trade-in values.^ That same year the discount house of Sam 
Goody's of New York destroyed the fair trade program on 
Columbia records by touching off a nation-wide price war in
^Senate Survey Report No. 2819, o£. cit., p. 7.
®S. M- Lee, 0£. cit., 275.
^Business Week. November 7, 1953, op. cit., p. 44.
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this p r o d u c t . I n  April 1955, the Lionel Corporation 
decided to forsake the mutual advantages of fair trade with 
small retailers and attempted to increase its sales by sell­
ing to large volume dealers without any resale price condi­
tions. That the decision was a correct one was born out by 
the fact that Lionel sold more merchandise in 1955 than in 
1954 under a fair trade p r o g r a m . A n o t h e r  company able to 
find out whether it was more profitable to fair trade or not 
was the VJestinghouse Corporation. This company had fair 
traded its small appliances for six years when it abandoned 
its program in September 1955. This was just two months 
after Hestinghouse's Electric Appliance Division announced
that it had set up a special fair trade enforcement com-
12mittee to put more weight behind its program. Apparently 
the Westinghouse management foresaw that considerable expense 
would be needed to effectively control its approximately 
500 distributors, who in turn sold merchandise to over 
100,000 dealers, when it abruptly changed its policy. The
l^Ibid.
M. Lee, op. cit. , 280. It must be noted 
that other factors may have played a role improving the 
sales performance for 1955.
l^ibid.. p. 277.
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company did not disclose its specific reasons for the
reversal of its opinion regarding fair trade. The company
simply announced: "We believe in fair trade, but under
13present conditions do not believe it workable." A year
later the company blamed the ineffectiveness of fair trade
on the fact that "No line is so well protected or policed
that any consumer who really shops around enough cannot buy
14all products of that line at less than fair trade prices."
By that time the company's records showed a 34 per cent in­
crease for the first seven months of 1956 appliance sales 
without fair trade over the sales of the same period in 
1955 with a fair trade program, despite a three month strike 
at the beginning of 1956.“  ̂ The company announced: "We
feel that after a fair trial this new policy has proven suc­
cessful and we do not intend to return to fair trade.
It reported that this new policy had created some resistance
• t.
of dealers which made it difficult for the Westinghouse
^^"Westinghouse Off Fair Trade," Business Week, 
September 3, 1955, p. 31.
^^"Westinghouse Decides to Continue Policy of 
Frowning on Fair Trade," Business Week, September 15, 1956, 
p. 131.
"Another Way to Skin a Cat," Fortune, 54 
(October 1956), p. 124.
^^Business Week, September 15, 1956, o£. cit., p.131.
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products to get its share of the market in some areas.
The favorable result of Westinghouse's new policy should 
at least partly be explained out of the fact that the other 
major portable appliance manufacturers stuck to their fair 
trade prices, which restricted the sale of their products 
through low-margin, high-volume dealers.
That company statements concerning the effective­
ness of a fair trade program cannot always be relied upon is 
clearly shown by the history of the W. A. Sheaffer Pen Com­
pany's fair trade policies. This company had been one of 
the strongest proponents of fair trade and had a resale 
price maintenance program before the enactment of fair trade 
laws.^^ In 1953 this company started a campaign for track­
ing down price cutters and carrying out legal proceedings
against them and repurchasing pens from discount houses, all
19at a cost in excess of $1 million. On an annual basis the 
enforcement costs were running as high as 4 per cent of the 
gross sales value, but with the result that in June 1955 the 
company could announce that its campaign had reduced price 
cutting of Sheaffer merchandise over the entire country to
l^Ibid.. p. 131.
M. Lee, pp. cit., 278.
19Advertising Age, December 12, 1955, pp. 1, 8.
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20a trickle. This was completely contradicted six months 
later when a company spokesman released: "We found that
Sheaffer merchandise still found its way into discount houses."
And this despite the vigorous and expensive enforcement cam-
21paign. There was no doubt concerning Sheaffer's decision
to abandon its fair trade program. In a news release, dated
December 2, 1955, the company announced:
The W. A. Sheaffer Company ... in order to serve 
an important segment of the buying public, particu­
larly in metropolitan areas, ... will add to its 
list of authorized dealers certain large volume 
retail outlets ... in fairness to all Sheaffer 
dealers, we are now permitting them to price out 
merchandise in accordance with their own local 2 ?economic conditions and competitive practices 
This statement contains a denial of at least three character­
istics of fair trade long preached by fair traders. First, 
the trademark protection by price fixing was suddenly not of 
any value to Sheaffer anymore, deflating considerably the 
alleged merits of fair trade to this effect. Neither gave 
the sales promotion loyalty of many small retailers to 
Sheaffer, by fair trading its products, the large market ex­
posure and sales volume normally attributed to accompany a
^°S. M. Lee, on. cit., 278,
21Advertising Age, December 12, 1955, pp. 1, 8.
M. Lee, o£. cit.. 278.
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fair trade pricing policy. And finally the statement 
acknowledges the existence of differences in local condi­
tions and competitive practices at the retail level, which 
should have its influence on the ultimate price to the con­
sumer. In relation to the last two points it is interesting 
to note that although some small dealers initially dropped 
the Sheaffer line after this company abandoned fair trade, 
the majority of them began to handle the Sheaffer line 
again in succeeding months when they found that the effect 
of the company's decision was not as dauaaging as they had 
believed it would be.^^ This cuts deeply into the fourth 
major argument for fair trade, namely that it is necessary 
for the very existence of small dealers.
The Eastman Kodak Company reversed a 19 year old
fair trade policy on December 31, 1956.^^ It cancelled its
2 5fair trade agreements with its retail dealers "reluctantly* 
but the legal defeats which fair trade by that time had 
suffered in 16 states made the arrangements impractical
^^Ibid.. p. 278.
Business Briefs," Business Week, January 5,
1957, p. 38.
Z^Eastman Concedes," Fortune, 55 (February 1957),
p. 94.
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2 6according to the company. To fair trade under those con­
ditions would create, in the company's opinion, unfair com­
petition with those dealers who were in the disadvantageous
position to he located in a state with effective fair trade
27legislation. Thus, without effective and complete monop­
olistic price control fair trade achieved just the opposite 
of what it was intended to achieve for the small dealer.
The Fortune editor added: "Eastman's sigh of regret merits 
a cheer from the still beleaguered c o n s u m e r . "^8 other giants 
in the photographic field followed. Bell & Howell Company 
terminated fair trade in February 195 7 and Revere Camera 
Company discontinued fair trade agreements in September 
1957.29
The use of fair trade provisions in the market­
ing policies of nationally advertised products experienced 
a considerable reduction when General Electric Company in 
March 1958 gave up its fair trade program. As Business Week 
reported: "... it let loose an avalanche ... In short order,
^^Business Week, January 5, 1957, op. cit., p. 38. 
^^Fortune, 55 (February 1957), pp. cit., p. 94. 
2®Ibid., p. 94.
M. Lee, op. cit., 280.
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Sunbeam, Toastmaster, Ronson, Schick, Royal McBee, Smith- 
Corona, and Waring Products abandoned fair trade on some 
products at l e a s t . "30 only b months earlier W. H. Sahloff, 
a vice president of the General Electric Company, had 
strongly defended the company's fair trade program cover­
ing small appliances as a reaction on the important legal
defeat the company suffered against Masters Mail Order 
31Company. According to this company official the policy 
would be continued as long as (1) no better system was 
available, (2) sufficient states had effective fair trade 
laws and (3) the great bulk of the company's dealers and 
distributors continued to support the company's price pol­
i c y .  ^2 Mr. Sahloff contended that fair trade was necessary 
in an industry which is based on mass exposure, mass dis­
tribution and mass advertising.^^ The General Electric 
Company also has held continually that price-cutting of its
Bargain Hunters Have a Heyday as GE Gives up
Fair Trade," Business week, March 8, 1958. p. 28.
General Electric Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co.,
supra, pp.
32"GE Announces It Will Continue Battling to En­
force Fair Trade," Business Week, June 29, 1957, p. 124.
^^Ibid.. p. 124.
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34fair trade prices injured the GE trademark and brand name. 
The economic soundness of those statements becomes highly 
doubtful when it is known that the General Electric Company 
in November 1954 decided to abandon factory-set retail 
prices on almost all of its major appliances. The stated 
reasons: Mass production requires (this time not fair 
trade, but) meeting competition! It was the discount house
which could give the manufacturer the chance to produce at
a large low-cost volume, according to General Electric Com­
pany. The elimination of fair trade prices on General 
Electric small appliances was also primarily caused by the 
activities of discount houses. The largest discounter 
Korvette, for instance, stated that "GE was losing sales at 
Korvette, but Korvette was not losing sales of electric 
appliances."
In the highly competitive metropolitan retail 
markets the chain reaction which General Electric Company 
precipitated by abandoning its small appliances' fair trade
34See for instance Cox et al v. General Electric
Co. 211 Ga. 286, 85 S. E. 2d 514 (1955).
^^"Who's Going to Set the Prices," Business Week, 
November 27, 1954, pp. 25-6.
3&S. M. Lee, op. cit., 275.
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program caused a short but heavy price war. In New York 
prices were cut in some cases over 40 per cent of the orig­
inal fair trade prices. In Philadelphia cuts up to 50 per
37cent were reported. This price war should be considered
Opas a sudden market adjustment. A gradually settling-down 
price war seems to have been also the pattern in states that 
had fair trade laws and then rendered them ineffective by a 
legal decision. Thus it is reported that in Cincinnati 
price cutting raged briefly after Ohio's nonsigner clause 
was declared unconstitutional in 1958. Some time later a 
retailer indicated that prices stabilized at prices approx­
imately 20 per cent below the previous fair trade price 
level,which might be a rough indication to what extent 
the fair trade price level was unrealistic and artificial 
in a competitive retail market area.
The Discount Revolution 
Discount houses and chain groceries have been the 
individual champions of the fight against the resale price
^^Business Week, March 8, 1958, pp. cit., p. 27. 
38see also Chapter IV, supra, pp.
^^Business Week, Maurch 8, 1958, pp. cit., p. 28.
239
fixing laws. The discount house is by no means a new 
thing in the business world nor should its development ex­
clusively be explained as a result of the fair trade struc­
ture. In 1934, for instance, the New York firm of L. and C.
Mayers celebrated already the completion of two decades of
41successful discount operation, while the New York dis­
counter Stephens Masters in 1958 remarked concerning the 
relationship between the existence of fair trade and dis­
count operations; "... the fair trade umbrella, which is 
supposed to have built up discount sales, has been a pretty 
skimpy object for some time n o w . "^2 The breath taking 
growth of the discount house and the great impact on cer­
tain sectors of the distributive system can be reviewed 
most usefully after a review of the basic economic functions 
of retailing in an age of mass distribution of branded goods 
as seen by the large manufacturers who set their fair 
trade policies accordingly. This economic philosophy is 
well expressed by Union Carbide & Carbon Company in
K. Bates, "Constitutionality of State Fair 
Trade Acts," Indiana Law Journal, 32 (1957), 130.
41R. S. Alexander and R. M. Hill, "What to do 
about the Discount House," Harvard Business Review, No. 1, 
33 (1955), 53.
42Business Week, March 8, 1958, op. cit., p. 28.
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defending its fair trade program on Prestone antifreeze.
The function of each retailer, under mass-market 
distribution, is to close the sale with the 
potential customers emd this function is impaired 
or destroyed unless large numbers of retailers 
throughout the nation cairry adequate stocks of 
Prestone, give it reasonëüale display, make it 
readily available on call and provide reasonable 
selling support for it. Under national mass- 
market distribution, the consumer does not rely 
upon the retailer but does rely upon the manu­
facturer and his reputation to test, research, 
package, and select ingredients and materials
for his product.43
The emphasis of this statement is on the number of re­
tailers and not on the efficiency of the retailer and the 
resulting higher benefits for the consumer. To provide a 
strong motivation for selling for all retailers and also to 
maximize the number of retail outlets that will handle the 
product, the manufacturer has to assure them a high profit 
margin so that even high-overhead dealers can sell the 
products a d v a n t a g e o u s l y . 44 This approach might even lead 
to a strange competition among manufacturers in which each 
vie for dealers' favor by offering larger and larger mark­
ups as is shown in the emphasis which manufacturers place
43Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Skaggs Drug 
Center. Inc., 359 P. 2d 644, at 655 (Mont. 1961).
44Kanter and Rosenblum, op. cit., 327.
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45on their retail margins in trade journal advertisements.
By marketing through a large number of small retailers the
manufacturer further minimizes the pressure that could be
asserted by a few large retailers to reduce the manufac-
46turer's price or to allow them other concessions. Effec­
tively maintained retail prices substitute advertising and 
other expensive forms of sales promotion for price compe­
tition at the retail level. The emphasis on a large number 
of retailers tends to decrease also the volume per re­
tailer. Those two factors result in the situation, which 
a fair trading manufacturer with highly organized retailers
especially has to face, in which the retailers are con-
47stantly pressing for higher margins.
That this high retail margin structure was bas­
ically initiated during the depressed situation of the 
1930's and earlier was due to the facts that in this period 
the per unit selling cost tended to be high because of low
45A survey of tne American Druggist, January-Jtine 
1951 Volume, produced an impressive amount of evidence to 
this effect. (G. R. Smith and H. C. Smith, Economic 
Appraisal of Resale Price Maintenance. New Orleans: Loyola 
University, 1957, pp. 69-70.)
cm ter and Rosenblum, op. cit., 351.
S. Bowman, Jr., "The Prerequisites and 
Effects of Resale Price Maintenance," University of Chi­
cago Law Review, 22 (1955), 848.
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volume and further because of the introduction of many new 
consumer goods for which a broad distribution could only 
be obtained if the retail margins were high enough to 
attract sufficient retail distributors.^® The fair trade 
structure and other administered pricing devices had fre­
quently the effect of freezing those margins at their high 
initial level. This process was considerably facilitated 
through the consumer goods shortage which developed since 
1940. "Price competition at all levels of the distribu­
tion system was thin and watered down, at times almost not
49existent." During and after the Second World War, how­
ever, with the return of sufficient consumer goods on the 
market, the arbitrary schemes of groups interested in re­
ducing price competition at the retail level crumbled de­
spite repeated legislative attempts to continue them,
48"Distribution: Straining to Move the Goods," 
Business Week, December 31, 1955, p. 43.
49Alexander and Hill, pp. cit., 56,
^^The fair trade structure has been compared with 
the merchant guild system which controlled the distribution 
of goods during the Middle Ages and which vanished under 
the pressure of the increased variety of goods and improved 
transportation broadening the market. (Smith and Smith, 
op. cit., pp. 91-2.)
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because Grether's generalization: "... any widespread 
scheme of price control oy arbitrary fiat is constantly 
sabotaged oy hidden and indirect methods of violation," 
was proven to be true under the buyers' market condition 
of the last decade.
Many manufacturers and most small retailers have 
always seen the discount houses as the biggest threat to 
resale price maintenance schemes to protect their market 
position. Legislative attempts were mainly aimed at de­
stroying tne retailing methods employed by those stores so 
that price stability would be a fact and the quietude of a 
less aggressive retailing situation and stable profits could 
be e n j o y e d . 52 The cause of the pricing troubles of fair 
trade minded retailers, however, must be sought deeper than 
just the existence of discount houses. Mr. Masters enum­
erates an impreaive list of relevant factors in this respect 
when he attributed the success of his discount house to 
the recognition of important structural changes such as;
... growth of national brand advertising, the ... 
growth of mass-produced consumer goods, the
C 1E. T. Grether, Price Control under Fair Tgde 
Legislation {New York: Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 54L
52"Tops For Fair Trade,” Fortune, 57 (April 1958),
p. 105.
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explosion in population, the migration to sub­
urbia, building of a million homes per year, the 
growth of outdoor cooking, the do-it-yourself 
movement, the growing demand for labor saving de­
vices in the home, the popularity of outdoor 
sports and tourism. We (Masters Co.) concluded 
that enough people were presold on national 
brands to know what they wanted, that they would 
come in to get what they wanted, to buy, not to 
be sold ...53
Rather than to consider the discount houses as 
the main trouble makers for resale price maintenance 
schemes, it seems more logical to see them as a conse­
quence of a basic change in the manufacturers' market ap­
paratus. Mass-selling in an age when volume production is 
the prime objective of a manufacturer became imperative.
This movement started in groceries with the development of
54the supermarkets. Most aggressive selling in this sit­
uation is conducted by the manufacturer instead of by the 
retailer. This took place through the manufacturers' ad­
vertising budgets which presold the consumers and left the
55consumer only to shop around for the most favorable price. 
That the manufacturer, by assuming many traditional retails:
53S. Masters, "Are We 'Illegitimate' or Unor­
thodox?" Vital Speeches of the Day, 23 (June 15, 1957), 541.
54Business Week, December 31, 1955, op. cit., p.
43.
55Fortune. 57 (April 1958), pp. cit., p. 106.
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functions, is hardly without responsibility for the growth 
of the discount house business and the consequent decline 
of the fair trade structure has been clearly indicated by 
Alexander and Hill. (1) Manufacturers' devices designed 
to stimulate sales by dealers, such as quantity discounts, 
quota systems to hold franchise, or deliberate overstocking 
of dealers, made the temptation for many dealers irresistible 
to dispose surplus stocks to price-cutting, low-margin 
houses. (2) Heavy advertising by manufacturers creates a 
degree of faith in his brand which makes it feasible for 
consumers to by-pass the small reliable retailer and buy 
the product through any outlet. (3) Manufacturers' guar­
antee programs took over the repair and guarantee services 
of small retailers, playing again into the hands of dis­
counters. (4) Enforcement of fair trade prices substan­
tially increased the effectiveness of discount house ad­
vertisements. (5) High guareinteed retail margins more 
liberal than circumstances justified, invited discounting.^^ 
The manufacturers' interest in the low-cost, 
limited-service dealers whose merchandising policies involve 
high turn-over and low mark-ups is easi^ explained. It is
^^Alexander and Hill, op. cit., 58-9.
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consistent with selling the most merchandise at the lowest 
possible cost, because dealers' competition forces the 
development of efficient merchandising methods, making for
lower retail prices and greater sales without reducing
57the per-unit returns to the manufacturers. This would 
also explain the not-more-than lipservice which manu­
facturers have given in the campaigns for the enacted and
C Qproposed resale price maintenance legislation.
Discount house price-cutting is by no means the 
only price-cutting and prooably is not even the most im­
portant manifestation of it. It is very possible that the 
sum total of the casual, individual allowances granted by
regular retailers exceeds that of all discounts granted by
59all the discount houses.
All those official acknowledgments from various 
economic groups of the price consciousness of the consumer, 
which the fair trade philosophy tried to deflate, substan­
tiate the remark of one authority concerning the proposed
^^Bowman, op. cit., 848-9.
SBchapter IV, supra, pp. 84-5; Chapter VII, supra.
pp. 210—6. -
S^Alexander and Hill, pp. cit., 54.
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resale price maintenance legislation of national coverage:
The federal bill would afford little ... protection 
... While vastly extending fair trade coverage, it 
would not provide the means to overcome present ob­
stacles to effective enforcement. 0̂
Resale Price Maintenance and the Consumer
Resale price maintenance schemes try to eliminate 
competition with that part of the sales dollar which repre­
sents distribution costs. With the increased importance of 
distribution this portion reaches in many instances 50 per 
cent or more.^^ With the discount house developments offer­
ing a wide choice of distribution services and corresponding 
charges highly appreciated by the c o n s u m e r , 62 the manu­
facturers' interests are becoming increasingly out of har­
mony with the anti-competitive objectives of any resale 
price maintenance scheme stabilizing the profit margins for 
all retailers. Just as much as manufacturers are the
60„,phe Enforcement of Resale Price Maintenance," 
Yale Law Journal. 59 (1959), 191.
G^Testimony of Professor C. E. Griffin. U. S. 
Congress, Senate. Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce. Hearing on S. 3850, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958, p. 59.
^^"Even if most customers prefer to buy their 
products with a rich admixture of services and a price jus­
tified by this service, it should still be the right of 
others to buy their products with a minimum of service and 
at a price consistent with the cost of selling that way." 
(Ibid.)
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producers of physical products, retailers are producers of 
the intangible distribution services. Fair trade advo­
cates competition among the former for the benefit ëuid 
protection of the consumer, however, it denies the com­
petitive benefits for the consumer on the retail level.
This denial appeared to be next to impossible during the 
last decade to be forced upon the retail distribution sys­
tem. Fair trade cam thus be seen as an attempt by strongly 
monopolistic manufacturers and organized retail orgamiza- 
tions to make the consumer their servant to guarantee the 
preservation of their vested interests. The developments 
of the last decade, however, indicate that the businesses 
which identify tnemselves with the wishes, ambitions and 
interests of the consumers and serve the "ultimate deter- 
minamts and beneficiaries" of the competitive free enter­
prise system accordingly, will receive the higher economic 
rewards. In wrongly evaluating the remaining strength of 
the consumer choice in our economic structure, the fair 
traders and their proponents fought a losing battle from 
the beginning, because :
The retailer is the buying agent of the con­
sumer. By his expert knowledge the retailer 
can save the consumer money. The consumer is 
boss. Overcharging the boss for more services
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thëui he wants, can't go on. By charging the min­
imum for efficiently provided services, the con­
sumer 's buying power is increased which will stim­
ulate the production of a greater diversity of 
goods. The opposite method would hurt the 
economy.
Professor Machlup has stated that: "If one wants a strong 
defense of so-called fair trade protection - resale price 
maintenance - on economic grounds, one must not turn to 
an honest e c o n o m i s t b u t  the honest economist will most 
likely happily underwrite the economic soundness of 
Mr. Lynn's business philosophy, as does the price conscious 
consumer by frequenting honestly and efficiently operated 
low-margin, limited-service retail institutions.
An estimate of the savings which the limited- 
service, large-volume operator can pass on to the consumer 
in comparison with the more conventional department store 
operations, might function as an indication of the impor­
tance of the discount house and adverse fair trade develop­
ments to the general public. In 1956 the total yearly vol­
ume of discount house sales was estimated at $ 750 million.
Business philosophy of Mr. Frank N. Lynn, Gen­
eral Manager, G. E. X. depsirtment store, Oklahoma City, 
Okla. Personal Interview, March 8, 1961.
64Prepared Statement of Professor Fritz Machlup. 
Hearings on S. 3850, op. cit., p. 63.
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while $ 25 billion was the estimate for merchandise sold 
at a discount p r i c e . T h e  gross margins on sales for 
discount houses that year ranged from 11.5 per cent to 
22.7 per cent. The department stores average was 36 per 
cent.^^ Making on the basis of these data the safe assump­
tion that the discount houses on the average had a gross
margin on sales of 20 per cent, a comparison can be made
between their operations and the operations of the tradi­
tional department stores. The discount house gross margin 
of 20 per cent of sales works out to a mark-up on cost of 
25 per cent.^7 The department stores' 36 per cent gross 
margin is identical to 56.25 per cent^^ mark-up on acquisi­
tion cost. Taking the [.discount house prices as the base, 
the consumer paid an average of 25 cents less for each 
dollar worth of merchandise^^ she bought in the average
Hard Sell Comes to the Discount House," Busi­
ness Week, October 13, 1956, p. 179.
^̂ Sraith and Smith, op. cit., p. 79.
^^Costprice is 80 per cent of salesprice, thus 
100/80 X 20 per cent = 25 per cent of cost.
GGcostprice is 64 per cent of salesprice, thus 
100/64 X 36 per cent = 56.25 per cent.
G^Discount house salesprices were 125 per cent 
of costprice, while department store prices were 156.25 per 
cent of the same base. Thus department store prices were 
100/125 X (156.25 - 125) = 25 per cent higher than discount 
house prices.
251
discount house instead of in the average department store.
For an estimated discount house sales volume of $ 750
million, the discount house saved the consumer $ 187.5
million if it is assumed that the consumer would have
bought the same quantity volume of merchandise without the
70existence of discount houses through department stores.
That the discount house policy was economically
sound and paid off handsomely for those benefactors of the
price-conscious consumer can be shown by conducting some
calculations on data reported in Fortune Magazine. It was
reported that the largest discount house, E. J. Korvette in
New York, with annual sales of around $ 70 million, had
overhead costs of 14.5 per cent of sales while this figure
was an average 33 per cent of sales for department stores.
Korvette's gross margin averaged 20 per cent of sales, the
department stores gross margin of sales average was 36 per 
71cent. This means that Korvette made a net profit of 5.5
72per cent of sales or $ 3.85 million on a sales volume of
^^25 per cent of $ 750 million. It is assumed in those compêirisons that the discount houses and the depart­
ment stores paid identical prices to the manufacturers or 
their wholesalers.
71"The Spectacular Rise of E. J. Korvette," 
Fortune, 54 (November 1956), p. 124.
72Gross margin 20 per cent minus overhead m^gin 
14.5 per cent.
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$ 70 million. The average department store would have sold 
the same volume of merchandise at 25 per cent higher prices?] 
than Korvette for a total of $ 87.5 million, while the net 
profit would have been only 3 per cent^^ of this sales vol­
ume which comes to a total profit of $ 2.525 million. Thus 
Korvette earned $ 1.225 million more on the same quantity 
of merchandise than the average department store would have, 
at the same time charging the consumer 25 per cent or a 
total of $ 17.5 million less than the average department 
store would have to maJce its lower profit.
In the light of this example it seems of great 
significance to leave the consumer free in choice whether 
he wants to patronize the conventional retail outlets or 
to take the less convenient route, thus eliminating some 
overhead charges and also cashing in on the greater effic­
iency of large volume discount houses. Any form of resale 
price maintSHnce on any portion of the total retail sales 
would reduce this valuable freedom of choice of varying 
amounts of retail services to the general public. That
73Supra, p. 250, notes 67-9.
?^Gross margin 36 per cent minus overhead 
margin 33 per cent.
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this freedom is appreciated has been evidenced by the great 
quantity of "dollar votes'* cast for (into) the discount 
houses. The ironic situation in the fair trade develop­
ments is, that this price maintenance legislation was 
passed by the representatives democratically elected, while 
the break-up of the legal fair trade structure was effec­
tuated by millions of individual dollar votes greatly 
assisted by many judicial authorities.
That for the principle proponents of fair trade -
the smaller, higher-overhead retailer - those developments
will mean destruction, should be doubted on the basis of
the experience in those states that never passed a fair
trade law. Although Schumpeter has defined progress as a
75process of creative destruction, the developments in fair 
trade and retailing over the last decade still leave to the 
small and/or conventional retailers the less-price-conscious 
and more-convenience-and-service-conscious consumer. Al­
though it might be a valid assumption that their share of 
the total retail volume was not as high during the last dec­
ade as it would have under an effective and widely used 
legal price maintenance umbrella.
^^As cited by Professor C. E. Griffin. Heaurings 
on S. 3850, pp. cit., p. 52.
CHAPTER IX
summary and conclusions
The fair trade developments during the last decade 
seem to warrant two encouraging conclusions. From them it 
might first be inferred that our mixed economic structure 
remains free and competitive enough to enable the cherished 
institution of private initiative to render restrictive le­
gislation ineffective, especially when its aim is to guar­
antee the status quo of the vested interests of certain busi­
ness groups without due regard for the interests of the 
general public. And secondly, that there were many judicial 
authorities and legislators able to interpret the real pur­
pose of fair trade statutes and their detrimental effects 
on the freedom of choice and economic interests of the con­
suming public. And this in spite of the many impressive 
terms and beneficial purposes attributed to resale price 
maintenance legislation by its proponents. The judges evi­
denced this by rejecting in strong or less strong terms the 
most important provisions of many fair trade laws or by
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refusing to give them any more than literal interpretation 
and application. For the legislators this is shown through 
the fact that they thus far prevented a reversal of the 
developments by obstructing the federal resale price mainte­
nance legislative proposals.
The legal fair trade structure is based on a weak­
ening of the Sherman Antitrust Act provisions through the 
exemption of fair trade practices from them as granted in 
the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Amendments. The same public 
sentiments which stimulated the political pressure for the 
passage of the Sherman Act, destroyed also the effectiveness 
of the fair trade exemption provisions: namely, the dis­
trust of the general public in the advisability of the dele­
gation of regulatory powers to private profit seeking enter­
prises. In the case of fair trade this was not expressed by 
legislative means but through the consumers' support of 
those businessmen who served their limited budgets most 
favorably by supplying a mixture of goods and services the 
consumers wanted and not what they would have been restricted 
to in this respect by fair trade legislation if this scheme 
had been able to achieve its goal more completely.
In the legal fair trade developments the most out­
standing phenomena is that during the last decade 21 highest
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State courts found fair trade provisions violative of the 
states' constitutional provisions safeguarding the basic 
American economic, legal and political philosophy. Those 
states, in combination with the 4 states that never chose 
to enact a fair trade act, represent exactly half of the 
states in the Union. The other half of the states either 
sustained their fair trade laws on the dubious trademark pro­
tection theory or have not rendered a decision as yet. The 
exact balance in the number of states taking opposite fair 
trade positions is closely related to two decisions of the 
U. S. Supreme Court. In 1936 this authority in the light of 
the then prevailing depressed economic conditions strongly 
defended fair trade provisions on the basis of trademark 
protection arguments and denied to recognize any objection­
able coercive characteristics in the scheme. In the con­
siderably more healthy economic situation of the year 1951 
the same court could not have expressed itself more strongly 
branding the heart of the fair trade structure as coercive 
and alien to the American legal emd economic traditions, it 
was this last decision that played such a devastating role 
in the break-up of the fair trade structure during the entire 
reviewed period, its influence could not be annihilated by 
the federal legislative attempt to this effect in the McGuire
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Amendment. Thus far the U. S. Supreme Court has not re­
viewed the constitutionality issue of this statute, but 
most courts refused to give its provisions any more than a 
very strict interpretation.
The majority of the most important legal fair trade 
issues arose in metropolitan areas in which a great variety 
of consumers is concentrated. It was here that the need and 
opportunity for varied retailing methods started to strain 
at the fair trade provisions which tried to deny the exist­
ence in differences in local conditions and competitive 
practices on the retail level. Pair trade provisions pre­
sumed all retailing operations homogeneous which proved to 
be too much of a contradiction of the vitality of the real 
situation.
Resale price maintenance provisions provided for 
by state legislation and federal enabling legislation ap­
peared to be vulnerable to diversified attacks. This became 
especially clear after the important legal decisions con­
cerning the operations of free state mail order vendors, 
which caused a series of important fair trade programs to 
be abandoned. Since then the groups interested in resale 
price maintenance are working for a federal statute.
The developments of the last decade had a signifi-
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cant educational effect on the general public and on many 
groups and authorities concerning the character and purposes 
of fair trade and similar schemes. The opposition to re­
sale price maintenance thus became more impressive ëuid ef­
fective in hearings on proposed federal resale price main­
tenance legislation in recent years than had existed in the 
period in which the fair trade structure originated.
Fair trade advocates have respectively justified 
the necessity of resale price maintenance (1) for the pro­
tection of manufacturers' trademarks. (2) to give small 
manufacturers a better fighting chance against the giants, 
and (3) for the very existence of the small retailer by 
eliminating the "law of the jungle" on the retail level.
None of those objectives have been factually substantiated 
in any general sense. Theoretically these objectives are in 
hopeless conflict with each other.
The activities and opinions of these businessmen 
who opposed fair trade were mainly inspired by their par­
ticular economic interests, but these happened to coincide 
with the interests of the price conscious consumer and did 
not conflict with the established and generally accepted 
philosophy of the competitive free enterprise system.
The developments of the last decade show that even
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if the legislatures want to go far in granting resale price 
maintenance provisions but not all the way^ the competitive 
forces are strong enough to negate the effectiveness of 
those attempts. The decline of the legal fair trade struc­
ture was achieved in a dynamically developing and adjusting 
economy through methods which simply cannot be characterized 
as "unfair" or "the law of the jungle" without denying the 
strength and benefits of our economic system.
Whether the competitive forces would be strong 
enough to render ineffective a well formulated federal re­
sale price maintenance statute cannot be answered on the 
basis of the experiences of the recent past. The question 
concerning the advisability or possibility of the enactment 
of a federal resale price maintenance statute, therefore, is 
not anymore an economic one, but exclusively an issue of 
political character.
The small retailer, notably the druggist, is the 
main proponent of resale price maintenance legislation. His 
effective trade organizations pressed successfully for the 
existing legal fair trade structure. The monopsonistic 
characteristics of those trade organizations in combination 
with the strongly monopolistic traits of their suppliers 
create the special situation which makes a resale price main­
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tenance scheme work profitably for both parties involved. 
That the retail volume sold under fair trade programs has 
never been estimated higher than 10 per cent of the total 
retail volume might function as an indication that these 
special circumstances are not characteristic for the larger 
part of the American distribution system. Resale price 
maintenance legislation thus serves specific rather than 
general business interests. The situation in which the 
specifically interested business group operates would re­
quire actions to increase price competition for the benefit 
of the general public rather than actions to reduce it.
The developments during the last decade prove 
that the legal fair trade structure was too weak to offer 
an effective method of resale price maintenance. The eco­
nomic reasoning used by the resale price maintenance pro­
ponents to justify their schemes should be interpreted as 
only a disguise for the common trait which John K. Galbraith 
has phrased so nicely:
The role of power in American life is a curious 
one. The privilege of controlling the actions 
or of affecting the income and property of other 
persons is something that no one of us can pro­
fess to seek or admit to possessing. Yet 
there is no indication that, as a people, we 
are adverse to power. On the contrary, few 
things are more valued, and more jealously 
guarded by their possessors, in our society.^
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The general public's interests in a diversified 
and flexible retailing system has been well guarded against 
the arbitrary power granted to private business groups in 
fair trade legislation by the flexibility, inventiveness and 
strength of the competitive system. Even the legislatures 
that were too obliging in trying to solve the aroused small 
retailers' problems created by price competition, were un­
able to cope with the strength of this cause.
Ijohn K. Galbraith, American Capitalism; The Con­
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